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ABSTRACT
 This dissertation focuses on a group of South American revolutionaries and the 
ways they shaped and challenged the precepts of the Age of Revolutions that rocked 
Latin America, Europe, and the Atlantic World in the early nineteenth century. 
Specifically, it investigates revolutionaries like Vicente Pazos Kanki, an indigenous 
journalist and diplomat, who traveled throughout South America, the United States, and 
Europe in an effort to form republican governments that brought together indigenous, 
African, and European citizens into multiethnic republics. I call these revolutionaries the 
chasquis of liberty. A chasqui was the rapid-traveling foot messenger of the Andean 
preconquest and colonial worlds. I use this metaphor to illustrate the ways revolutionaries 
connected disparate struggles for independence and made hemispheric republicanism a 
reality by forming alliances with other nation states’ luminaries, like the U.S. politician 
Henry Clay. More than simple messengers, the chasquis of liberty envisioned an 
inclusive republicanism that stood in contrast to other republics in the Atlantic World that 
defended slavery and racial exclusion. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
 
On the 9 February 1818, Vicente Pazos Kanki, an indigenous man from what is 
today Bolivia, stood before the Congress of the United States of America, readying a 
speech to promote South American liberty. After the congressmen took their seats, Pazos 
Kanki began recounting the things he had seen during his winding path from a small 
indigenous community in South America to his lectern in Washington, D.C.. He recalled 
spending years fighting alongside ardent defenders of “the cause of liberty and 
independence” in Alto Peru, he recounted the debates over republican ideals he had 
fought in the press culture of Buenos Aires, Argentina, he mentioned the time he served 
as a diplomat for the South American Republics in London, and he defended his actions 
as leader of a short-lived  project to wrest the provinces of Florida from Spain.1 It was 
this final independence project that brought Pazos Kanki to the U.S. capital and would 
dominate his speech. The U.S. government had forcefully repressed Pazos Kanki and the 
multi-ethnic revolutionaries, from South America, Europe, and Haiti, who had tried to 
liberate Florida, and Pazos Kanki, in response, came to the U.S. capital to offer his 
“exposition, remonstrance, and protest” to the national leaders of the U.S. On that 
                                                           
1 Vicente Pazos Kanki, The Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest of Don Vicente Pazos, 
commissioner on behalf of the republican agents established at Amelia Island, In Florida, 
under the authority and in behalf of the Independent States of South America, 
(Philadelphia, 1818). 
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February day, Pazos Kanki outlined an inclusive vision of citizenship and chided the U.S. 
legislatures for not following the political creed that all men were created equal.2 From 
his political pulpit in D.C., Pazos Kanki passionately defended the Amelia Island 
revolutionaries and outlined his vision for an independent Florida and America. Pazos 
Kanki explained to the Congress that he and his followers had attempted to emancipate 
Florida from Spain, starting with Amelia Island, in order to establish an example and 
“school, where the patriots would have been taught to imitate the heroic conduct” of 
other republics in the Atlantic World like those in the US and France.3 After the 
revolutionaries had taken Amelia Island by force in 1817, they organized elections and 
wrote a constitution. Pazos Kanki described the Amelia island republic, which, brought 
together people of indigenous, African, and European decent under the shared belief that 
the democratic and egalitarian precepts of the Age of Revolutions (1750-1850) applied to 
people of all backgrounds, with Pazos Kanki professing to US congressmen that 
“individuals of different origin, united under the same laws, form but one nation.”4 
Pazos Kanki offered a scathing critique of and challenge to the republicanism he 
saw in the United States. He started by asking U.S. officials if the project on Amelia 
                                                           
2 Vicente Pazos Kanki, The Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest of Don Vicente Pazos, 
commissioner on behalf of the republican agents established at Amelia Island, In Florida, 
under the authority and in behalf of the Independent States of South America, 
(Philadelphia, 1818). 
3 Vicente Pazos Kanki, The Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest of Don Vicente Pazos, 
commissioner on behalf of the republican agents established at Amelia Island, In Florida, 
under the authority and in behalf of the Independent States of South America, 
(Philadelphia, 1818). 
4 Vicente Pazos Kanki, The Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest of Don Vicente Pazos, 
commissioner on behalf of the republican agents established at Amelia Island, In Florida, 
under the authority and in behalf of the Independent States of South 
America,(Philadelphia, 1818). 
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Island and the U.S. did not embrace the same ideological principles—liberty, self-
determination, republicanism, and the equality of all men. Pazos Kanki continued 
inquiring why the national leaders of the U.S., a nation who, with the American 
Revolution in 1776, had helped to spark the Age of Revolution and inspired like-minded 
dreamers around the globe to pursue similar paths, would repress a similar project in 
Florida. He asked the elected officials  if “the interests of the New World seem to enjoin 
the union of all Americans” why had the U.S. prevented the liberation of Florida, boldly 
suggesting that the U.S. politicians feared “some political contagion spreading” into their 
territory.5 The United States, who was in the midst of its own debates about the future of 
slavery and extent of citizenship following the aftershocks of the Haitian Revolution, was 
not eager to have a multiethnic republic on its Southern border. At the cutting edge of 
republican thought, Pazos Kanki and the Amelia Island Republic challenged U.S. 
politicians blueprint of Independence—one that allowed slavery and republicanism to 
uneasily coexist.  
Pazos Kanki’s protest fell on deaf ears and the U.S. congressmen instead rejected 
his petition and began taking steps to purchase Florida from Spain, but the Amelia Island 
independence initiative and Pazos Kanki’s speech offer a keyhole glimpse into the 
evolving meaning of the Age of Revolution in the early nineteenth century. Similar to 
Pazos Kanki, other revolutionaries from what is today Bolivia traveled throughout the 
Americas promoting their vision for a Republican America that was defined by 
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commissioner on behalf of the republican agents established at Amelia Island, In Florida, 
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republicanism, multi-ethnic citizenship, and political independence, in effect, pushing the 
goals of independence processes well beyond the boundaries of comfort for 
contemporaries in Latin America, the United States, and broader Atlantic World. This 
dissertation investigates the writings of revolutionaries like Pazos Kanki, court cases 
involving the itinerant revolutionaries, and Spanish colonial records in order to identify 
their political ideology and their contributions to the Age of Revolutions which rocked 
the United States, Latin American, and the Atlantic World from 1750 to 1850. 
Beyond just messengers or isolated nationalists, Pazos Kanki and other 
revolutionaries like him outlined their own unique vision of liberty. These men served as 
the chasquis of liberty during the Age of Revolutions. A chasqui was the rapid-traveling 
foot messenger of the Andean pre-conquest and colonial worlds, connecting multiple 
nested communities. Pazos Kanki and his peers served a similar role by uniting disparate 
struggles for independence and facilitating the exchange of ideas that gave rise to 
republicanism in Bolivia and the broader Americas. They advocated for democracy 
throughout the Americas via their publications, speeches, and correspondence. Within 
Bolivia, the chasquis pushed for radical social change including the abolition of 
indigenous tribute and land reform for their region’s majority native population.6 During 
their travels, chasquis like Pazos Kanki chided U.S. politicians for not abolishing slavery, 
and challenged US Representatives to fulfill his nation’s discursive commitments to 
republican government and the equality of all men. The chasquis proposed an alternative 
                                                           
6 Andres Resendez, The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in 
America, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016); Enrique Tandeter, Coercion 
and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosi 1692-1826, (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1993). 
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and more egalitarian form of nationalism which criticized other nations that were defined 
by racial exclusion and protected the practice of slavery. The chasquis of liberty served as 
the vanguard of republican thought during the early 1800s, as their vision for an 
independent America continents  was defined by multi-ethnic republics that brought 
people of all backgrounds into a republican confederation.7 
Historical Literature 
This study of the chasquis of liberty intervenes in broad historiographical 
discussions on the Latin American independence era, the Age of Revolutions in the 
Atlantic World, and indigenous political history in the Americas. This dissertation offers 
contributions to these literatures by fore fronting the political actions of indigenous and 
African revolutionaries in the production and development of Republican thought. It flips 
U.S. and Latin American relations on its head, showing how Latin American thinkers 
grappled with and influenced political debates in North America and Europe. Finally, it 
connects two historiographical traditions that are rarely in dialogue—indigenous 
historiography and Age of Revolutions literature.  
Building off a nearly two-century-long discussion, this work grapples with Latin 
American independence and its broader meaning for the men and women who 
participated in the hemispheric struggle to sever ties with Spain and found new political 
collectives. Over the last two centuries, scholars have created a profound body of 
scholarship that outlines the military, political, social, and intellectual context for 
independence. They have helped uncover heroic and tragic tales of the independence era 
                                                           
7 James Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Creating Modernity, Nation, and 
Democracy in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2014). 
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and have helped to define the padres de la patria, or founding fathers, of their respective 
nations. In addition, these scholars have helped develop theories that cogently explain the 
causes and effects of the political transition from colony to independent republics and 
have opened up debates about the significance of independence.8   
Shortly after gaining independence from Spain, early historians throughout Latin 
America began crafting narratives which glorified the political and military campaigns by 
Latin Americans in their struggle to end Spanish colonialism. This generation of scholars 
typically employed political, military, or intellectual approaches to history, using a source 
base of political proclamations, constitutions, and declarations to glorify the success of 
the wars for independence that destroyed much of Spain’s three-century-long American 
empire. These early works, like Bartolome Mitre’s biography of Manual Belgrano, 
enshrined a group of political and military heros in the national pantheons of newly the 
newly formed republics of South America, championing men creoles revolutionaries, like 
Manual Belgrano and Manuel Ascnecio Padilla, as the padres de la patria.9  
For the Bolivian case, Gabriel Rene Moreno’s Ultimos dias coloniales en el Alto-
Peru is both paradigmatic of this first wave of literature, and yet Moreno’s magnum opus 
                                                           
8 Manuel Maria Urcullu, Apuntes para la historia de la Revolucion del Alto-Peru, (Sucre, 
1855); Bartolome Mitre, Historia de Belgrano y de la independencia Argentina, (Buenos 
Aires, 1857); Bartolome Mitre, Historia de San Martin y de la emancipacion 
sudamaericana (Buenos Aires, 1887); Charles Arnade, The Emergence of the Republic of 
Bolivia (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957); Jose Macedonio Urquidi, 
Bolivianas ilustres: Las guerilleras de la independencia, (La Paz, 1967); Jorge Siles 
Salinas, La indepednencia de Bolivia, (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992); Estanislao Just, Comienzo 
de la indepedencia en el Alto Peru: los sucesos de Chuquisaca, 1809 (Sucre: Editorial 
Judicial, 1994). 
9 Bartolome Mitre, Historia de Belgrano y de la independencia Argentina, (Buenos 
Aires, 1857); Bartolome Mitre, Historia de San Martin y de la emancipacion 
sudamaericana (Buenos Aires, 1887).  
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transcends most of his contemporary’s publications for his historical methodology and 
academic rigor. Rene Moreno’s work details the causes that spurred the lettered doctors 
and lawyers of Alto Peru to begin their break from Spain. The work tracks the political 
and intellectual origins of the Bolivian nation to Chuquisaca, as he suggested that 
Chuquisaca’s doctors and lawyers developed a line of argument that led to a demand for 
American self-determination: the Syllogism of Chuquisaca. In Moreno’s formation, the 
leading figures of Chuquisaca reasoned that the Americas were supposed to be the 
domains of the king of Spain, but since the King Ferdinand VII  was unable to reign due 
to the Napoleonic invasions in the Metropole, that Americans could then govern 
themselves. Moreno underscored the role of the elite as the primary political actors in the 
independence movement. Moreno’s thesis has inspired and challenged Bolivian 
historians to search for the intellectual origins of the Bolivian nation, leading to a debate 
on whether revolutions in Chuquisaca or La Paz have a better claim to the foundational 
moment of independence.10 
Moreno’s thesis, for all its sophistication, came under renewed inspection during 
the second historiographical wave on the Latin American independence wars. As the 150 
year anniversary of independence came, scholars returned to re-evaluate the meaning of 
political independence. The academy was then influenced by new methodologies that 
                                                           
10 Jorge Siles Salinas, La indepednencia de Bolivia, (Madrid: Mapfre, 1992); Estanislao 
Just, Comienzo de la indepedencia en el Alto Peru: los sucesos de Chuquisaca, 1809 
(Sucre: Editorial Judicial, 1994);  Jose Luis Roca, 1809: La revolucion en la Audiencia 
de Charcas en Chuquisaca y en La Paz (La Paz: Plural, 1998); José Luis Roca, Ni con 
Lima ni con Buenos Aires: la foramacion de un estado nacional en Charcas, (La Paz: 
Plural Editores, 2007); Javier Marion, “Indios Blancos: Nascent Polities and Social 
Convergence in Bolivia's Ayopaya Rebellion, 1814-1821," Colonial Latin American 
Historical Review, vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 2006).  
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eschewed older political and intellectual history and looked to social history—the study 
of popular classes—to understand the era. This wave helped to re-interpret independence 
in two ways: First, scholars revealed that women, indigenous, mulatto, and black 
revolutionaries participated in the independence era. For example, René Danilo Arze 
Aguirre’s Participación popular en la independencia de Bolivia inserted the popular 
classes into the grand political narratives of Bolivia, showing in hundreds of examples 
how the popular classes were also involved in the political debates of the era, and they 
were foundational to the creation of the Bolivian republic.11 In effect, this new wave of 
scholarship helped to start the process of expanding the historical discussion to include 
many groups—women, indigenous, and African—who were left out by the early histories 
of independence that defined politics narrowly.12  
In their second major contribution, this wave of scholars began to question the 
glorified accounts of the wars for independence, and they suggested that, for most people 
in Latin America, the wars for independence failed to live up to its many promises of 
liberty, equality, and democracy. Using social history approaches—court testimony, 
census data, letters, newspapers—scholars showed how many indigenous, mestizo, and 
Afro-Latin Americans, along with women, were excluded from citizenship and saw 
limited benefits in the new nations. For example, Sarah Chambers’ study of Arequipa, 
                                                           
11 René Danilo Arze Aguirre, Participación popular en la independencia de Bolivia, (La 
Paz: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1979). 
12 Jose Macedonio Urquidi, Bolivianas ilustres: Las guerilleras de la independencia (La 
Paz, 1967); René Danilo Arze Aguirre, Participación popular en la independencia de 
Bolivia (La Paz: Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1979); Tristán Platt, Estado 
Boliviano Y Ayllu Andino: Tierra Y Tributo En El Norte De Potosí (Lima: Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, 1982); Brooke Larson, Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and 
Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).   
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Peru revealed that many male, working-class Peruvians were able to claim a limited form 
of citizenship through appeals to the concept of honor, however, women were largely 
excluded from the benefits of citizenship.13 These scholars, like Chambers, read the trials 
of the mid-to-late nineteenth century back into the independence era and argued that the 
defining characteristic of the wars for independence was not revolutionary 
transformations, but remarkable continuities between the colonial and national periods of 
Latin American nation states.14  
Nearly all current scholarship has advanced the idea that indigenous and African 
communities fought over and shaped the political debates of the era, but scholars disagree 
over what indigenous communities desired politically. Many of the most current 
monographs suggest indigenous communities fought during the wars for independence 
but sided with the royalists, or fought for an Inca monarch, in order to continue gaining 
patronage from the crown.15 Another interpretation is that indigenous communities 
                                                           
13 Sarah Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, 
Peru 1780-1854, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). 
14 Sarah Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, 
Peru 1780-1854 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Mark 
Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial 
Nationmaking in Andean Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Nils Jacobsen, 
Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780-1930 (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1993); Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of 
Republican Peru, 1780-1840 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Brooke Larson, 
Trials of Nationmaking: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
15 Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 
1780-1840, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Tristan Platt, Estado Boliviano y 
Ayllu Adino : Tierra y tribute en el Norte de Potosi, (Lima: IEP, 1982); Sinclair 
Thomson, We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002); Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “Oppressed 
but not Defeated”: Peasant Struggles Among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-
1980, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1987); 
Hernando Armaza Perez del Castillo, Libertarse de Sus Propios Libertadores, (La Paz: 
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fought for local autonomy and their project was co-opted by creole leaders who formed 
modern nation states.16 I suggest that indigenous communities also mobilized for political 
independence with their own goals, motivations, and vision for the future. In contrast to 
much of the recent scholarship which suggests they wanted only local autonomy, I argue 
they had a much larger vision of an independent America. Their vision was one that 
reflected many of the tenants of the Age of Revolutions—an expansion of political 
voices, a movement towards an egalitarian society, and societies defined by constitutional 
representation—while also envisioning a place that contained elements of communal 
democracy with local leadership and political sovereignty. Their vision was loosely 
organized and affiliated with other regions and territories and resembled an inclusive and 
flexible federal governmental agreement.  
A second major aim of this dissertation is to contribute to a broader discussion on 
the political history of the Age of Revolutions through a foregrounding of indigenous and 
African-descended revolutionaries. In recent years, scholars began investigating political 
and intellectual connections between revolutionary movements in France, the United 
States, and in other locations in the Atlantic World. They noticed that these revolutions 
shared major tenants— including anti-monarch stances, republican ideals, and the use of 
                                                           
Plural Editores, 2014); Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson, Revolutionary Horizons, 
(New York: Verso, 2007). 
16 Eric Van Young, The Other Rebellion: Popular violence, Ideology, and the Mexican 
Struggle for Independence, 1810-1821 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Peter 
Guardino, “Connected Communities: Villagers and Wider Social Systems in the Late 
Colonial and Early National Periods,” in Paula Lopez Caballero and Ariadna Acevedo-
Rodrigo eds., Beyond Alterity: Destabilizing the Indigenous Other in Mexico (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2018); Marcela Echeverri, Indian and Slave Royalists in the 
Age of Revolution: Reform, Revolution, and Royalism in the Northern Andes, 1780-1825 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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egalitarian language—and scholars have suggested that we should study the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century as an era of revolutionary dialogue and exchange 
that often crossed political borders.17 These works have demonstrated how 
revolutionaries in the United States, Europe, and Latin America embraced similar 
precepts and began a dialogue on how to create a society that was more representative 
and better suited the social and political needs of citizens. By expanding their analytical 
scope beyond local or national politics, Age of Revolution scholars have shown 
transnational trends that made the era a period of social upheaval and political 
possibilities.18  
However, the existing scholarship has also privileged some revolutionary 
movements and excluded other regions and groups. Throughout the Age of Revolutions 
scholarship there is a trend of focusing on revolutions in the North Atlantic region and 
overlooking other revolutionary movements. The earliest works on the era, like Eric 
                                                           
17 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1973); Jane Landers, Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011); Julius S. Scott, The Common Wind: Afro-American 
Currents in the Age of the Haitian Revolution (New York: Verso, 2018); Caitlin Fitz, Our 
Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions, (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2016). Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967); Alan Taylor, American 
Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2016); Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American 
Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
18 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and 
Revolution, 1868-1898, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); James 
Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Creating Modernity, Nation, and 
Democracy in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2014); Ernesto Bassi, “The ‘Franklins of Colombia’: Immigration Schemes and 
Hemispheric Solidarity in the Making of a Civlised Colombian Nation,” Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 50 (November 2017). 
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Hobsbawm’s The Age of Revolutions,  focused on the influence of the United States’ 
Wars for Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789. In this formulation, 
the revolutionary thinkers in the US and France created republican precepts that were 
then exported and employed by other revolutionaries around the Atlantic World.19 This 
analysis, however, depicted a unidirectional diffusion of revolutionary thought and 
explained revolutions in Haiti, Mexico, and South America as imitations of early 
movements in the North Atlantic. Even the most recent literature continues to provide 
more information on the role of the United States in the struggle to create other 
revolutionary movements in the South America.20 
Recent scholars, myself included, challenge this diffusion model, and flip the 
North-to-South exchange on its head. Beginning with the Haitian Revolution, scholars 
argued that revolutionaries outside of Europe and North America created their own 
political thought and made original, and often radical, contributions to the Age of 
Revolutions.21 Like this most recent line of scholarship, this dissertation contends that 
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Latin Americans contributed original thought to the Age of Revolutions dialogue. 
Revolutionaries like Pazos Kanki did not dogmatically follow previous revolutionary 
thought  and often offered critiques of republics in the north Atlantic. In the early 
nineteenth century, South American revolutionaries were the most vocal proponents of 
the equality of mankind and were at the vanguard of political debates.  
My research on the chasquis of liberty outlines an indigenous vision for an 
independent America and more egalitarian version of nationalism defined by a loose 
republican confederation, and therefore my research intervenes in current discussions on 
indigenous political history. Early historians treated indigenous communities as apolitical 
agents that rarely got involved in the important political develops in history.22 If they 
included them in their grand political narratives, historians depicted indigenous men and 
women as mere cannon fodder or as revolutionaries of the stomach—rising up during 
food shortages only to return to their villages after their hunger pains were satisfied. They 
appeared fleetingly in the grand narratives , and their actions were always depicted as 
collective. This early scholarship overlooked multiple indigenous political initiatives and 
contributions, or left them out of historical accounts. 
Following Vine Deloria Jr’s call to move beyond a “cameo” theory of history, 
which simply inserted indigenous people as a colorful aside into a traditional political 
narrative, a revisionist wave of social and cultural historians used new theoretical 
concepts to emphasize the political consciousness of indigenous groups. To move beyond 
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this cameo model of indigenous history, scholars have studied whether indigenous 
communities developed alternative visions for their political future. They determined that 
indigenous communities that worked alongside creole revolutionaries were akin to 
manipulation and that indigenous groups were gulled into the hegemony of the creole 
elite and nationhood. Scholars, instead, focused their gaze on rural communities which 
had previously been depicted as apolitical and detached from long duree political 
events—revolutions, constitutional debates, and civil wars—and studied their political 
ideologies and consciousness and determined these groups were politically engaged and 
had their own, distinct agenda, which scholars began to detail with new analytic 
concepts.23 
Within US literature, scholars have employed the framework of tribal sovereignty 
to illustrate the political motivations of indigenous groups.24 In a manner similar to 
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trendswithin Latin American historiography, scholars have relied on the concept of 
community autonomy to show the importance of indigenous groups within political 
communities.25 This wave of scholarship has helped to advance the historiographical 
discussion, and their findings outlined the complexity of indigenous political thought, 
replacing the cameo theory of indigenous history with one that suggested that indigenous 
communities had their own political motivations that lay outside the political history of 
the individual nations. While the terminology differs in the two regions, both groups of 
scholars have largely confined indigenous political contributions locally within a tribe, 
ethnic group, or region.  In contrast, I argue that the chasquis of liberty had their own 
vision of an independent America that connected different ethnic, racial, and national 
groups in a common republican confederation that transcended a local setting. By placing 
indigenous political participation within a hemispheric frame, the contributions of 
indigenous communities during the Age of Revolutions comes into focus, as the chasquis 
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Aguirre, Participacion Popular en la Independencia de Bolivia, (La Paz: Organizacion 
de los Estados Americanos, 1979); Sinclair Thomson, We Alone Will Rule: Native 
Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2002); Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “Oppressed but not Defeated”: Peasant Struggles 
Among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980, (Geneva: United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, 1987); Hernando Armaza Perez del Castillo, 
Libertarse de Sus Propios Libertadores, (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2014); Forrest Hylton 
and Sinclair Thomson, Revolutionary Horizons, (New York: Verso, 2007). 
25 Rebecca J. Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba After Slavery, 
(Cambridge: Belknap University Press, 2005); Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: 
Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840, (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1999). 
 
16 
of liberty employed and deepened the meaning of liberal republicanism by implementing 
multiethnic republics during an era of limited citizenship.  
Indigenous men, like Pazos Kanki, envisioned a future that would bring the 
American hemisphere together in a loose republican confederation. The chasquis of 
liberty held alliances to local collectives—tribes and communities—and developed a 
broad republican consciousness. The chasquis of liberty fought for a republican nation 
state that addressed many of the platforms often depicted as central to a local indigenous 
agenda. The example of Pazos Kanki and other chasquis of liberty illustrate that 
indigenous revolutionaries contributed to the political debates of the nineteenth century 
by offering an innovative form of nationalism that transcended the usual geographical, 
racial, and social barriers that defined the Age of Revolutions. 
Methodology and Chapter Outline 
This dissertation begins and ends in what is today Bolivia, so in a sense, it is an 
origin story of the Bolivian nation, but along the way, the chapters take detours to Buenos 
Aires, Europe, and the United States to show the constellation of possibilities available 
during the Age of Revolutions. During the late colonial period, what is today Bolivia was 
known as Alto Peru, or Upper Peru. It corresponds roughly to the same geographical 
territory of Bolivia with the addition of the Atacama desert and access to the pacific 
coast. The Bolivian case also offers a different view of the Age of Revolutions. Bolivian 
independence has long been treated as a reluctant revolution that needed an outside 
liberator, Simon Bolivar, to gain political sovereignty. Before founding the Bolivian 
nation, the Chasquis of Liberty explored a number of different political possibilities—
reformed colonialism under Spanish rule, local republics, hemispheric republicanism, a 
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loose republican confederation that tied South America together, and a Peru-Bolivia 
confederation. I will show how revolutionaries from Alto Peru mobilized throughout the 
Americas to shape independence processes.  
 Each chapter of this dissertation uses biographies of revolutionaries, like Vicente 
Pazos Kanki, to guide the reader down various different roads and possibilities explored 
from 1780-1825. Although long considered shopworn, historians have rediscovered how 
to ask historical questions through biography, and this work follows in that tradition. 
Using this model, the dissertation avoids telescoping forward to independence, while also 
avoiding the tendency to upstream the trials of nation making of the early nineteenth 
century back into the independence wars themselves. It is only by an exploration of both 
the successful and failed routes to independence that scholars can study the Age of 
Revolutions and the significance of independence for Bolivians and find a new path out 
of either hagiographies of independence or dismissals of the era altogether.  
To achieve this goal, chapters employ different scales of observation—local, 
regional, national, and hemispheric—in order to understand the political consciousness 
and influence of South American revolutionaries in early nineteenth-century America.26 
Local, regional, and national political struggles can be understood only when studied 
together, so some chapters employ a “zoom lens” to hone in on a specific community, 
region, or person.27 In other chapters, I zoom out and look for hemispheric inspirations, 
connections, and goals. With this shift in magnification, I can provide micro-historical 
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detail without losing sight of the national and hemispheric contexts that help to frame the 
political contributions of the chasquis of liberty and indigenous communities more 
broadly. My approach complements a recent trend in indigenous studies literature to 
focus my analysis more transnationally.28 This methodological shift will help reveal 
connections between indigenous political movements, and it will link indigenous 
historiographical debates within larger debates about the Atlantic world.  
Chapter one, “These Opulent Provinces: A Political Cartography of Alto Peru, 
1778-1809,” follows the life of Jose Manuel de Goyeneche—a Spanish official sent from 
Spain to announce the Napoleonic invasion of Spain to South America—to describe the 
late colonial context of Alto Peru. This chapter utilizes a broad national and transnational 
scale to show broader influences that might have led to a movement for political 
independence. The Alto Peru that Goyeneche entered was an opulent society built on the 
exploitation of indigenous groups, but it also allowed numerous indigenous men and 
women to contribute politically and prepare themselves to demand revolutionary change. 
I begin with the Tupac Amaru II rebellion and outline how even though Tupac Amaru 
II’s movement was repressed, the goals outlined by the Great Andean rebellion persisted 
into the late colonial period, fostering a generation that was prepared to create 
revolutionary change in the Andes and beyond. 
Chapter two, “The Cry of Liberty: The May 25, 1809 Rebellion in Chuquisaca,” 
examines the social and political commentary of mulatto and indigenous rioters during an 
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urban rebellion on the night of May 25, 1809 in the South American city of Chuquisaca. 
This chapter zooms in on one particular urban rebellion to give micro-historical detail to 
the burgeoning independence movement. I employ a sensory history approach, with a 
particular focus on the aural soundscape of the riot, and I utilize the court testimony of 
Francisco “Quitacapas” Rios, a mulatto barber from La Paz, to understand the popular 
goals of subaltern actors who rebelled against Spanish authorities on May 25, 1809. I 
read the documents to hear the events of that evening, the cries, and the jeers, and the 
chants, and the demands of that evening. I instead argue that the popular classes, 
including urban indigenous communities called cholos, led this rebellion and offered a 
unique expression of the egalitarian and democratic ideals that defined the Age of 
Revolution. 
 Chapter three, “The Chasquis of Liberty: Revolutionary Messengers in the Alto 
Peruvian Wars for Independence,” explores the movement of a group of itinerant 
revolutionaries, like Pazos Kanki, who helped to unite multiple, nested communities in 
South America into an anticolonial, nationalist movement defined by representative 
democracy. The indigenous messengers made a nationalist movement possible and 
connected different ethnic groups (Aymara and Quechua) into one larger confederation. 
The chasquis defined the independence movement as one to found a Republican nation 
and avenge the Spanish conquest of the sixteenth century. Many of the documents they 
carried were written in indigenous languages, suggesting that they openly recruited 
indigenous communities and intended to make them part of their emerging nation.  
 Chapter four, “An Indigenous Vision of Liberty: Popular Ideology in the Alto 
Peruvian Wars for Independence, 1810-1817” zooms in on pro-independence enclaves in 
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Alto Peru and investigates the political ideology and goals of Aymara and Quechua 
groups in South America. I use case studies in Chayanta, Yampares, and Potosi to show 
that each community supported the independence movement and the efforts to create a 
South American nation. In contrast to other scholarship which suggests that indigenous 
communities retreated into a protective shell to retain their autonomy in their community, 
I argue that indigenous communities tried to unite most of South America into a 
Republican confederation that provided them a degree of sovereignty within a broader 
national movement. 
 In chapter five, “The Land of Liberty: Vicente Pazos Kanki and the Amelia Island 
Affair, 1817,” explores Vicente Pazos Kanki and how he attempted to export democracy 
throughout the Americas. I use the case study of Amelia Island where Pazos Kanki and a 
coalition of former slaves, French pirates, and Haitian soldiers tried to create a republican 
Florida that offered a critique of other nations that are defined by exclusionary 
nationalism and racism. This chapter connects indigenous movements in South America 
to broader debates of the Age of Revolutions. The chapter outlines the hemispheric nature 
of indigenous politics and argues that the actions of indigenous revolutionaries had a 
foundational impact on the history of the Americas, including forcing the US to 
symbolically intervene in the wars for independence of Latin America through the 
Monroe Doctrine.  
 In the conclusion, I explore the path that Alto Peru took to independence and the 
change brought by this transition from being a Spanish colony to a post-colonial republic. 
By using diplomatic records, newspapers, and diaries this chapter explores the changes 
and continuities of the revolutionary age by outlining the roles that the chasquis of liberty 
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took on in the new republican era for the Bolivian nation and in other new republics in 
the Americas. Even after the chasquis won political independence, they continued trying 
to better the new nations they had helped to form. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CARTOGRAPHY OF 
THE “OPULENT PROVINCES OF ALTO PERU,” 1779-1808 
 
In May 1808, the Spanish official Jose Manuel de Goyeneche traveled to South 
America to deliver the shocking news that Napoleon Bonaparte’s invading French armies 
forced Spain’s royal family from power. During the invasion, Napoleon made the 
Spanish king Carlos IV to abdicate the throne to his son Ferdinand VII in March 1808, 
and shortly thereafter, Ferdinand VII fled into exile in May 1808. Under Napoleonic rule, 
Joseph Bonaparte, the brother of Napoleon, assumed the Spanish throne and became 
Emperor of Spain’s American colonies. Instead of supporting a foreign king, some 
Spaniards began to organize their own governing bodies, called juntas. The largest and 
most power junta in Spain, housed in Sevilla and led by Conde de Floridablanca as its 
president, hoped that Goyeneche would be able to deliver the news of recent events and 
ease any concerns held by the American colonists. So, Goyeneche set off across the 
Atlantic in the summer of 1808 to inform the American colonists that Supreme Central 
Junta of Sevilla would rule the Spanish empire until Ferdinand VII returned to Madrid 
and rightfully re-claimed the Spanish throne.29  
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Goyeneche arrived in the Americas in August of 1808 and “as soon as [he] set 
foot on the shores of Rio de la Plata, [he] began publishing the first notices that 
Ferdinand VII remained alive and the Spanish monarchy endured.”30 Goyeneche first 
traveled to Montevideo and Buenos Aires, and shortly thereafter, made plans to travel 
into the heart of South America to the provinces of Alto Peru, or modern day Bolivia. 
Despite hoping to calm any fears and rumors about the crisis in the metropole, 
Goyeneche and the news he brought with him in November 1808, sent shock waves 
around Alto Peru. Upon hearing that the Spanish royal family had been forced from 
power, Americans began to revisit, through gossip and rumor as well as their own local 
juntas, their political futures.31 
Despite being born in Arequipa, Peru, Goyeneche had resided most of his life in 
Spain and was little more than a knowledgeable outsider when he arrived to Alto Peru. In 
Spain, Goyeneche attended school and established himself as a successful military leader, 
but this European lifestyle and training left him ill-informed on Alto Peru’s social and 
political climate. He had heard tales of Alto Peru’s riches; the area was renowned as a 
silver-producing region of the new world and included one of the world’s most profitable 
silver mines in the colonial city of Potosi.32 These precious metals enriched the Spanish 
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crown and the cities of Alto Peru. Goyeneche saw this wealth during his tour of what he 
called “these opulent provinces of Alto Peru;” however, the provinces’ gilded 
magnificence belied a region riddled with social turmoil.33 
Hidden beneath Alto Peru’s lavish veneer was a complex social hierarchy built on 
inequality and human exploitation. Numerous Spaniards and creoles—or people of 
Spanish decent born in the Americas—benefitted economically from the region’s silver 
production; however, Spain’s recent Bourbon reforms had further concentrated wealth 
and power in the hands of a select group of government-appointed Spaniards. Alto Peru’s 
indigenous majority, who formed the bulk of the laboring class, remained political, 
social, and economic subordinates to the Spanish mine and hacienda owners. Further 
exacerbating their subordination, the indigenous majority recently lost some of their 
access to traditional forms of political representation through indigenous leadership. As 
the crown’s reforms modernized the empire, they also worsened existing social 
inequalities. The provinces of Alto Peru, despite their opulence, were on the brink of a 
crisis as significant as the one in Europe.  
As Goyeneche traveled through Alto Peru, he began to learn about the social and 
political cartography of the provinces; this chapter provides a similar description of what 
Goyeneche may have learned on his journey. The chapter begins with a survey of Alto 
Peru, including a discussion of the Tupac Amaru II and Tupac Katari rebellions, their 
long-term consequences, and how these rebellions affected a new generation of Alto 
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Peruvians in the early nineteenth century.  The Alto Peru Goyeneche entered in 1808 was 
deeply exploitative, dynamic, and quickly evolving. Despite having all the pre-conditions 
for an anti-colonial movement, Alto Peru stayed in an anxious peace during most of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Indigenous communities were able to 
develop local leaders and shaped the late colonial period through legal channels within 
the Spanish colonial system. Resistance remained localized and was easily contained by 
the Spanish due in part to the flexibility within the colonial model but also because of the 
social diversity within the province. However, there were growing debates and 
disagreements about the best ways to right Alto Peru. The Spanish colonial regime was 
on a shaky foundation, pieced together through negotiation between indigenous 
communities and Spanish officials, and the arrival of news of the Napoleonic invasion 
made Alto Peru a fertile ground for revolutionary ideas to take hold in the mountains and 
valleys of the eastern Andes.  
 
Alto Peru’s Social and Political Landscape, 1780-1808 
As Goyeneche arrived in Chuquisaca in November 1808, he realized how 
unfamiliar he was with the area.34 He began “to examine the customs, the interests, and 
the opinions of all the cities on his transit.”35 Goyeneche fixed his attention particularly 
on the ecclesiastic community given their education and close relationship with parish 
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priests throughout the territory. He believed that these religious figures had great access 
to their followers “through the pulpit and the confessional to calculate the inclinations of 
these inhabitants.”36 He hoped that through these examinations he would be able to mine 
the priest’s cultural knowledge, in order to understand “the vices and…the dominant 
passions of the country.”37 Goyeneche presumably learned that Alto Peru was a complex 
amalgam of environments, communities, labor systems, and government arrangements. 
By this point, Alto Peru was nearing its third century as a Spanish colony, one which had 
produced both great wealth and mounting troubles: a struggling economy, unpopular 
reforms, a divided society, and a history of indigenous rebellions. Through his travels and 
discussions, Goyeneche quickly learned about the opulent provinces he would now be in 
charge of during the Napoleonic crisis.  
Although he traveled through most of Spanish South American, Goyeneche 
prioritized Alto Peru because of its profitability and its potential for unrest. The Province 
of Alto Peru, sometimes called Charcas, sat nestled between the Viceroyalty of Peru and 
the Viceroyalty of La Plata and was divided into thirteen corregimientos, or districts. 
This area included numerous urban centers like the mining cities of Potosi and Oruro, and 
the commercial hubs of La Paz, Chuquisaca (also called the city of La Plata), and 
Cochabamba. Outside these urban centers, lay vast areas without much development. 
Antonio de Alcedo, renowned Spanish geographer of the Americas, noted that “in many 
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parts [Alto Peru] is lightly populated, and has extensive deserts that break up the 
region.”38 The region had all the imaginable extremes of geography, including what 
Alcedo described as “harsh and impenetrable mountains,” a vast, high-altitude plains 
called the altiplano, and numerous valleys and lowlands that provided a temperate 
reprieve from the “extremely cold” highlands.39 Goyeneche somehow passed the 
impenetrable mountains and cold drafts of Alto Peru and made it to Chuquisaca. 
                                                           
38 Antonio de Alcedo, Diccionario Geográfico-Histórico De Las Indias Occidentales Ó 
América: Es Á Saber: De Los Reynos Del Perú, Nueva España, Tierra Firme, Chile, Y 
Nuevo Reyno De Granada. (Madrid: En la impr. de B. Cano, 1786), 777. 
39 Antonio de Alcedo, Diccionario Geográfico-Histórico De Las Indias Occidentales Ó 
América. 777 
 
28 
 
 
 The vast majority of Alto Peru’s population was of indigenous descent in the late 
eighteenth century; however, there was little cultural or social homogeneity within this 
casta, or colonial racial category. Multiple, nested, indigenous communities lived in Alto 
Peru with their own histories and cultures, including the Aymara, Quechua, and Guarani 
groups. Indigenous society was further divided into those who remained part of their 
traditional ethnic unit, the ayllu, and those that had left their ethnic clan, who were called 
either a forestero or yanacona. Indigenous men or women of the latter group moved to 
Figure 2.1 "Demonstración Geográfica de las Provincias que abraza cada 
Yntendencia de las establecidas en la parte del Perú desde Salta, pertenecientes a el 
Virreynato del Río de la Plata,"Archivo General de Indias 1783 
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urban environments in Alto Peru and was often labeled cholos—or hispanized, urban 
indigenous or mestizo citizens. For example, Mathias de Tal, an indigenous man of 
uncertain community origin, traveled from La Paz, to Potosi and then, to Chuquisaca in 
1809 without a permanent living situation.40 These communities frustrated Spanish 
officials who neatly mapped indigeneity onto the Andean country side and Europeanness 
on the Andean cities—a cartography that was not based in reality. 
 The indigenous men and women who left their community often found ways to 
rise up to a modest position within the hierarchy of the late colonial period. Indigenous 
men and women were essential to the labor market of urban centers, like Potosi, La Paz, 
and Chuquisaca, and often were able to open their own market stalls, chicheras, or stores. 
Other members of these forestero communities had opportunities in education and trained 
to be members of the clergy or became scribes who held the language abilities to translate 
indigenous languages into Spanish. For example, Vicente Pazos Kanki, an indigenous 
man from Larecaja, Bolivia, was sent to Cusco to learn Spanish and train to be a member 
of the Spanish clergy until he decided to abandon that path once the wars for 
independence broke out in the region.41 Within these urban communities, there were 
examples that blurred the imagined social hierarchy of Alto Peru. 
Despite the social and ecological challenges of living in Alto Peru, indigenous 
civilizations had long found unique ways to thrive in the Alto Peruvian environment with 
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its multiple ecological niches. Relying on a system of vertical archipelagos, societies 
dating back to the ancient Inca civilization had made the mountains and valleys of Alto 
Peru their home.42 Key to the continuation of life in this difficult terrain was the ability of 
men and women to claim lands in multiple altitudes and live in a sort of “double 
domicile” living arrangement.43 At times, this caused land disputes among communities 
that claimed multiple locations at once, like the indigenous communities of Tinguipaya 
who sent their community leaders, Dionisio Saavedra and Bartolome Choque, to colonial 
courts to reclaim their lands. In their petition, they asked the courts “to return the lands of 
Yanani,” to their community.44 Communities, like the one in Tinguipaya, moved and 
traded across these ecological zones to feed and clothe their communities and it was 
essential that they had access to both sets of land. Adapting to the Andean environment, 
men and women formed highly mobile communities capable of envisioning a collective 
identity that was both bound to certain lands and transcended local environments.45 
Indigenous groups made up the vast majority of the working class and were 
largely marginalized from social and political power except for a small elite group of 
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indigenous community leaders called caciques or kurakas. These community leaders 
were essential to Spanish control in the Andes and were responsible for labor 
mobilization and local governance. Caciques could also serve as a buffer against 
community exploitation and often helped control the pace and amount of forced labor 
that indigenous communities faced. Caciques made it possible for the Spanish to mobilize 
thousands of indigenous men to work in the forced labor system of the mita, where 
indigenous men and women worked in the silver mines of Alto Peru. The mita labor draft 
had made Alto Peru one of the most profitable of their colonies in the Americas for 
centuries, but the mines were beginning to yield fewer profits by the late eighteenth 
century, in part because caciques had learned the colonial legal system well enough to 
reduce their communities’ labor requirements.46  By the eighteenth century the mita at 
Potosi was a complex economic system that creatively combined forced and wage labor 
in order to extract silver from the mines Potosi and process it with highly poisonous 
mercury from the neighboring community of Huancavelica. Although the mita was not 
equivalent to chattel slavery, many now consider it another form of slavery.47 Goyeneche 
learned that he must keep relations with kurakas to keep Alto Peru’s economy from 
tarnishing.   
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 When the Spanish conquered the Inca in the sixteenth century, they set up 
administrative and political units called viceroyalties to govern the Americas and ensure 
that the large indigenous populations worked to enrich the Spanish metropole. 
Historically, Alto Peru had been part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but in 1776 the Spanish 
crown created the Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata, and Alto Peru was placed in this new 
colonial region. The new viceroyalty was meant to direct communication, trade, and 
administration goals towards Buenos Aires instead of Lima with the hope of reducing 
contraband trade, increasing royal revenue on precious metals, and improving Spanish 
control on a region that had increasingly become less economically productive in the 
eighteenth century. However, divorcing Alto Peru from the viceroyalty of Peru proved 
neither easy nor quick. Much of Alto Peru had been part of Tawantinsuyu, the official 
name of the Inca empire that spread across Peru and Alto Peru, and many Alto Peruvian’s 
into the late eighteenth century felt that there was still a degree of cultural continuity 
between Alto Peru and Peru.48 
The creation of the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires was just one of a series of 
changes to colonial administration known as the Bourbon Reforms, which tried to 
profoundly reshape the social and political landscape of the Spanish colonies. The 
Spanish crown hoped to curb its decline in Europe by making the American colonies 
more profitable again and increasing its absolute control over the empire. So, in 1767 the 
Spanish expelled the Jesuit order, which they saw as a threat to their power and wealth. It 
created the new position of Intendent to replace the former local government position of 
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Corregidor. This new position of Intendent was reserved for Spanish citizens born in 
Spain and thus took power and influence from many creole men. Most importantly, the 
crown increased taxation, more efficiently collected taxes, and continued to enforce the 
Reparto de Mercancias or a forced distribution of goods to indigenous communities.  
Collectively, the Bourbon Reforms increased Spanish control over Alto Peru but 
at the expense of many of the traditional incentives that had helped creole and indigenous 
communities. Over the three centuries of Spanish colonialism, creoles had established 
themselves at the top of the Alto Peruvian society. Many had large plantations, or 
haciendas, that exploited indigenous labor; Others held important positions within the 
Spanish government like the local cabildos or corregidors, or were owners of Alto 
Peruvian mines. The Bourbon Reforms effectively placed peninsulares in the uppermost 
positions in society and pushed creoles out of the most prestigious power positions. This 
angered many creoles, like a lawyer from Alto Peru named Mariano Alejo Alvarez, who 
argued in a speech that “americanos should have preference for American jobs.”49 Alto 
Peruvian creoles accustomed to a privileged position in society now had to answer to 
their fellow Spaniards. This caused great frustration within the creole communities who 
increasingly denied the same profits as they had reaped historically.   
While creoles saw a moderate decrease in their quality of life, indigenous and the 
small but growing African societies of Alto Peru experienced the full effect of the 
Bourbon Reforms. Throughout the Spanish colonial period, indigenous men and women 
had discovered creative ways to adapt to an exploitative mercantile system. Kurakas 
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often served as cultural mediators between the Spanish colonial state and their indigenous 
ayllus. Kurakas were figuratively between two worlds of the Spanish and the indigenous. 
They had to mobilize indigenous labor for the mita and opened their society to Spanish 
labor demands, but they also tried to uphold their traditional community’s demands of 
reciprocity by shielding indigenous communities from the full brunt of labor exploitation. 
When Spanish labor demands became too excessive, many indigenous men went to the 
Spanish courts and petitioned the crown to give their communities concessions for their 
loyalty and labor. These strategies allowed indigenous societies to help shape a colonial 
labor system that was at least livable for the indigenous majority. However, the Bourbon 
Reforms and their goal of increasing revenue and control upset this delicate equilibrium 
and put kurakas in a difficult position.50 
With this increased Spanish control, kurakas found it impossible to balance the 
competing goals of the Spanish and their indigenous communities. As Spanish demand 
for labor and control increased, unrest within the indigenous community grew. 
Indigenous communities, who were frustrated by their kurakas’ inability to balance the 
competing goals of their job, put pressure on their traditional leaders to find new 
solutions to their community’s problems. This “Crisis of the Cacicazo” played out 
uniquely in different parts of the Andes as some leaders were more adept at navigating 
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the dual demands of their community and the Spanish colonial world.51 However, the 
increased exploitation from the Bourbon Reforms and the crisis of traditional indigenous 
authority erupted in the 1780’s into the biggest anti-colonial rebellion the Spanish had 
faced since the 1500s.  
 In three distinct Andean theatres, La Paz, Chayanta, and Cuzco, indigenous 
groups rose up to challenge local Spanish authority and demanded a reformed 
colonialism that better suited their communities’ needs. In the Cuzco area, Jose Gabriel 
Condorcanqui, an indigenous Kuraka from Tinta, took the name of the last ruler of the 
Neo-Inca Resistance movement of the 1500’s, Tupac Amaru, and led a multi-ethnic 
rebellion that initially brought together indigenous and Spanish Peruvians. The Tupac 
Amaru II rebellion engulfed colonial Peru and called for an end to the Mita, an abolition 
of slavery, and an end to the Reparto de Mercancias.52 Condorcanqui’s movement 
resonated with a broad cross-section of Andean society as it addressed many of the 
concerns of the region, and it used a powerful regional symbol, the Incas. The Inca were 
a revered pre-conquest society that had been idealized in post-conquest literature. 
Authors as varied as Garcilaso de la Vega and Voltaire had written romantic depictions of 
a utopian Inca empire free from strife. While idealized, this image of a utopian Inca 
society was widespread in the Andes and was an important symbol used by both Indian 
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and non-indian reformist ideological movements.53These works that promoted and equal 
society were attractive to a broad cross section of Andean society. 
In Alto Peru, a pair of related rebellions took place with slightly different goals 
but with similar causes as the Tupac Amaru II rebellion. In the Chayanta region, Tomas 
Katari, an indigenous cacique, helped to tie together multiple ayllus in the area around 
Potosi to fight against exploitation by unscrupulous kurakas and Spaniards to defend their 
communities’ traditional rights. Similarly, in the La Paz region of Alto Peru Tupac Katari 
helped to lead his mostly Aymara region into rebellion against exploitation in their 
community. The Tupac Katari rebellion ousted many kurakas who had not upheld their 
communities’ demands of reciprocity and attempted to give more political power to the 
common members of the ayllus. In all three rebellions, indigenous groups tried to ensure 
that Spain addressed their political demands and that indigenous communities had more 
access to self-representation.54  
Despite the widespread uprisings, these movements were not able to unify 
Andean communities into an anti-colonial movement. In each of the centers of rebellion, 
Chayanta, Cuzco, and La Paz, indigenous communities had slightly different goals and 
the different movements struggled to disseminate a message that could unify all corners 
of the region. To complicate matters, there were significant numbers of Andeans, both 
indigenous and non-indigenous, who actively fought against the proto-nationalist 
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movements of Tupac Amaru II and the Kataris. In the Cuzco region, many of the families 
with claims to a direct lineage to Inca royalty opposed Tupac Amaru II and considered 
him an illegitimate heir to the Inca title.55  
Resistance to the anti-colonial movements of the 1780’s were widespread, and in 
other parts of Alto Peru indigenous communities mobilized to protect the colonies from 
the Andean insurrections. In the Yamparez region of Alto Peru some indigenous leaders 
helped to organize local militias of indigenous men to put down the rebellions which 
shook the region. In the town of Yotala, both the cacique and governor of the region were 
even awarded a medal with “the royal bust” and an inscription an “award of loyalty” for 
his support during the rebellions.56 Ultimately, the Age of Andean insurrection was put 
down by Spanish forces. Its failure resided in the rebellions disjointed nature and the 
diversity of movements within the era. Tupac Amaru II and the other leaders of the 
rebellion revealed the fissures in Alto Peruvian society, but they did not have an 
infrastructure set up to unite an eclectic and diverse region. Many Alto Peruvians rallied 
behind Inca imagery and a platform of colonial reform, but that alone was not enough to 
hold together the movements.  
When Goyeneche met with local priest to learn the inclinations of Alto Peruvians, 
he would have learned about these events that dominated Alto Peru in the 1780s and still 
cast a shadow over the landscape in 1808. This divided society was still recovering from 
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the great Andean rebellions, and they tinged the world Goyeneche entered. Goyeneche’s 
goal was to keep Alto Peru in an organized state that would allow the colonial political 
and economic system to remain functioning even without the Spanish sovereign in 
power. He knew if he failed another era of Andean rebellion might erupt, one that he 
would be charged with containing.  
Reform or Reconquest: Responses to Tupac Amaru II 
 Of his many Alto Peruvian informants, Goyeneche grew especially close to 
Doctor Mariano Rodríguez de Olmedo, an honorary religious canon in Chuquisaca. 
Rodríguez de Olmedo was a creole from the city of Arequipa, and a reportedly a 
“descendent of an illustrious father and a very distinguished family.”57  Relying on 
Olmedo’s council, Goyeneche soon became more familiar with the deep turmoil Alto 
Peru faced at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indigenous groups were still 
reeling from the rebellions of the 1780s and their traditional authority figures and social 
norms of reciprocity were in crisis even when Goyeneche arrived. The economy, which 
relied heavily on silver production from Potosi, was struggling to keep up with the 
growing Spanish demand, and creoles and peninsulares were constantly fighting over 
access to cheap indigenous labor. With these issues in mind, Alto Peruvians began to 
reassess  different ways to restore Alto Peru to its former riches, developing into two 
different paths at ordering Alto Peru: one that tried to rule Alto Peru with a strong hand 
and another that tried to introduce reform and a liberalizing element into society. Colonial 
officials began implementing these two sets of policies in contradictory ways, leaving the 
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men and women of Alto Peru unsatisfied with an inefficient colonial system that 
struggled to address the needs of Spanish subjects.  
After the Spanish quelled the Great Andean rebellions, colonial officials began to 
re-assert their control over the region by first pursuing a policy of reconquest.  Spanish 
officials brutally executed Tupac Amaru II and other leaders of the rebellions in public 
executions and displayed their bodies in plazas throughout the Andes to ensure that 
indigenous communities would not consider revolting again in the near future. Other 
kurakas were similarly punished for their suspected support of the rebellions. Along with 
these displays of ritualized violence, the Spanish implemented a series of laws to 
depressurize the region. The Spanish burned subversive material especially those related 
to the ancient Incas which had been an effective symbol used by Tupac Amaru II to tie 
together his rebellion. Following the rebellions, the Spanish increased mita demands in 
what became known as the “new Mita” and even considered ending the position of the 
cacique/kuraka. These physical and cultural assaults on Andean communities following 
the rebellions were designed to be a “second conquest” of indigenous society.58 
A common feature the Spanish used in their second conquest was to replace 
traditional community leaders with ones that they assumed would better defend colonial 
security and Spanish economic interests. In the Province of Puno, along the north-eastern 
part of Alto Peru, the Spanish employed this strategy and “removed the Indian Manuel 
Guagua Condori from the position of cacique.” The Spanish “replaced [Guagua Condori] 
with Don Tomas Mango Turpo, who had accredited his loyalty” to the Spanish during the 
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Tupac Amaru II rebellion.59  With the intention of adding more colonial stability to 
Spanish colonialism in the Andes, the policy actually disrupted local politics in Puno.60  
Replacing Guagua Condori from his official position did not diminish the former 
cacique’s leadership in the town of Asillo and it ultimately resulted in a series of tumults 
in the early 1790s. Following his removal from the position of cacique, Guagua Condori 
continued to petition the Spanish courts on behalf of his community. Guagua Condori 
went to local Spanish officials, the Governor Intendent of Puno and later before the high 
court of Cuzco, to report “some excesses made by Don Tomas Mango and other 
Caciques.” Among other things, Guagua Condori claimed that the new Caciques, who 
had replaced him were “concealing tributaries” for their personal use, and Guagua 
Condori revealed that many community members were having to deal with “poor 
treatment” at the hands of Tomas Mango.61 In these protests, Guagua Condori hoped to 
be re-inserted into his previous position of power in Asillo. Two other indigenous men, 
Andres Chanca and Tomas Guzman, supported Guagua Condori’s claims to power, and 
they “called on various followers to expel [the current caciques] from their town.” Upon 
hearing of this disturbance, the local Intendent captured Tomas Guzman, Andres Chanca, 
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and Guagua Condori.62 These arrests threw the Province of Puno into full blown turmoil, 
that would have reminded officials of the Great Andean rebellions.  
Colonial officials, however, were able to calm the area by sending an influx of 
troops. Following the arrival of “a garrison of troops from La Paz” the Puno returned to a 
state of reported “tranquility.”63 But the episode set off a series of condemnations by the 
viceroy of Peru, Francisco Gil de Taboada, concerning indigenous communities of Puno. 
The viceroy claimed that “the continuation of forced labor drafts” in Puno was the cause 
of the “unfortunate occurrences” in the area, and he felt that these types of tumults would 
“always result from the practice of such a violent commerce.”64 Despite the laments of 
Peru’s viceroy, forced labor and military repression continued to be important tools to 
ensuring that indigenous unrest did not grow into a widespread movement against 
Spanish colonialism.  
Despite these methods of control, Thomas Guzman, Andres Chanca, and other 
local level leaders continued to work within the colonial system to bring about change. 
Leaders like those in Puno petitioned colonial officials and demanded local caciques that 
had the ability and respect to command their communities. If their efforts were ignored, 
they turned to other means—as was the case in the Province of Puno where they plotted 
to overthrow the local cacique. The era saw both continued repression but also the 
continuation of a long tradition of indigenous mobilization that ensured that ayllu 
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members were involved in Spanish colonial system. This ensured that the next generation 
of Andeans would continue to have a say in the politics of the Andes. Throughout the late 
eighteenth century, Indigenous communities, oppressed but not defeated following the 
great Andean Rebellions, shaped the colonial political process and challenged injustices 
in Alto Peru.65 
While a true second conquest never materialized, the Age of Andean insurrection 
and its brutal repression divided Andean authorities over the best governing strategies. 
There was no consensus on how to proceed following the massive upheaval and the 
Spanish and creole leaders were quite divided on the “Indian question.”66 Alto Peruvian 
authorities knew the importance of indigenous communities to the success, both 
financially and politically, of their region relied on the incorporation and contributions of 
the indigenous majority, but they were divided on how best to integrate them into the 
colonial system. While many advocated for greater repression and control of indigenous 
societies as seen in the province of Puno, other leaders like the viceroy of Peru began 
advocating for a more reformist approach. This group of reformist Latin Americans was 
often associated with the University of San Francisco Xavier, where a group of the 
lettered elite began questioning the unjust treatment of indigenous communities. They 
started to call for an abolition, or at least a significant reform, of the mita labor draft and 
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other exploitative regimes that had helped to spark the indigenous uprisings of the 1780s 
and 1790s. 
Despite its complexity in the late eighteenth century, the mita and the mines of 
Potosi were as dangerous and the labor was just as back-breaking as it had been centuries 
beforehand.  Mitayos were forced to work three month intervals in the mines and often 
left their families and ayllu communities behind.  If mitayos did not meet their quotas, 
they became indebted and were forced to linger in the mines until they had fulfilled their 
obligations to the mine owners who were called azogueros. Mitayos would go to 
extremes to avoid or lesson the labor service and it was a constant source of contention 
between indigenous and Spanish officials. These appalling labor conditions killed many 
mitayos who often succumbed to mercury poisoning, respiratory infections, or mining 
accidents.67  
Alto Peruvians widely acknowledged the horrible conditions in Potosi, and there 
were sporadic campaigns by colonial and religious figures to reform or end the mita. The 
mita, however, continued for centuries unabated. By the late eighteenth century a new 
generation, who had witnessed the Age of Andean insurrection and read of 
contemporaneous revolutions in the United States, France, and Haiti began to renew 
debates about the utility of the mita. The United States and Haiti offered very different 
solutions to the global debate about forced labor, with Haitian renouncing slavery and the 
United States embracing it, Alto Peruvians began to consider how they would approach 
this debate in their own region. In Alto Peru, the debates relied in part on emotional 
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appeals to the cruel treatment of mita laborers, but new enlightened ideologies also were 
introduced to challenge the mita. Some important leaders in the Andes were convinced 
that the recent downturn in the Alto Peruvian mining economy was a result of the use of 
forced labor. These leaders argued a shift to wage labor and a liberalizing of trade might 
improve productivity and production in the mines. Officials even went so far as to draft a 
series of legal reforms that would have implemented new laws, like one that guaranteed 
that mine owners “make houses or servant quarters where Indians could live 
comfortably” or another that required “Azogueros to treat Indians well.”68 Despite this 
liberal current and the persistent mobilization of community leaders in indigenous 
communities, the crown never approved the legal reforms that would have provided more 
protection for labor, ensuring that Goyeneche would still find disputes and unrest about 
mita labor and service. 
A key figure in this reformist movement was Victoriano de Villava, a native of 
Zaragoza, Spain and the Fiscal of the Audiencia of Charcas in the 1790’s.69 In the years 
following the Age of Andean insurrection, Villava waged a massive campaign to 
discredit the forced labor systems used to exploit indigenous communities. In his 
assessment of the mita, Villava asserted that forced labor migration did not really benefit 
Potosi, and that nothing could save the mining industry from the decline into which it had 
sank.70 Along with this economic argument, Villava used a passionate appeal to the 
humanity of mitayos. As part of his reformist campaign, Villava argued that the mita is “a 
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tyrannical servitude where the Indians are maltreated, poorly fed, and poorly paid.”71 
Villava demanded better treatment of indigenous laborers, and suggested a reformed 
labor system that might help to solve the tensions in Alto Peruvian society. 
Villava also took issue with how his peers in Alto Peru discussed the indigenous 
laborers. Villava lamented most of the arguments aimed at justifying the mita were done 
on behalf of the Azogueros, and in particular he took exception with the description of 
the Indians as “brutish, drunken, thieves, idle, useless, and should be made to work by 
force.”72 Villava instead argued that the forced labor system and mistreatment at the 
hands of priests, colonial officials, and Azogueros were the true cause of any indigenous 
shortcomings. Villava’s passionate and frequent condemnations of the mita, although at 
times patronizing, reflected a small but boisterous reformist element within Spanish 
officials in Alto Peru. 
Some Alto Peruvians took notice of Villava’s writings and the government of 
Potosi even commissioned an inspector to meet with local leaders to ascertain the level of 
exploitation in largely indigenous regions like Chayanta and Macha.73 In addition to 
Villava’s campaign to shift away from forced labor, Villava also influenced a new 
generation of Andeans at the Carolina Academy in the city of La Plata. In the academy, 
Villava instructed future leaders of the independence movements in Alto Peru and the 
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata including Bernardo Monteagudo, Mariano Moreno, J. J. 
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Castelli, and Jaime Zudáñez.74 Villava and his students represent one branch of the 
Spanish American enlightenment. They paralleled the enlightened campaigns of much of 
the Atlantic World in the mid to late eighteenth century that began challenging 
monarchical governments and envisioned a new form of representative government , 
envisioning partial participation in governmental decisions by some members of society. 
In locations like the United States and France, men and women embraced the ideas of the 
equality of mankind, representative government, and started movements to overthrow 
monarchies and colonial systems and took active part in the Age of Revolutions that 
embroiled Europe and the Americas in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  
Alto Peruvians had read many of their European peers’ debates over government, 
economics, and society and began to consider how they applied to their own society in 
Alto Peru. Villava and his influence would live on after his death in 1802, and his many 
disciples would make ending the mita a central tenant of their separatists platform. 
Goyeneche’s path encountered many of these new reformist Alto Peruvians, like 
Monteagudo and Zudáñez, who were both in Chuquisaca in 1808. While those leaders 
built off the findings of Villava in the years to come, in the short term, Villava’s calls for 
reform were largely unheeded and conflict over indigenous labor and leadership 
continued to define Alto Peru through the turn of the eighteenth century. Villava and his 
students outlined a critique of Spanish colonialism and pointed to Spanish official’s 
inefficient policies as the source of many of the Andes problems.  
Villava’s calls for reform were largely overtaken by the mine owners in the Potosi 
region who launched a massive campaign to increase their labor supply. The King of 
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Spain, Charles IV, seemed receptive to calls for increased mita labor and the presumed 
increase in silver production and he approved a “nueva mita” system in the late 
eighteenth century. This greatly increased labor demands on the seven mita contributing 
regions. To implement part of this new mita, Charles IV sent a royal order on May 5, 
1793 which “assigned to Don Juan Batista Jauregui and Don Luis de Orueta, Miners and 
Azogueros of the Rivera of Potosi, surplus laborers from the seven mita contributing 
communities.” This put Jauregui and Orueta “in possession of 184 Indians mitayos” from 
the towns of Pocoata, Morcari and San Pedro all from the party of Chayanta.75  
Enacting this nueva mita proved challenging, as indigenous communities strongly 
resisted these new demands. During the mita sorting and selection process, the unnamed 
sub-delegate in charge of executing the royal order of 5 May 1793 witnessed 
“extraordinary resistance that he could not contain without promising the services for 
priests and the church would be abolished entirely or reduced to the minimum 
possible.”76 This concession would have been significant since indigenous communities 
often had to pay tribute or service to priests, including ceremonies ranging from baptism, 
deaths, and mass, but this would not have offset the increased mita service.77 Further, 
there were rumors that priests used mitayos as personal servants in the Charcas region. 
The unnamed sub-delegate claimed that without a reduction in Church services the 
communities of Chayanta “could not remit the 184 Indians assigned to Orueta and 
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Jauregi.”78 Almost immediately “some priests from this province brought up complaints 
to the Real Audiencia of La Plata” and set off in-fighting between the church and colonial 
officials over who had access to mita laborers.  
As the clergy and colonial officials squabbled, indigenous communities took 
matters into their own hands and challenged whether either party had the right to expand 
their access to indigenous labor. Reports indicate that “the Indian Victoriano 
Ayra…roused the natives in a seditious junta that met in the location of Machamacha.” 
During this meeting, Ayra proclaimed that “he was Governor and Cacique” of Urinzaya, 
an ayllu in Chayanta, and told his followers that “they should not pay the tributes to the 
legitimate governor of the area Don Toribio Navarro.”79 Although this set off a minor 
commotion, officials concluded that it was an isolated event and could be attributed to 
“the Indian Ayra and his depraved intent to declare himself governor and cacique of 
Urinzaya and for the Indians feelings of oppression that they suffer on account of the 
priests.” In particular, the  viceroy of Buenos Aires  suggested that there were an 
excessive number of religious fiestas but he admitted that he was not “sure of the true 
cause” of the rebellion. The Viceroy did defend the mita whose “necessity and utility is 
incontestable.”80 Despite the efforts of Ayra to bring reform to the Andes, an agenda that 
included demanding the abolition of tribute payments, indigenous request for reform 
were unheard. 
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Victoriano Ayra and his followers’ protests did not unite Andeans behind 
Villava’s impugnation of forced labor. Instead, it set off episodes of finger pointing 
between colonial officials and the clergy about the causes of indigenous exploitation and 
unrest. As Spanish colonial officials began to interview indigenous caciques, the crown 
learned of accusations that, in addition to mita service, indigenous servants were being 
used by the clergy. In 1797, the archbishop of Alto Peru José Antonio de San Alberto 
angrily contested these claims and argued that “the falsified and contradictory 
declarations, that the caciques gave” were fabricated. The unnamed cacique of the 
Chayanta region had told a colonial inspector “that the priest had seven Indians mitayos 
for his service.” However, the archbishop claimed that “only one of all those [servants] 
was a mitayo or subject of the mita.”81 The archbishop saw no problem with a few 
indigenous servants for the priests, as long as they were not supposed to work in the 
mines of Potosi. The archbishop aggressively defended the various religious payments 
and services required of the Indians for things ranging from festivals, marriages, or 
baptisms.82 
Instead of viewing these actions as a cause for indigenous unrest, archbishop Jose 
de San Alberto claimed that the true troubles for the indigenous subjects of his 
archbishopric arose from their forced mining service and abusive colonial leaders. The 
Archbishop claimed that this increased workload of the nueva mita was the true reason 
behind the indigenous complaints about the excessive work load. Archbishop San Alberto 
suggested that the Government of Potosi was insincere and the projects “are not born 
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from true zeal, or a sincere desire for the betterment of the unhappy Indians.” The 
archbishop continued by pointing at that at the same time the colonial officials were 
accusing the clergy of mistreatment, they were implementing the “new mita.” This new 
project, which  was “increasing, and now putting into effect three mitas more than 
previously” or put in another way “it is to say three hundred, or four hundred more 
Indians in each year taken as forced victims to the slaughterhouse of Potosi.” The 
archbishop believed the majority of the indigenous complaints were aimed at the 
“oppression and enslavement of the mitayos to the ambition and avarice of the 
corregidores, governors, caciques, and miners.” He suggested that “only some priests 
[were] among the oppressors.” Villava’s calls for reform caught the attention of many in 
colonial Alto Peru and debates did spring up, however, they were often more about 
assigning blame than trying to alleviate the plight of indigenous communities. 83 
In the archbishop’s attached documents, testimony from indigenous leaders in the 
Chayanta region outlined numerous cultural and economic grievances. The central issues 
were a combination of assaults on some of the community’s cultural activities and the 
increased labor demands of the “nueva mita.” Various caciques from Macha, Chayapata, 
Chayala, and Pocoata presented themselves “before both inspectors, exclaiming that they 
were eager and willing to continue the fiestas, and services of the church, along with 
those of the old mita, but that they will not discuss new mitas.”84 The community leaders 
had lived through “the violent past year, where there were two new mitas,” and many of 
their community members had taken the extreme step to avoid the mita labor draft. 
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Indigenous communities had sent members of their communities to labor in the mitas, 
both in the pre-conquest period and colonial era, as a form of tribute in exchange of a 
number of local demands—local autonomy, reduced tax, and communal democracy. 
What the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw was a breakdown in this 
agreement, that historians call the “Andean Pact.” Spanish officials with their alternating 
policies of reconquest and reform were eroding any benefits that indigenous communities 
had. As a result, indigenous communities were avoiding the mita and growing 
increasingly frustrated with the colonial arrangement.  
According to the testimony, the men who fled mita service were prosecuted by the 
Government of Potosi and especially the sub-delegate Don Pedro Arizmendi. These men 
became fugitives, and if captured, Arizmendi “ordered them to be incarcerated and held 
in prison until they could satisfy in silver” the expected profits gained from a mitayo. 
This money went to the azogueros, or mine owners, in this case Orueta y Jauregui, “in 
whose hands they give 600 or more pesos.”85 In the colonialist’s drive to increase 
productivity in the mines of Potosi, they were pushing indigenous communities too far 
and indigenous communities fell back on old forms of resistant adaptation.86 However, 
these opportunities to avoid mita labor service were become more challenging and 
difficult to maintain as Spanish officials tried to reassert control over indigenous subjects 
following the Tupac Amaru II rebellion. 
The Archbishop San Alberto’s investigation also uncovered divisions within 
indigenous society and a possible breakdown in ayllu social relations. In a similar fashion 
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to the prelude of the Age of Andean insurrection, caciques were increasingly stuck 
between the drive for profit and serving their community’s best interests. In San 
Alberto’s report, he noted that community members in Chayanta had started to question 
their local caciques. These indigenous informants contested previous claims made by 
their caciques, Governor Gregoria Priapi and Governor Ordonez. Archbishop San Alberto 
reported that the community members “complained about [the caciques], and clamored 
against governor Ordonez, calling him a tyrant  unfit for the position of cacique…for not 
having the blood of caciques, only mulatto.”87 The community even mentioned to the 
Archbishop that they had been “asking to elect another” cacique.88  
While colonial officials and mine owners attempted to blame the clergy for the 
continued instances of indigenous complaints and resistance, they conceded that unhappy 
mita laborers could be a threat to their financial interests. In January 1796, the union of 
azogueros of Potosi organized five “dressed and armed” militias to protect the city of 
Potosi. To justify these new militias they noted that “[Potosi] has a very numerous mita 
of Indians” and “in this forced service that [mitayos] work, loyalty is not well 
established.”89 Included in the leadership of these new militias was the azoguero Juan 
Baptista Jauregui who had been at the center of previous complaints of mita labor. 
Jauregui and his fellow azogueros hoped that the militias would have the “power to 
suffocate in their beginning whatever spirit of sedition that malcontents might foment.”90  
This was even more vital now because of the current “critical circumstances” that Alto 
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Peru faced where authorities believed that someone might try to “spread here the spirit of 
liberty adopted by France.”91 Colonial officials knew that Alto Peru was in a delicate 
social position and they feared outside news could unite the region against Spanish 
colonialism.  
The revolts in the provinces of Puno and Chayanta were not isolated events and 
there were other rumors and episodes of unrest throughout Alto Peru. In 1791 Pablo 
Yuerri Dabalos, the prior of the San Augustin convent of Cochabamba, asked the viceroy 
of Peru, Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, if he could “go down to this city of Lima” to 
avoid “a new uprising  of Indians” in Cochabamba.92 The viceroy followed up this claim 
and concluded that the news of Indians rebellion was entirely false, but rumors of 
indigenous unrest continued to frighten Alto Peruvians. Similarly in the city of La Paz in 
1795, there was “a riot and uprising” organized by a creole named Josef Pablo Conti and 
assisted by caciques of the city.93 Collectively, the various rebellions in Alto Peru show 
that the region was in a state of turmoil following the Age of Andean insurrection. In a 
drive to increase profits and more effectively control their colonies, the Spanish had upset 
the colonial system that had lasted for nearly three centuries, exacerbating pressures that 
had plagued South America since the conquest. The changes brought about by the 
Bourbon Reforms and reforms following Spain’s reaction to the Tupac Amaru II 
rebellion, increased exploitation on indigenous communities, forced colonial officials 
into infighting over indigenous labors, and reduced the legitimacy of traditional beacons 
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of authority like parish priest, caciques, and colonial officials. As a result, periodic and 
sporadic uprisings dominated Alto Peru in the late eighteenth century. Indigenous 
communities remained engaged in the colonial process and demanded reforms—Spanish 
officials were to divided on their strategy to implement a policy that might have address 
the concerns of colonial Andeans.  
Despite the widespread unrest, Alto Peruvians did not unify into another 
anticolonial movement in the two decades following the Age of Andean insurrection. 
However, the uprisings of Alto Peru began to outline shared concerns among its 
inhabitants. Indigenous societies of the region were growing increasingly frustrated with 
the mita and their demands on their community. This often played out with unrest in 
communities as ayllu members lashed out against caciques who were tasked with 
mobilizing labor, and resulted in a crises in local communities as seen in both Chayanta 
and Puno where indigenous leaders tried to address issues through official and 
extrajudicial channels. Creoles and Spaniards, often competing for colonial positions and 
indigenous labor, resorted to finger pointing over the demands for reform and increasing 
unrest. This group of the lettered elite splintered into how best to address the Indian 
problem, and their lack of a coherent policy led to a haphazard implementation of 
reactionary reform and protection of indigenous communities followed by military 
repression of the same communities. The Spanish colonial system was failing numerous 
sectors of Alto Peruvian society, and with news of new revolutionary ideas coming from 
places like France, the United States, and Haiti, Alto Peruvians were beginning to 
question their current status.  
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The Alto Peru Goyeneche entered in 1808 was a troubled and divided world. The 
failings of the Spanish colonial system often appeared as symptoms on the local level, 
which the Spanish government was able to funnel through its legal system that served as 
the official arbiter of issues. So communities, only treating symptoms instead of the 
underlying problem, blamed local priests, indigenous caciques, or the mine owners for 
their struggles. The complaints identified local issues and the Spanish were able to stop 
any unrest either through force or by placating local demands. This allowed the Spanish 
to keep control over the region and let unrest burn itself out much like they did for 
rebellions in Mexico.94 This process also allowed indigenous communities to cultivate 
their own leaders and continue to demand Spanish reforms. Although those were only 
sometimes effective, this process allowed indigenous communities to outline their 
demands and envision a reformed and more just colonial system. Goyeneche hoped that 
he would be able to continue this delicate balance of governance in the name of the 
Spanish Juntas in the metropole. 
Conclusion: The Bearer of Bad News 
Goyeneche’s announcement added another layer of discord into Alto Peru’s 
mounting issues. When Goyeneche arrived, he found a diverse and widespread society 
that was still struggling to solve the issues brought about by the Bourbon Reforms and 
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the Age of Andean Rebellion. The region was divided over their future path, with some 
believing that Alto Peru should use force and its military strengthen to reconquer and 
reorder the Andes, while others hoped to reform their society around free wage labor 
practices and offer a liberalizing element into Alto Peru’s legal code. Neither group had 
achieved a consensus, and instead had implemented, in spurts and starts, partial reforms 
and half-finished conquests. As an outsider, Goyeneche relied on the clergy to find out 
about this social climate, and he continued to rely on them to spread the message that 
Spanish juntas were now ruling the Spanish empire, introducing a new challenge for Alto 
Peru. The news of Napoleon’s invasion and the Junta Superior in Sevilla spread like a 
contagion around the region, with rumors and gossip seemingly infecting nearly every 
mountain and valley of Alto Peru, eventually leading to a small but growing faction in 
Alto Peru who believed that they should set up their own ruling junta until Ferdinand VII 
returned to the throne. Over those next fifteen years, the issues that dominated the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century would re-appear and become key points of 
struggle during the Alto Peruvian independence war. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CRY OF LIBERTY: SOUND, RIOT, AND POLITICAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN AN ANDEAN LETTERED CITY
 
While sipping on a glass of chicha, weary from weeks of travel, a mulatto barber 
named Francisco Rios heard a cry in the Chuquisaca streets.95 Rios, a drifter originally 
from Brazil, followed the cries towards the city center where he witnessed Jaime Zudáñez 
—Chuquisaca’s public defender—being escorted away in chains. Rios and a growing 
crowd heard Zudáñez exclaim, “countrymen help defend an innocent victim that they are 
taking to the jail,” for simply being “a loyal and good vassal, and for defending his 
country.”96 The cry shattered the anxious quiet in Chuquisaca and set the city into a fury. 
Responding to Zudáñez’s call, Rios and Chuquisaca’s popular classes stormed the central 
plaza, filling it with a cacophony of shouts, cries, and jeers. They quickly liberated the 
imprisoned lawyer, forced the local president of the Province of Charcas, Ramón García 
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de León y Pizarro, from power, and in the tumult of that night, they shouted a cry of 
liberty that shook the Spanish colonial world. 97  
That evening,  25 May 1809, Rios along with hundreds of Andeans of indigenous 
descent, also began a protracted discussion about the political future of South America. 
Through whispered rumors, shouted pleas, and chanted demands, Chuquisaca’s popular 
classes began articulating their political concerns and goals. They did not come to a 
consensus that night, but they began a lively debate about their future that would take 
nearly two decades of open warfare to answer. Rioters sacked the Chuquisaca streets and 
took control of the city, and in the course of that night, they temporarily reorganized 
colonial hierarchies of class, race, and political speech. Rios played an active role, 
becoming the de-facto leader of the coalition that overthrew the local Spanish officials 
and created a space for the popular classes to declare their wishes. In effect, Rios and the 
crowd converted Chuquisaca into a theater for political debate where they began crafting 
their own aural construction of liberty.  
Using methodology associated with riots, countless researchers analyzed this 
event, and other similar urban rebellions, in an effort to uncover the political goals and 
causes behind popular unrest. Some have looked at material causes, suggesting that the 
violent actions were spasmodic responses to food shortages or other structural 
pressures.98 Others have claimed that social or cultural causes lay behind the unrest, 
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pointing to a moral economy or a subaltern political consciousness that motivated 
rioters.99 They have employed different analytical lenses, methodological perspectives, 
and temporal scopes, but in the process, they have often muted the aural soundscape from 
their studies. This is surprising, since the primary documentation of riots repeatedly 
emphasizes the aural dimension of unrest. Even the terminology to discuss riots—tumult, 
uproar, or during the Latin American independence era gritos (meaning shout or cry)—
reflects the noise that defined these chaotic events. Historians, however, have been 
hesitant to explore these reported sounds. Because current methodology prefers the 
written word, the cries of rioters, like Rios, have largely remained unheard.100 
Since Chuquisaca was one of the few “lettered cities” in Alto Peru, or present day 
Bolivia, these methodological issues have been exacerbated in the study of this particular 
“cry of liberty.” Angel Rama’s foundational work, The Lettered City, outlined the power 
of the writing throughout the long durée of Latin American History, showing that the 
written word underwrote Spanish power colonization and colonialism. As such, historians 
continue to treat urban centers as environments where literate citizens and written words 
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flourished.101 Scholars, therefore, have typically fixed their gaze on secret letters, formal 
petitions, and satirical posters, hoping to catch a glimpse of the era’s political climate. 
Muffling the role of popular actors like Rios and the hundreds indigenous rioters, most 
chroniclers of the 25 May rebellion have concluded the events must have been scripted 
by the lettered elite.102 In contrast, this chapter privileges the aural descriptions of the 
riot. The sounds emanating from and heard by rioters are key to understanding a popular 
perspective of the Chuquisaca rebellion and their ideas of liberty. The study of 
Chuquisaca’s cry of liberty through sound, listening, and hearing helps to explain the 
causes of the rebellion and why Alto Peruvians of all castas rebelled in a way that 
foretold many of the central concerns that dominated the Latin American independence 
era.  
By listening to the testimony of rioters, like Rios, the Chuquisaca rebellion 
announced the beginning of the wars for independence and the age of political modernity 
in Alto Peru and the Spanish colonies. In whispered rumors, cries for help, chants of 
“viva Fernando VII,” and the roar of canons, the rebellion in Chuquisaca declared the 
beginning of a pronounced assault on colonial institutions and the creation of a new 
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society that echoed the precepts of the Age of Revolution, like popular sovereignty and 
the flattening of social hierarchies.103 Responding to a generalized disquiet caused by the 
Napoleonic invasion in Spain, the popular classes spoke in the language of riot. The 
popular classes claimed the Chuquisaca plaza and removed local leaders that had not met 
community expectations. In the process, rioters offered a vernacular form of liberty that 
turned colonial hierarchies upside-down, converting the Spanish sites of authority into 
tools of rebellion, replacing Spanish leaders with ones from lower castas, and supplanting 
the primacy of the written word with the verbal form. This aural version of liberty reveals 
that even though the May 25, 1809 riot might have been defined by a “militant myopia,” 
as the rioters’ immediate demands where contained to their urban environment, their 
actions had a revolutionary resonance that carried far beyond earshot of the Chuquisaca 
bell tower.104   
A Time of Quiet and Disquiet: Silence and Rumor in Alto Peru, 1809 
 As he navigated the mountains and valleys of Alto Peru, Rios heard and spoke a 
lot about the world around him. Rios spent most of his time with the popular classes in 
the region’s urban centers and chichería, where he integrated himself into the region’s 
large indigenous population. Alto Peru was a region built on the exploitation of 
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indigenous men and women for the profit of the Spanish crown, and many members of 
society were upset with the social climate.105 This delicate situation was worsened when 
José Manuel de Goyeneche, a Spanish military official in charge of Alto Peru, announced 
news of the Napoleonic invasion of the Spanish Peninsula.106 The invasion of Napoleon 
had quieted the most important symbol in the Spanish colonial world, the King of Spain 
Ferdinand VII. The sovereign, who had final say in all political matters, was now silent, 
and his lack of voice created a crisis of leadership that disrupted colonial society. In an 
effort to fill this awkward silence, Alto Peruvians whispered about the events in Spain 
and its implications for the American colonies, distorting any unifying message that 
would have eased tensions. Rios and others started hearing rumors of independence 
movements, reformed colonialism, and an invasion by the Portuguese crown. Ill-
informed rumors and widespread gossip defined the political climate of 1809, and they 
added to the generalized disquiet of a region already on a shaky foundation.107  
Rios took a rocky path to Chuquisaca that constantly got him in trouble with the 
law. Reportedly, Rios was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil as a free mulatto. Rios’ early life 
is obscure, but he trained as a barber and knew how to play the guitar.108 In the early 
nineteenth century, he chose to leave Brazil and made his way to the Spanish territories 
of South America. He spent some time in Buenos Aires before he ultimately settled down 
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in La Paz where he got married and resided for at least five years in the early nineteenth 
century. Despite settling down, Rios did not find a secure and steady income in La Paz, 
and he often travelled in order to find work. In 1809, Rios left his home looking for 
employment and traveled to the neighboring city of Potosi where he arrived in the last 
week of April.109 In Potosi, Rios met a Chuquisaca resident named Matias de Tal, who 
went by the nickname Jucucha—Quechua for the rat. Matias de Tal was part of the 
growing forestero community, or outsiders, in Alto Peru that had left an indigenous 
village to secure outside employment. The two spent time together in Potosi, and 
discussed their economic plights and the state of their region. Rios, “finding himself 
without money or a mule,” searched for a job as a barber, but he did not earn much 
money in that profession in Potosi.110 His friend, Matias de Tal, advised him to travel to 
Chuquisaca because “there it would be easier for him to secure money for his 
nourishment.”111 The two hatched a plan to travel to Chuquisaca in search of work.  
Lacking means of transportation, Rios and Matias de Tal returned to the Santo 
Domingo Inn and stole two mules and a horse from the innkeeper, so they could make 
their way to Chuquisaca in April 1809. After the theft, they “remained hidden all the next 
day” in an effort to escape the gaze of authorities. Once clear, the two set out for Mataca 
and the Turuchipa valleys, and they arrived two days before Easter holiday, where they 
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spent “15 days of fun” celebrating the festivities.112 Following the conclusion of Easter 
ceremonies, Rios and Matias de Tal sold one of the stolen mules and made their way to 
Chuquisaca. Despite the celebratory setting, all was not well in Alto Peru and there were 
numerous rumors floating around about the future of the region. As Rios and Matias 
sneaked around the taverns, chicherias, and inns of Alto Peru they heard and took part in 
conversations dealing with the future of Alto Peru.  
The talk of the nineteenth-century world was the fate of the King Ferdinand VII 
and the future of the Spanish Americas. Following Goyeneche’s announcement of the 
Napoleonic invasions, Alto Peru experienced a crisis of leadership at the very top of 
Spanish Colonial power structure—the royal family. Napoleon’s armies stormed through 
the Iberian Peninsula and forced Carlos IV’s abdication and Ferdinand VII into internal 
exile in Spain. Alto Peruvians, and most Spanish colonial subjects had a close 
relationship with the crown that transcended physical space, so this was a shock to many 
of the lower classes.113 Napoleon’s invasion and conquest of the royal family had 
distorted the voice of the crown and created a silent throne in Spain. Goyeneche had tried 
to reassure his Andean audience by urging Andean subjects to remain loyal vassals to the 
Spanish courts of Cadiz, who were ruling in the name of Ferdinand VII until the 
sovereign was returned to the throne. These reassurance had a limited effect, and Alto 
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Peruvians like Rios remained concerned about their sovereign and the state of the 
Spanish empire. 
Ferdinand VII’s silence unsettled Alto Peruvians, and left colonial subjects to fill 
the quiet uncertainty with their own political theories. In Spain, those loyal to the crown 
began forming their own governing bodies, or juntas, to rule while the royal family was 
held hostage. They sent Goyeneche to speak for the King in South America and calm 
anxieties in the colonies. Other Alto Peruvians also began speaking for the silent king. 
The Spanish archbishop of Chuquisaca Benito Maria Moxo, for instance, realized that the 
Spanish patria was “in trouble” and warned the priests of Alto Peru that “silence in these 
times would not only be suspicious, but criminal.”114 He recommended the priests of Alto 
Peru defend the Spanish crown with their words until Ferdinand VII returned. Subjects in 
the colonies replaced the King’s awkward silence with the constant chatter of feeble 
reassurances, which only exacerbated the crisis of leadership created by the Napoleonic 
invasion. 
Talk of the future was not limited to the letrados (the lettered elite), and many 
others also began whispering about the future of Alto Peru.115 Spanish officials frequently 
reported about “rumors and scandalous conversations” within the general population.116 
This talk extended to rural indigenous communities of Alto Peru, including some who 
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were under the impression that the King had been killed during the crisis in the 
metropole. The indigenous communities claimed that they “would not continue paying 
tribute, until it is known to whom there is to contribute,” and they specifically noted that 
they had been forced to pay during the last few years even though “the king was killed by 
the French.”117 Rios claimed, he heard similar talk of “treason against the King” in 1809, 
and he likely spread these conversation and would have added to the whispers of 
uncertainty.118 The silence from Ferdinand VII left Alto Peruvian minds to wonder, and 
their imaginations were filled with unsettling images of the future.  
By the time that Rios reached Chuquisaca, residents of the valley city were 
sharing their own gossip about the future of the Spanish empire and Alto Peru. 
Chuquisaca was a major city in Alto Peru that hosted a number of colonial administrative 
posts, a prestigious university, the archdioceses, and a comparatively significant 
population of 20,000. The city was known for its wealth and opulence due to its close 
proximity and historical relationship with Potosi and its mine owners. The written word 
helped to order the city in its laws, sermons, notarial records, and the occasional 
pasquine.119 It was through the written medium, that the Spanish had held control of the 
colonial world for three centuries. The written word had given power, codified 
authorities, and had even channeled grievances in the form of royal petitions. For all its 
                                                           
117 The King had not been killed by the French and Ferdinand VII remained alive, but 
there were apparently rumors of his death in Alto Peru during this period. 
118 La causa criminal contra Francisco Rios, el Quitacapas, ABNB ALP, em 4. 
119 Angel Rama, The Lettered City (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Joane 
Rappaport and Tom Cummins eds. Beyond the Lettered City: Indigenous Literacies in the 
Andes (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Alcira Duenas, Indians and Mestizos in 
the “Lettered City”: Reshaping Justice, Social Hierarchy, and Political Culture in 
Colonial Peru (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2010); Kathryn Burns, Into the 
Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
 
67 
power, the stacks of silent edicts and laws could not mute the rumors and gossip that 
dominated the city in 1809, for the city remained a social as well as a political forum.120 
Numerous lawyers and doctors, along with a growing population of literate 
indigenous Alto Peruvians, helped to make Chuquisaca a “lettered city,” but the gridded 
streets also acted as a studio for the spoken word.121 For every word written by scribes 
and notaries, there were thousands of words spoken in the market, in the chicherias, and 
in the streets. People spoke in Spanish, Quechua, Aymara, or sometimes, a creolized 
mixture of languages, creating a lingua franca that was unquestionably Andean. Although 
not associated with authority like the written word, the vocalized word also had power in 
the colonial world. Indigenous and Spanish alike attended theatrical productions, listened 
to sermons, and shared their personal experiences in aural dialogue. After his arrival in 
1809 , Rios began adding his own words to the gossip and rumor that filled urban 
Chuquisaca.122 
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          Figure 3.1 “La Ciudad de la Plata ó Chuquizaca” by Ramon  Pizarro, 1803 
One particularly troubling scandal broke out in Chuquisaca in early 1809. Alto 
Peruvians caught word that the Portuguese Princess Carlota Joaquina might try to take 
sovereign power of the Spanish Americas. Princess Carlota was the eldest daughter of the 
recently abdicated Spanish King Carlos IV, and through her marriage to Infante John, she 
became part of the Portuguese royal family. Due to the Napoleonic invasion and the 
resulting escape of the Portuguese royal court, Carlota resided in Brazil in 1809.123 
During that year, Carlota reportedly sent a letter to the Alto Peruvian city of Chuquisaca, 
which proclaimed her right to “attend, protect, and preserve the sacred rights that her 
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Augustin house has to the throne of Spain and the Americas.”124 The lettered elite of 
Chuquisaca—the doctors and lawyers of the city—heard about this rumor and interpreted 
the proclamation as an attack on the political sovereignty in the Americas. Locally, 
Chuquisaca residents grew concerned that the unpopular President of Charcas Pizarro, 
might be plotting to hand control over to the Portuguese Princess. This rumor could have 
been particularly troubling for Rios since he had fled Brazil in the early nineteenth 
century and might have had unresolved legal trouble in Brazil. The continued silence in 
Spain helped heighten the power of rumor in Chuquisaca. 
Because of the Princess Carlota rumor, on the 11 January 1809, forty-eight 
doctors assembled at the University of San Francisco Xavier to denounce Pizarro and the 
reported conspiracy of the Portuguese royal court. Included in this meeting was Jaime 
Zudáñez, Bernardo Monteagudo, and many other of the educated upper classes of 
Chuquisaca, who would later play significant roles in the wars for independence. In 
writing, and announced aloud in the central plaza, they condemned the “irregular and 
unjust measures by the court of Portugal against the sacred and inviolable rights of…Don 
Fernando VII.”125 This body realized that Alto Peru was experiencing a crisis of 
leadership due to the Napoleonic invasions, and they hoped their announcement would 
combat the “pernicious effects” that might result if news spread that the Portuguese court 
was planning to invade the Spanish Americas.  The doctors of Chuquisaca were 
concerned that the news might “blind and seduce those who are not endowed with the 
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ardent and inalterable love, fidelity, and obedience” to the Spanish crown.126 These less 
endowed citizens might welcome Princess Carlota since she was a member of the 
Bourbon family, and local authorities grew concerned that the action might create a 
power struggle over authority in the Americas. To preserve the “public tranquility,” the 
cloister vowed to “not permit papers of this class to circulate in these dominions in the 
future.”127 Further, they lauded Don Fernando VII and pledged their loyalty to defend the 
rights of their “adored” King. The group actively strategized to mobilize the written 
word, a proclamation, in hopes of containing potential unrest or sedition in Chuquisaca; 
the spoken word, however, was not so easy to contain.  
This set off a local squabble between Pizarro and the members of the local 
governing body of judges, the oidores. Many of these leaders had signed the petition to 
condemn the potential measures of Princess Carlota, and they felt that Pizarro was a 
foreign and incompetent leader. Pizarro had been appointed President of the Province of 
Charcas in 1796, and he had survived a number of political and social conflicts during his 
time in power, including the British Invasions of South America in 1806. Despite his long 
tenure, he was not well liked by local authorities or the masses. Pizarro was from a 
prestigious Spanish family and had been born in Oran, now Algeria, and was seen as an 
outsider in Chuquisaca. Charcas had a long history of local sovereignty and the actions of 
Pizarro had eroded the power and influence of the oidores, so when rumors spread that 
Pizarro was plotting with Princess Carlota, the oidores condemned the President and tried 
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to increase their own social influence.128 These squabbles leaked out to the broader 
community, where Rios reported hearing that President Pizarro “wanted to coronate in 
these dominions the senora Carlota, Princess of Brazil.”129 
Despite their best efforts, the doctors’ declaration could not cure the nearly 
inaudible anxiety that cloaked Chuquisaca. There was no political fix to settle the 
simmering tensions or preserve the public tranquility in the city. In the months that 
followed the Princess Carlota letter, reports proliferated in Chuquisaca and Alto Peru 
about the political future of their region and the Spanish empire. One Spanish official 
reported hearing “a general gossip in the lower classes.”130 Rumors and murmurs spread 
everywhere. Residents whispered news of a Portuguese plot in the city streets and in 
chichería taverns. It became so bad, that “gravely serious pasquines” began “appearing” 
on city walls.131 These pasquines, or satirical letters or cartoons, ridiculed the crisis of 
leadership in the Spanish empire, and some even began suggesting a new political future 
for the Americas.  
In the weeks leading up to the 25 May rebellion, many recalled hearing of a 
pasquine fixed to the door of the Cabildo building in the center of the city. The message 
was aimed at Rafael Mena, Chuquisaca’s collector of Tribute. The exact contents of this 
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pasquine were never reported, but other complaints made by indigenous and lower-class 
Alto Peruvians had demanded a reduction or elimination of tribute in the early nineteenth 
century.132 Mena would have been the local face of the tribute payment that coerced 
indigenous communities to give money or labor to enrich the Spanish empire.  Eventually 
colonial authorities “discovered the suspected [pasquine writer] who was poor of quality, 
age, and assets.” Authorities gave the unnamed pasquine author “twenty-five lashes and 
three days in jail” in an effort to deter future political attacks on Spanish authority and 
tribute payment.133 
A Chuquisaca military patrol found another pasquine that hinted at even bigger 
goals than a challenge to colonial taxes. Jaime Zudáñez reportedly handed over the 
pasquine “that they encountered…in which it was proposed to form a junta” to rule Alto 
Peru.134 Others recalled seeing pasquines that were fixed on the walls that had “the theme 
of the treachery of the Viceroy, President, and Archbishop, suggesting the formation of a 
junta.”135 These pasquines and the general gossip that filled Chuquisaca, hint at the 
dysfunction caused by Ferdinand VII’s silence. Without a respected sovereign to speak, 
too many voices and ideas were raised about the political state of the Spanish empire. 
Pedro Vicente Cañete, the intendent in Potosi, could only compare the gossip to the 
mythical “Hydra,” explaining that after combating “each rumor”  it seemingly regrew 
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“100 more limbs.”136 In the form of “formidable pasquines,” “sacrilegious songs,” and 
“general murmurs,” the noise of unease polluted Chuquisaca’s soundscape.137 
Pizarro grew increasingly concerned at the proliferation of rumors about local 
juntas, and he set out on the herculean task of stifling the sounds of sedition. Pizarro 
blamed the declaration of the doctors for de-stabilizing his rule and upsetting the 
tranquility of the city, and he began to try to quiet the doctors, calling on a number of 
their arrests. Pizarro, however, could not contain the political contagion in Alto Peru. In 
May 1809, he reported to the Viceroy multiple times that the city was on the verge of a 
“popular commotion.”138 The consensus among Spanish officials was that “the 
fermentation of anger had gotten to its utmost extreme,” and officials cautioned that the 
city was on the verge of “a very dangerous event whose progress would not be 
containable after it began.”139 As Rios travelled through Alto Peru, he would have 
overheard this fermented anger in his discussions with his friends and acquaintances. 
In an effort to combat the pasquines and whispered rumors in the city, Pizarro 
launched an investigation to root out possible sources of sedition in Chuquisaca. He heard 
rumors that there were secret meetings taking place in the city where participants began 
to consider their new political reality.  He had heard whispers that “in the house of Don 
Joaquin Lemoyne” groups of Alto Peruvians “were forming juntas to discuss 
independence.”140 Authorities began to suspect that Lemoyne and his cohorts might be 
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creating or fostering the “anonymous pasquine papers, and other methods of seduction” 
to spread in the surrounding provinces.141 While Lemoyne was hosting parties, and they 
likely discussed the political climate, all attendees denied revolutionary intentions. 
Among those in attendance were many members of Chuquisaca society including the 
Zudáñez brothers, but he testified that he never heard any “insinuation about 
independence.”142  
In this climate, Pizarro ordered the arrests of a number of citizens who had been 
openly critical of his leadership and further upset his local constituents. Word of the 
imminent arrests reached the ears of residents in Chuquisaca. A local resident, named 
Angel Gutierrez, remembered that “he heard through public conversations” of a plan by 
Pizarro “to apprehend various neighbors of different classes” who had been causing 
political trouble.143 Zudáñez ended up on the list of plotters and Pizarro also planned to 
arrest him for his role in crafting the denunciation of the president..  
 In the months leading up to May 1809, Rios drifted around colonial Alto Peru 
during a time of quiet and disquiet. Alto Peruvians talked about and heard rumors as the 
Spanish empire and Chuquisaca were in a crisis of leadership, and this predicament was 
only exacerbated by the actions of local authorities like the Chuquisaca doctors and 
Pizarro. Despite their garrulous reassurances, local leaders could offer no words that 
could calm the fears of the colonial subjects, like Rios. This lack of leadership helped to 
feed the rumors and conspiracy theories in Alto Peru, emboldening colonial Subjects to 
speak and debate openly about their political future. As a barber, Rios would have seen 
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the pasquines on the walls of Chuquisaca and heard rumors about the future of the 
Spanish Americas. No one knew if Ferdinand VII was alive or when he would be restored 
to power. No one knew for certain if the Portuguese royal family would try to take Alto 
Peru. Rios helped to spread these rumors as a barber and a frequent patron of the lower-
class chicha establishments in Alto Peru, where he would have helped to destabilize a 
Spanish political power and have added a new voice to the political debates of the era.144  
The Language of the Unheard: Debating their political future through Riot 
 In the evening of 25 May 1809,“four masked soldiers” and a “locally unknown 
official” named Don Pedro Azua broke into “a room in [Zudáñez’s] house” with 
“unsheathed swords” and ordered the lawyer’s arrest.145 The soldiers, then, forcibly 
removed Zudáñez from his house and escorted him through the city streets. On his path 
towards the jail, Zudáñez began exclaiming his desperate plea.146 Less a cry of liberty, 
Zudáñez’s screams were a frantic appeal for help.  Chuquisaca residents answered that 
call and carried the discussion further. In the resulting tumult, they deliberated over the 
immediate social issues that plagued Chuquisaca and began a debate about the political 
future of the Americas. In the process, the popular classes began imagining a new 
political future for Chuquisaca. The popular classes overturned colonial hierarchies, 
spoke for a silent king, and opened up political dialogue to sectors of society that had 
largely been left out of political processes. The crowd’s cry of liberty—their vocalized 
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chants, jeers, and demands—announced the beginning of a new era that saw the 
expansion of democratic modernity.147 
 Rios, who was in the chichería on San Francisco street, was one of thousands who 
responded to these shouts. Shortly after Zudáñez’s arrest and cry for help, Pedro Vicente 
Cañete reported that the lawyer’s “kindred and confederates, distributed themselves to 
clamor in the neighborhoods,” spreading Zudáñez’s cry to all corners of the city.148 Rios 
learned the details of Zudáñez’s arrest from “a woman [who] entered” the chichería and 
“explained to the patrons that there was something strange happening in the plaza.”149 
Rios and many other curious observers hurried down San Francisco Street towards the 
central plaza, where a raucous scene filled with angry shouts, chants, and jeers. They 
began hearing the noise of “more than five hundred people that were shouting that the 
esteemed President Pizarro was a traitor and wanted to coronate the princess Carlota in 
these dominions.”150 By the time Rios reached the plaza, he saw and heard a mob made 
up of “all the cholos” in a “rowdy state.”151 People were enraged that a respected leader, 
like Zudáñez, had been arrested and the masses decided to take action by revoking their 
support from local Spanish officials.  
 The multiethnic horde’s heist of the central plaza signaled the seriousness of the 
rebellion and the overturning of colonial norms. Urban centers, and particularly plazas in 
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Latin America, were rigidly organized and designed to project the order and authority of 
Spanish institutions. In Chuquisaca, the local Cathedral and its bell tower, the presidential 
palace, the University of San Francisco Xavier, and the cabildo building all towered over 
the center square. These architectural features served as constant reminders that Spanish 
authority and the Catholic Church were the foundation of Chuquisaca’s urban center and 
colonial lives. This setting was coded as an upper-class, Spanish environment for doctors, 
lawyers, and colonial officials. Cholo and indigenous groups, although not specifically 
segregated from the plaza, usually congregated on the outside of towns. By claiming the 
plaza as their own, Rios and the rest of the rioters announced a changing of political 
process.  
An exact census of the rioters is unknown from existing documentation, but 
testimony repeatedly used the umbrella term “cholos” or “cholada” to describe the 
rioters. In contemporary language, the term Cholo is a pejorative term to label an urban 
Andean of indigenous descent. In the colonial era, cholo was often used as a synonym for 
mestizo. Vicente Pazos Kanki, an Alto-Peruvian journalist turned independence fighter, 
claimed cholos were “the descendants of mestizos and the Indians.” He continued, “they 
have little or no education, and can scarcely speak the Spanish language.”152 Despite any 
language barriers, Pazos Kanki suggested they were key to the business of the colonial 
Andes serving as mechanics, chamber maids, and nurses for wealthy Spaniards.153 In 
spite of their economic significance, Spanish authorities derided this sector of society 
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because, like mulattos, they did not fit neatly into their scripted republic of Indians and 
could not be accounted for like a more stationary indigenous community, or ayllu. 
Spanish authorities never intended them for them to engage in debates about the colonial 
system. By taking the plaza and demanding the release of Zudáñez, the mob was 
inverting the typical hierarchies that muffled castas and pushed them outside the central 
debates of the Spanish colonial world. They demanded that people of indigenous and 
African descent have an opportunity to voice their concerns. They would hold the 
Chuquisaca plaza for the rest of that evening, and they converted it to a forum where they 
articulated their political desires. 
 Many of the leading figures of Chuquisaca missed this scene, as they fled and hid 
within secure buildings in the city; some local authorities, however, tried to calm the 
fears of the masses. Angel Gutierrez, the second lieutenant of Chuquisaca, barricaded 
himself inside his house because he “was afraid” “of the “gang of Cholos” in the streets 
of Chuquisaca. Upon hearing “the first cries of the popular commotion,” a number of 
priests “met in [the] Archbishop’s palace” to come up with a plan to settle the city. The 
priests hoped to “set the cholos straight” and end the conflict before there were more 
deaths. A retired priest, Marcos Jorge Benvente, ran through the Chuquisaca streets 
“placating…the fury of the plebe.”154 Likewise, Doctor Mariano Rodriguez de Olmedo, 
an honorary canon in the Metropolitan Church of Chuquisaca, took to the Chuquisaca 
streets the morning after the tumult “to convince the plebe” to not cause any more 
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political or social damage.155 Running around the city, Rodriguez de Olmedo, a devoted 
royalist and priest, added to the cacophony by giving public “admonishments and 
council” to angry Chuquisaca residents. However, these were quixotic efforts by the 
priests and their attempts at “exorcising the malevolent” rioters were in vain.156 The 
priests could not appease the growing discontent and only added to the noise on the city 
streets, as their cries for calm were drowned out by demands for political change.  
These examples show that the rioters were not only overturning the social norms 
of colonial America, but they were also re-imagining the forms of political dialogue. 
Political and social power had been associated with the written word and a small group of 
letrados, like those priest who were now helplessly yelling in the streets. In the 
Chuquisaca riot, Priests and political officials, along with their pens, had limited power. 
The thousands of finely scripted laws that ordered colonial society sat unheard, muted out 
by the screams, jeers, and chants of the tumult. The rules of political engagement had 
been changed, and popular class rioters were discussing their political futures and 
political possibilities. There is even some evidence that there was a shift in language in 
the plaza. Vicente Rodriguez Romano, a local Spanish official, recalled that he had 
exerted “the forces possible to contain [the tumult], but without fruit” because he was not 
versed in “the language of Quechua.”157 The lingua franca of that night may well have 
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been the indigenous language spoken in the Inca Empire and people of indigenous 
descent in Alto Peru.  
In the chaotic scene of shouts in Quechua and Spanish,  someone hatched a plan 
to free Zudáñez from his imprisonment and to “break the doors” of the presidential 
palace, so they could “take some papers that were said to contain references to the 
treason” of President Pizarro.158 The cholo rioters in the central plaza drew others 
towards the magnetic pull of the sounds of Spanish authority by ringing the church bells. 
One Chuquisaca resident, a farmer named Antonio Amaya, recalled that he heard “the 
bells of the [metropolitan] Cathedral and [the cathedral of] San Francisco ringing 
furiously.”159 The ring of bells was a familiar sound in the nineteenth century that carried 
with spiritual and physical meaning. The peal of bells usually reminded subjects of the 
social and political power of ecclesiastic and secular Spaniards, its chimes ordered the 
day into discrete units, and it was an important emblem of local communities.160 
Chuquisaca rioters converted the bells sounds to draw more people to the plaza to 
overthrow the Spanish authorities who had previously dictated the cadence and meaning 
of the bells in Chuquisaca. Following the sounds, people flooded into the central plaza, 
filling it with chaotic noise. Angel Gutierrez was one Alto Peruvian who tried to “go 
down to the plaza” so he could go to the Cabildo house to find some of his companions. 
He recalled that he “could not pass through” the streets because, the mob was so dense 
that they had blockaded the area. Rios and the rest of the mob were drawing even more 
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members towards them so they could break into the presidential palace on the central 
plaza and remove Pizarro from power.  
The noise in the plaza was deafening, and observers recalled torrents of sound, 
like the local Archbishop Benito María Moxó who could only compare the riot to “the 
fury of a storm.”161 In the resulting chaos, the rioters took control of the local armory, and 
they “repeatedly fired the artillery canons, in order to terrorize the community with this 
racket.”162 They even began distributing weapons to “arm Indians and blacks” even 
though it was “prohibited by law.”163Others called it a “general din” of shouts, cries, and 
threats against the local authorities, like Pizarro, who were suspected of treachery against 
the interests of the local community and the Spanish empire. The sound of the crowd’s 
fury was doubled by the city’s “bells that seemed to submerge all the city” in a sea of 
noise.164 This was not just mindless screaming but, rather, an angry, loosely coordinated, 
cathartic outburst from the popular classes. The popular classes were frustrated with the 
continued exploitation of the late colonial period, and now the local equilibrium was even 
more unsettled thanks to the silences from Ferdinand VII, a seemingly benevolent ruler 
and the last line of protection for many exploited communities. So the masses erupted, 
voicing their anger at President Pizarro and other local officials who had continued 
overseeing the Spanish colonial system in Chuquisaca. 
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 The rioters quickly began chanting and screaming their political demands in the 
plaza. Spanish authorities accused the mob of shouting “viva la Republica,” but everyone 
who was brought forward to testify denied these accusations. Much like Rios testified, 
Jose Joaquin Lemoyne reported that he heard “the voices of the crowd shouting [claims 
of] treachery” aimed at local representatives of the Spanish crown. Others, like Manuel 
Zudáñez, the brother of Jaime Zudáñez whose arrest kicked off the rebellion, witnessed 
“a multitude of people shouting, viva Fernando VII.”165 Rioters were demanding 
leadership that responded to their needs. They wanted a say in local representation, the 
amount and cadence of work, and the organization of local politics. The Bourbon 
reforms, an ineffective local leader like Pizarro, and the removal of a Monarch had 
amplified the exploitation of Spanish colonialism. The safety nets that had protected 
indigenous and cholos, like petitions directly to the monarch or local representatives like 
Zudáñez, seemed to have been destroyed by the Napoleonic invasions and local 
mismanagement by Pizarro. Alto Peruvians like Rios felt unheard—there were no official 
mediums to air their grievances—so they decided that they spoke for the king, until he 
returned, and were going to organize their social world how they saw fit.  
President Pizarro, alerted by the shouts of the mob, barely escaped the initial 
assault and fled with a small armed guard to a safer place. Despite escaping with his life, 
Pizarro was soon “abandoned by his guards,” and “he found himself in the most 
deplorable situation.” Pizarro had few supporters left in Chuquisaca because of the 
rumors that he was allied with Princess Carlota. According to the Archbishop Moxo, “the 
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masses were hallucinated and irritated with the supposed existence of a false and 
imaginary treason” and had turned on Pizarro and distrusted other Spanish officials.  
Allies of Pizarro helped him to get to a Pretorial house, and a group of priests 
periodically went to check in and “encourage and console the elderly” president. The 
rioters, however, continued their rebellion despite the escape of Pizarro and were able to 
free Zudáñez. Left to ponder his fate in quiet, Pizarro hid throughout the riot, avoiding 
capture and punishment at the hands of Chuquisaca residents.166  
The riot raged on and filled the city with what one observer called the “thorny 
circumstances of inquietude.” That evening, the horde assaulted multiple symbols and 
institutions that represented Spanish Imperial authority. The “rabble,” according to one 
observer , “furiously attacked the living quarters of…the Senor President Ramon Garcia 
Pizarro, entering through the windows because they could not go through the doors.” The 
shatter of broken glass, the thud of blows to the door, and the continued shouting of riots 
filled the plaza. They then attacked the President’s “armed guard, some of whom were 
injured.”167 The mob also attempted to attack the royal treasury, but a retired priest, Fray 
Marcos Jorge Benvente, defended the coffers by “hindering the plebe’s horrendous 
attempt to assault the Royal Treasuries.” The fury of the crowd “reached the extreme 
point of attacking the Churches and convents.”168 Chuquisaca residents had had enough 
of colonial exploitation and the leadership vacuum created by the Napoleonic invasions. 
Local Spanish authorities and the church had tried to settle fears and continue colonial 
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policies during the crisis in the metropole, but the masses no longer listened to the 
babbling voices of lesser authorities. They claimed the plaza and that the general will of 
the people ruled the Chuquisaca. 
In the turmoil of that night, the Chuquisaca crowd rose up and expressed their 
grievances against Spanish authorities by physically attacking local symbols of the 
Spanish colonial bureaucracy, the church, the president’s palace, and the Royal treasury. 
These institutions were failing, and the people were beginning to revoke their consent to 
be governed by the local representatives of Spanish colonialism. At this early stage, the 
rioters were not yet developing an alternative to Spanish colonialism. Like many other 
uprisings in the early nineteenth century, the Chuquisaca rebellion was not explicitly 
anticolonial or nationalist in its aim. The rebellion was more an attack against the 
symptoms of an increasingly dysfunctional and highly exploitative colonial model. In the 
cries, shouts, and chants of 25 May, rioters reaffirmed their loyalty to Ferdinand VII, but 
in the process, they articulated demands for revolutionary social change. Cholos and 
mulattos openly debated politics, they followed leaders that they popularly anointed, and 
they silenced Spanish leaders. The riot shows a transition towards a more inclusive future 
where the urban masses attempted to shape the local political structure. The anger and 
frustration caused by the colonial model caused rioters to envision new forms of political 
participation, even though they had not yet developed a true alternative to monarchism. 
The mob wanted political and social change, but they only had a few early ideas on what 
that new world would look like. 
Reportedly, Francisco Rios played a large role in this conflict and perhaps became 
the principal leader that night. Numerous observers claimed that Rios helped to lead the 
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rebellion, including Francisco Ponce, a local merchant, who testified that “the mulatto 
Quitacapas,” Rios’ nickname meaning cape thief, led “the cholos, perturbing the public 
society, and causing disturbances to the neighboring communities.”169 Jaime Zudáñez 
also claimed that Rios had nearly struck the President with a sable during the initial 
attack and suggested that it was “the mulatto Francisco Rios that made himself capitan of 
the cholos.”170 Others reported that they tried “to apprehend the mulatto known as El 
Quitacapas…[because] he was one of the caudillos who with his insidious seduction” had 
helped to spur on the movement.171 In his own testimony, however, Rios downplayed his 
involvement and claimed to be simply following the mob in their efforts to defend the 
sovereignty of the king. As an outsider to Chuquisaca, Rios would have stood out to 
locals. He was well known for his past infractions with the law, and he might have 
appeared a good scapegoat for the rebellion, conveniently fitting Spanish stereotypes 
about mulattos and rebellions.  
Rios, however, likely played a major role in the rebellion, as he earned his 
nickname “Quitacapas,” for his dramatic flair during the riot. At some point in the night, 
Rios stole a dark-red cape from a Spanish authority and wore it as his own. These capes 
were reserved for Spaniards and Creoles of power and authority in colonial Alto Peru. 
The dark-red cape made of fine fabric symbolized the Spanish colonial order—baroque 
authority, a hereditary hierarchy, and Spanish privilege in the colonial world. Rios turned 
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this symbol on its head and claimed it as his own.172 Rios claimed the ability to lead, to 
rule, and to speak as a local authority even though he was not a Spaniard, a letrado, or an 
appointed official. More than just a “carnivalesque” role reversal, Rios’ cape and his 
broader actions were a unique, and rather colorful, expression of the egalitarian and 
democratizing ideals that defined the early-nineteenth century.  
Whether the cape-clad Rios or someone-else in the unnamed “horde” took a 
leading role in the action, the testimony and resulting colonial explanations suggest that it 
was led by the popular classes. The rebellion was not a premediated act, and therefore 
was characterized mostly by spontaneity and reaction to the dysfunction of the late 
colonial period. That night, the crowd erupted both verbally and physically displaying 
their anger towards the political crisis in Chuquisaca. It was a backlash against local 
politics and was largely a movement to rectify local issues, but they also brought up 
issues that transcended their own city. In the outburst, they voiced their goal that the 
popular classes also needed to have a say in politics, which foretold the expansion of 
politic debate that would define the ideals of the Spanish American wars for 
independence and the age of revolutions more broadly.173 
The riot reached its fever pitch when the crowd erected a gallows in the central 
plaza with the intention of executing Pizarro. According to his testimony, Rios witnessed 
the mob yelling, “all the traitors should be hanged,” but they had no one to punish. Since 
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the crowd had not captured any of the supposed traitors, they enacted a performative 
display of their dissatisfaction. A local farmer, Antonio Amaya, witnessed the crowd 
transporting a gallows past his house, and he had heard gossip that a young man had 
“committed the excess of taking a portrait of the President Pizarro from the Hospital of 
San Juan de Dios.”174 The crowd used the portrait to hang the president in effigy. With 
cheers and jeers aimed at the now hiding Pizarro, they symbolically executed their 
President, the local symbol of Spanish authority, declaring themselves the leaders of 
Chuquisaca. 
Chuquisaca residents, perhaps in Quechua, announced a challenge to letrados and 
their colonial order; in the process, they also demanded that people of African and 
indigenous descent be heard in the political debates of their region. They hoped to protect 
their region from the outside threat of the Brazilian royal court and oust poor leaders like 
Pizarro. By doing so they reaffirmed their commitment to royalism and Fernando VII. 
Because of the disfunction of the late colonial period, however, they were also beginning 
to question elements of the colonial social world. Rioters were frustrated with the 
continued exploitation by the clergy, they no longer wanted to pay the tributary wages, 
and they questioned the colonial hierarchies of race and class. During the riot, 
Chuquisaca rioters began imagining a political future where indigenous subjects had the 
final say in local politics, mulattos wore capes of authority, and the masses spoke as the 
sovereign rulers of Chuquisaca. Although relegated to an urban center, these demands 
were revolutionary, foretelling the long struggle to create a more democratic and 
egalitarian future.  
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Hearing Liberty: The Cry of Liberty and its Broader Resonance  
 While the exhortations of the priests could not calm the crowd, the rioters began 
to quiet as news of Garcia Pizarro’s resignation reached their ears. At around three in the 
morning of 26 May 1809, the president formally resigned his post. By four in the 
morning, Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales, a Spanish colonel in charge of the royal 
army in Yamparaez, was temporarily put in charge of the city. The crowd slowly began 
to settle down, and Rios and the rest of the rioters returned to their homes. Exhausted 
from the events of the previous night, they rested for much of the next morning.  While 
the Chuquisaca riot dissipated quickly, the social and political commentary embedded in 
those cries did not peter out completely, allowing thousands to hear echoed versions of 
25 May 1809. The hurried, secondhand accounts they heard around Alto Peru were 
alarming. The Chuquisaca riot sounded revolutionary—a group of Andeans of native and 
African descent overthrew Spanish representatives of the crown and overturned the 
hierarchies that underwrote Spanish privilege in the Americas. In the act of hearing, a 
separate and fungible act, the Chuquisaca riot’s meaning became amplified. 
 Like an echo, news of the Chuquisaca riot began to spread around Alto Peru and 
the rest of South America. As Chuquisaca rested, couriers and others fleeing the city 
began carrying word of the previous night’s events around the Viceroyalty of Rio de La 
Plata. Jaime Zudáñez, in his testimony, recalled that “various subjects” fled the city as 
fugitives “declaring incredible things before the senor governor intendent [Paula Sanz],” 
even recommending “preparations of war” against Chuquisaca.175 First news of the 
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Chuquisaca mobilization reached nearby cities like Cochabamba and Potosi. As it spread, 
it eventually reverberated in the ears of Spanish authorities in the vice-regal capital of 
Buenos Aires, including the Viceroy of Rio de la Plata Santiago de Liniers. These 
officials interpreted the event as an anticolonial attack instead of a movement to 
overthrow a local leader and defend the honor of King Ferdinand VII.  
As Chuquisaca residents rested off the previous night’s events, Spanish officials 
began mobilizing military forces to muzzle Chuquisaca’s cry of liberty. According to 
Pazos Kanki, the actions in Alto Peru “aroused the Viceroy to greater activity” 
characterized by the “relentless vengeance.”176 Whispers of these outside events slowly 
started to reach Chuquisaca. Zudáñez recalled that the city became “rowdy” when news 
broke that the Potosi official Francisco Sanz was going to “invade Chuquisaca.” Arenales 
organized an armed force that “summoned  many Indians” from the surrounding area to 
protect the city.177 Sanz only had a small force and chose not to try to take the city and he 
chose to let passions relax. Having freed Zudáñez and taken control of the city, the rioters 
were content with the new leadership that they respected. Things began to return to 
normal by July 1809, with only a handful of participants facing trial and limited 
punishment for rioters like Rios.  
Although the Chuquisaca rebellion petered out following the renunciation of 
Pizarro, the city’s cry and the resulting backlash from colonial officials did not solve the 
lack of leadership and dysfunction of the late colonial period. Within months similar 
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rebellions took place in La Paz, Quito, Santa Cruz, and Buenos Aires. Spanish officials 
were convinced that the separate outbreaks were connected or influenced by the bad 
example of Chuquisaca. There are few direct connections between the rebellions; they are 
more likely separate contained movements lashing out against symptoms of a troubled 
Spanish imperial model that had fewer American defenders now that the metropole was 
in crisis.  But Spanish officials began searching for a continental wide plan to liberate 
South America, and they hoped to prevent this political movement from breaking out. 
Others Alto Peruvians heard something promising in the events in Chuquisaca 
and the other rebellions in South America. Bernardo Monteagudo, the local lawyer in 
Chuquisaca, heard in the riot the sounds of a new era and an opportunity to begin 
imagining a different political future. Later in life, he claimed Chuquisaca “ripped off the 
veil” of Spanish colonialism.178 Likewise, Vicente Pazos took inspiration from the 
Chuquisaca rebellion where, he recalled “these bold men felt the impulse of liberty 
irresistible in their hearts, and fearlessly” they “broke asunder impatiently the shackles of 
the ancient dominion.”179 Within the act of hearing and interpreting the riot, Alto 
Peruvians heard the anger and outrage of the crowd and the demands for change and 
believed it was a call to end the colonial relationship with Spain.  
Cañete, one of the leading loyalist figures in Potosi, called the riot the “spectacle 
of truth” and claimed he had never seen anything like it before, but he realized its 
significance. He explained, “the entire world spills its furor against the authors of an 
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inquietude never seen before, that has pulled all of the [Spanish Americas] to the edge of  
its precipice.”180 For Cañete, however, what lay beyond this edge was unclear. The 
fundamental ideas that would define Alto Peruvian society were still being crafted in 
1809, but the 25 May riot announced that the voices of unnamed cholos and cape-clad 
mulattos would define this revolutionary time.
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CHAPTER 4  
THE CHASQUIS OF LIBERTY: REVOLUTIONARY MESSENGERS IN 
ALTO PERUVIAN WARS FOR INDEPENDENCE,  1809-1816
 
Following the May 1809 urban rebellion in Chuquisaca, the city’s local scribe and 
recently turned revolutionary Francisco Angel Astete, published a proclamation calling 
on the “courageous inhabitants of La Paz, and the entire Peruvian empire” to rise up 
against Spanish rule.181 Sensing that the Spanish metropole was in a weakened state due 
to the Napoleonic invasion, Astete and a number of his peers questioned the legitimacy of 
the governing Juntas set up in Spain to rule during the crisis. Therefore, Astete urged his 
Alto Peruvian neighbors to take action because “now is the time to organize a new 
system of government founded on the interest of our homeland.”182 Astete’s rallying cry 
circulated around Alto Peru and reveals that Spanish forces may have been able to quell 
urban rebellions in the short term, but they could not completely repress Alto Peruvians’s 
revolutionary fervor. Over the next decade, a group of itinerant revolutionaries and their 
messages, like Astete’s, helped spread an emerging Alto Peruvian independence 
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movement throughout the South American continent and connected it to the broader 
Atlantic world.  
This group of itinerant revolutionaries served as metaphorical chasquis, or rapid 
travelling foot messengers of the Inca Empire, during the South American independence 
wars. While not all of them physically ran throughout the Andean region, as true chasquis 
would have, these revolutionaries traversed the Americas spreading messages of liberty 
and independence to the masses. Some chasquis were indigenous men or women who 
helped to connect communities through rumor and travel. Others were creoles or 
mestizos who sought to over throw the Spanish empire in Alto Peru by working with 
indigenous groups. Throughout their extensive travels to modern day Peru, Bolivia, and 
Argentina, these revolutionaries sought to convince nested communities made up of 
different racial, ethnic, and class backgrounds that the emerging independence project 
was not only possible but a better alternative to the continuation of Spanish colonialism.  
Historical research of Andean politics has travelled a path nearly as winding as 
the one followed by the chasquis of liberty. For much of the national period, scholars 
studied the actions of the founding fathers of their nation and revealed the political 
thought of the lettered cities of Latin America.183 In the 1960s and 1970s a new wave of 
historians sought to re-write this grand narrative in order to include the political 
contributions of the popular classes, indigenous communities, and people of African 
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descent.184 These scholars have greatly reshaped the new political history of South 
American independence, re-orienting the regions’ history to include the subaltern classes, 
but this revisionist interpretation has depicted subaltern politics as separate and “other” 
from the older political narratives, suggesting that indigenous and African communities 
were fighting for their own visions of the future instead of a nationalist project. 
Part of the reason for this disconnect is the methodological choice historians of 
the Andes have made by studying specific Andean cities, communities, or regions. By 
zooming in on a specific place, scholars have privileged local causes and political 
motivations. As a result, they fail to investigate the ways political ideas might have 
traveled the Andes with the people and goods that flowed around the Andean world.185 
By specifically focusing on movement and the flow of information, Andean political 
movements appear far less parochial and connections between South Americas’ founding 
fathers and the masses come into focus.  
The chasquis of liberty, through their travels, letters, public satires and 
newspapers, made an anticolonial movement and a national consciousness possible in 
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Alto Peru. These itinerant revolutionaries connected disparate communities together in a 
common cause by promising to avenge the Spanish conquest of the 1500s and deliver 
Alto Peruvian independence. Relying on a tragic memory of the conquest and an 
idealized image of the Inca past, they proposed the creation of a republican nation that 
would create a more egalitarian and representative future which would address issues that 
had plagued indigenous and creole communities in the Andes since the conquest era. In 
the process, the chasquis of liberty envisioned a political model that merged Andean 
political traditions, Inca symbolism and indigenous communalism, and Enlightenment 
political conventions, like human rights and constitutions, that offered a powerful and 
compelling alternative to the continuation of a colonial pact with Spain and served as the 
rallying cry of Alto Peru.  
 
Colonial and Revolutionary Chasquis in the Andes  
 
With towering mountains, high-altitude plateaus, and rolling valleys, the physical 
landscape of Alto Peru posed a significant challenge to timely communication, but 
generations of Andean societies had employed foot messengers to link communities 
across the region.186 An effective messaging system was key to governance in the Andes 
from the pre-conquest era all the way to 1809, when the urban centers of Chuquisaca and 
La Paz broke out in rebellion against the Spanish throne, and the ability to communicate 
and deliver messages would continue to be key throughout the Age of Revolutions in 
                                                           
186 Antonio de Alcedo, Diccionario Geográfico-Histórico De Las Indias Occidentales Ó 
América: Es Á Saber: De Los Reynos Del Perú, Nueva España, Tierra Firme, Chile, Y 
Nuevo Reyno De Granada. (Madrid, 1786). 
 
96 
South America. Immediately after the 1809 rebellions, the Spanish government was able 
to mobilize their messengers and call for reinforcements to stop unrest in Chuquisaca and 
La Paz. Following the unrest and the quelling of these rebellion, revolutionary minded 
Alto Peruvians, like the Chuquisaca scribe Astete, realized that if they wanted their 
anticolonial movement to succeed they would need a similar way to spread messages and 
coordinate a broader revolutionary consciousness that transcended a local setting. In 
short, they would need to develop their own system of chasquis.  
Despite the regions natural impediments, multiple generations of Alto Peruvians 
discovered innovative ways to navigate this environment. Pre-conquest civilizations, like 
the Incas, were able to rule a vast territory and deliver information across thousands of 
miles by using a far-ranging system of roads that still exists today. Along these “Inca 
trails” indigenous societies sent messages, officials, goods, and troops to all corners of 
the empire to create a degree of cultural continuity and ensure control of the region.187 
When the Spanish arrived and conquered the area in the early sixteenth century, they 
followed the Incas’ roads and built off this communication network to rule a vast 
territory. Thanks in part to this system, the Spanish were able to create a productive 
colony that enriched the metropole for three centuries.  
Throughout the pre-conquest and colonial era, the key figure who forged 
connections in Alto Peru and kept the region connected to the broader world was a “letter 
carrier,” or chasqui. These men were ubiquitous throughout the Andes, and commenters 
such as the mestizo chronicler of the conquest Guaman Poma de Ayala commented on 
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these messengers and their utility.188 Chasquis, which literally translates to “rapid 
travelers” in Quechua, were selected for their running speed and endurance as these skills 
were key to the timely delivery of information.189 Certain regions like the high altitude 
community of Larecaja, in modern day Bolivia, were renowned for their messengers.190  
Vicente Pazos Kanki, an indigenous intellectual and diplomat from Larecaja, 
mentions that chasquis did “indeed travel with wonderful rapidity. They fasten their 
letters to their body with straps, provide themselves with a bag of coca, some dried beef, 
corn, pepper, and a dollar in cash, and set forward, and finish their journey in the allotted 
time, in spite of every obstacle.”191 Pazos Kanki marveled at their routes, which he 
claimed were “always direct across the country, and they will traverse up and down the 
lofty mountains of the Andes with the same rapidity as on the plains.”192 These routes led 
to quick travel across space, and Pazos Kanki recalled that he knew chasquis “to travel 50 
leagues [approximately 150 miles] in four days.”193 These men made it possible to share 
information and experiences across vast distances in relatively little time, and made 
possible both governance and the growth of shared ideologies across the Andes. 
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Figure 4.1 “Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, “Coreon Major I Menor” in El primer nueva 
corónica y buen gobierno (1615/1616). København, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, GKS 2232 4. 
 
Even into the late colonial period, indigenous chasquis served a vital role for 
Spanish governance, and administrative officials took great care to ensure that they could 
carry out their travels in peace. In 1796, colonial administrative officials in the city of 
Chuquisaca and Potosi got into a heated argument over the treatment of an indigenous 
messenger named Blas Roque. The administrator of letters of Potosi, Antonio Ramon 
Zulaica, reported an “outrageous complaint” against officials in Chuquisaca who, he 
alleged, had incorrectly imprisoned Roque on August 15, 1796.194 Zulaica went on to 
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claim Roque was given an “arbitrary amount of lashes” to get him to report the 
whereabouts of a letter that Chuquisaca officials believed Roque had previously been 
charged with delivering.195  
Zualaica attempted to defend the chasqui, and reported that Roque had been a 
loyal messenger who had worked in the department of letters for “more than 15 years 
manually carrying correspondences by foot to the city” of Chuquisaca196 In urgent times, 
Roque had “with evident risk to his life” transported information to places as distant as 
“one hundred and fifty leagues from [Potosi].”197 Zualaica pleaded with Spanish officials 
to step in and free Roque who he knew was “entirely innocent of any culpability.”198 It’s 
uncertain if Zualaica’s pleas were heeded, but his passionate appeal to higher ranking 
officials shows the importance of Blas Roque, and chasquis in general, to the late 
eighteenth century Andes. Zualaica risked alienating his fellow colonial officials in Alto 
Peru by reporting the violence against the chasqui. Further, Zualaica took great care to 
protect Roque, an effort that was rarely extended to other indigenous men and women, 
and pleaded for a quick resolution to the conflict. Roque was a valuable messenger to 
Spanish colonial officials, and his case reveals just how vital rapid travelling messenger 
were in a terrain where horses and other beast of burden struggled to quickly move 
through the Andes.  
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Upon hearing news of the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, residents of 
the city of Chuquisaca and La Paz rose up in rebellion and the provinces of Alto Peru 
descended into revolutionary unrest in 1809. This revolutionary era meant that timely 
spread of information and propaganda only grew in importance. Spanish officials who 
remained loyal to the crown initially had a clear advantage in spreading communication. 
Jose Manuel de Goyeneche, the Spanish military official tasked with ruling Alto Peru 
during the European conflict, relied on existing colonial messengers and a network of 
priest to communicate with the masses. The crown and the church were in possession of 
the only printing presses in South America, and using these, they spread proclamations 
that tried to downplay any apprehension over the crisis in Spain. These officials rosily 
announced that “Ferdinand VII remained alive and the Spanish monarchy endured,” and 
they hoped that these announcements would ease concerns and instill confidence in the 
Spanish crown’s governance.199 Thanks to their messages they were able to call royalist 
reinforcements to the urban rebellions and smolder the unrest in the short term. 
Parallel to this officially sanctioned communication network, the chasquis of 
liberty began to develop a subversive system of messaging that was intended to 
undermine Spanish colonialism. In the early years of the rebellion, this underground 
network functioned on a localized level and allowed a number of vocal Alto Peruvians to 
spread messages that criticized Spanish governance. The medium these chasquis used 
was typically the pasquine. Pasquines have a long history in both southern Europe and 
Latin America as the etymology of the word pasquine is a reference to the early-modern 
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tradition of the “talking statues of Rome,” where dissatisfied romans would post witty 
satires criticizing social or political topics on statues around the city.200 Alto Peruvians 
began a similar practice and often posted cartoons, poems, or political tracts on city walls 
or on the doors of colonial officials.201  
While the style of pasquines varied, a Spanish official claimed they were part of a 
similar genre of “papers meant to induce distrust in the government.”202 Pasquines which 
were usually in manuscript form were found throughout the urban centers of Alto Peru 
including Chuquisaca, La Paz, and Potosi. In late 1809, for example, Francisco de Paula 
Sanz, the governor of the city of Potosi, reported the discovery of a “seductive pasquine” 
he found in various parts of city. According to Sanz, the pasquine “was being dispersed 
by method of little Indians” to the [k]urakas,” who were in charge of organizing 
indigenous tribute.203 Sanz claimed that the pasquine attempted to turn the Indians of the 
mita “against the Spanish government and Europeans.”204 Alto Peruvian revolutionaries 
relied on chasquis, in this case unnamed “little Indians,” and used these subversive satires 
to spread discord throughout the lettered cities of Alto Peru.  
 As unrest began in Alto Peru in 1809, two dueling sets of messages began flowing 
around Alto Peru. Royalists and many priest tried to ease concerns and calm the Alto 
Peruvian masses. Meanwhile, a revolutionary faction began developed a subversive 
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messaging system that used chasquis to create discord in Alto Peru. Revolutionaries, like 
Astete, began calling for an end to Spanish colonialism and Alto Peruvians began 
publishing more pasquines that both criticized and delegitimated Spanish institutions, like 
the mita. These networks were still rather small at this early stage, often only extending 
within small regions. The messages themselves were also not follow developed and the 
anti-colonial goals of the chasquis was still fuzzy at this stage. Revolutionaries were 
unhappy and wanted to form a new government, and they had begun articulating a 
platform that included a new system of government and a reduction or an elimination of 
indigenous tribute. It would take further time for the chasquis to craft a message that 
could transcend local environments and connect Alto Peru.  
A Chasqui like Journey: Defining and Expanding the Revolution 
 
In 1809 and the following years, revolutionary chasquis of African, indigenous, 
and creole descent began to hone and spread a rallying cry that brought together the 
diverse communities of Alto Peru in a loosely coordinated independence project. Their 
message built upon previous efforts to delegitimize Spanish authority and embraced 
many of the demands for change coming from indigenous and African communities in 
Alto Peru. To deliver their message, the chasquis of liberty utilized the memory of the 
Inca empire, because the Inca past was familiar to Alto Peruvians, and the Inca symbol 
was malleable enough to help envision a new future for the region.205 Using the Inca past, 
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the chasquis of liberty, like the Chuquisaca based lawyer Bernardo Monteagudo and 
priest Andres Jimenez de Leon, harnessed the potent potential of the Inca past by using 
the memory of the Spanish conquest of the Inca to demand an end to Spanish 
colonialism. In its place, the chasquis of liberty claimed they would avenge the Spanish 
conquest by restoring sovereignty of the Americas to those born in America, hinting that 
creole, as well as indigenous and African, Alto Peruvians would have the opportunity to 
govern their own region.206 
The chasquis of liberty’s rallying cry began quite informally, as a pasquine, 
entitled “The dialogue between Atawallpa and Fernando VII in the Elysian Fields.” The 
author of the manuscript is still debated by scholars, but one pro-independence figure 
known to publish multiple pasquines was the Chuquisaca lawyer Bernardo Monteagudo, 
the likely author of this rallying cry for independence. Monteagudo was an unlikely 
figure to define the Alto Peru’s independence movement. He was born and raised near 
president day Tucuman, Argentina within a middling, merchant class family. His father 
Miguel Monteagudo, a native of Spain who hoped he would find his fortune in the 
Americas, was the owner of a small shop that sold numerous household items in 
Chuquisaca. It is possible that Bernardo was mixed race as his peers, like the foreign 
observer William Bennet Stevenson, noted that Monteagudo had characteristics of a 
“zambo,” or a person of African and indigenous decent. Stevenson further described 
Monteagudo as “a native of Upper Peru, of the lowest ranks of society, of spurious 
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offspring, and African genealogy.”207 Thanks to the help of a local priest, Monteagudo 
was able rise from these humble origins and went on to study law at the University of San 
Francisco Xavier.  
While at the University of San Francisco Xavier, Monteagudo studied with the 
professor Victorian Villava, the rabid advocate for liberalizing Alto Peru through reforms 
to the mita, and read the key revolutionary literature of the day.208 In particular, 
Monteagudo noted that “the Social Contract of [Jean Jacques] Rousseau and other 
writings of this genre” had a formational impact on his intellectual beliefs.209 While at the 
University, Monteagudo was surrounded by numerous peers who had similarly read 
many of the texts emanating from the european enlightenment. However, Monteagudo 
stood out among his peers for a particular talent for writing and even his enemies, like 
Stevenson, noted that his “talents and literature…have been held up as possessing 
considerable perfection.”210 Monteagudo’s humble origins, radical education at the 
University of San Francisco Xavier, and his writing talents positioned him to develop a 
rallying cry in Chuquisaca.  
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In 1809, not long after the May 25 rebellion, Monteagudo began circulating pro-
independence propaganda throughout the city of Chuquisaca including his fictional 
dialogue between Atahualpa, the last Inca emperor before the Spanish conquest, and 
Ferdinand VII, the Spanish monarch of the early nineteenth century. Monteagudo’s 
fictional monarchs met in the mythical Elysian Fields, where Ferdinand VII laments the 
Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Monteagudo likely meant for this setting to 
be understood as a double entendre and a reference to the grand promenade in Paris 
which shares its name with the mythical fields.  In the dialogue, Atahualpa is initially 
sympathetic towards Ferdinand VII. By the end of the fictional exchange, however, 
Atahualpa starts drawing a direct comparison between the Napoleonic invasions and the 
Spanish conquest of the Inca Empire two centuries earlier. Ferdinand VII at first 
dismisses any similarities between the two conquests, but after a contentious debate, the 
Spanish king eventually accepts Atahualpa’s logic and concedes that the Spanish have no 
more claim over the Americas than Napoleon does over the Iberian Peninsula. In the 
dialogue’s powerful conclusion, the fictional Ferdinand VII proclaimed that “convinced 
by your reasoning…I myself would urge [Americans] to liberty and independence, rather 
than live subject to a foreign nation.”211 
In his dialogue, Monteagudo cleverly employs two of the most important figures 
in colonial Latin America: Ferdinand VII and Ataualhpa. Ferdinand VII was viewed 
favorably by most residents of the region and especially indigenous communities. Known 
as the desired one, Ferdinand VII was still viewed as the rightful sovereign of the Spanish 
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empire.212. Throughout the three centuries of Spanish colonialism, indigenous and 
African groups had learned ways to manipulate the colonial system to gain important 
concessions by appealing directly to the Spanish crown and had grown to see this 
powerful figure in a benevolent light.213 Beyond a naïve monarchism, these subaltern 
groups knew there were tangible benefits for remaining loyal to the Spanish crown.  
If any symbol was more revered in the Andes than the Spanish monarch, it was 
Inca. Thanks to the widespread diffusion of Garlisaco de la Vega’s Royal Commentaries 
of the Inca’s, residents of the Andean region had a wealth of positive information on the 
pre-conquest empire. De La Vega depicted an almost utopic Inca civilization free of 
exploitation, hunger, or crime. This was a powerful symbol in an era where many lived 
through those same plights, and people in the Americas and even Europe looked to the 
Inca as a possible cure to their societies ills. In Alto Peru, people of all classes and races 
revered the Inca as powerful cultural symbols. Into the late colonial period indigenous 
communities still commemorated their Inca ancestors and mourned the Spanish conquest. 
Pazos Kanki recalled that “the Indians have also their dramas, or theatrical 
representations, written in metre, with much purity and eloquence, in their own language. 
The subject of these pieces always alludes to the conquest.”214 The memory of the 
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conquest and “the supplications of Atahualpa” brought many indigenous men and women 
to shed tears for the tragic memory of their indigenous ancestors.215 Monteagudo utilized 
these two pervasive and persuasive figures, and he wielded them to call for revolutionary 
change.   
Monteagudo’s characters were even more useful for a revolutionary call to arms 
because of the recent reinvention of Inca symbolism. Following the Tupac Amaru II 
rebellion in the 1780s, which hinted at returning an Inca to power in the Andes, Inca 
symbolism became with subversive, revolutionary thought. Despite efforts by the Spanish 
crown to repress Inca symbolism, the Inca remained an important component in 
movements for change and reform and was used to depict a utopic future that might be 
attainable if only the Incas returned.216 The Incas, and Ferdinand VII lent legitimacy to 
Monteagudo’s dialogue, and the climax of his pasquine depicted a powerful consensus 
between these two powerful symbols, as both Atahualpa and Ferdinand VII agreed that 
Latin Americans should seek independence.  
The power of Monteagudo’s pasquine, however, did not arise from his use of 
esteemed figures, but from the pasquines’ proposal to avenge the conquest. Monteagudo 
overtly connected contemporary politics to the conquest era by employing the figures of 
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Atahualpa and Ferdinand VII. At the beginning of the Dialogue, Monteagudo has the two 
monarchs “compare…the conquest of [the Iberian] peninsula with that of the New World 
and the conduct of the French in Spain with that of the Spain in the Americas.”217 By 
drawing parallels between these two iconic events, Monteagudo was able to define the 
emerging independence movement as a vindication of the Inca past and suggest that 
sovereignty should not be left to outside conquerors. 
Using the memory of the conquest also allowed Monteagudo to point to the 
horrors brought about by the Spanish conquest and colonialism. In the dialogue, 
Monteagudo suggested the conquest brought nothing but “desolation, terror, and death” 
to all parts of South America.218  South America was left devastated and Monteagudo 
describes a horrific scene where “in all parts ran rivers of innocent blood, everywhere one 
looked they witnessed thousands of cadavers, unfortunate victims of the ferocious 
Spaniards.”219These horrific scenes only grew as the Spaniards secured their conquest 
and implemented their colony.  In Monteagudo’s extended discussion of the terrors 
brought about by Spanish colonization, he mentions the mita, a forced labor system 
which required indigenous men to mine for precious metal.  Monteagudo describes how 
“entire tribes of Indians are forced to mine the mountains where they descend to the 
deepest and most remote depths,” where they had to toil in a “dark and dismal chaos.”220 
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Monteagudo goes on to show how this forced labor system tore apart families, resulted in 
widespread hunger and death. In a moving seen, the fictional Atahualpa recounts seeing 
an “innocent mother bitterly crying over the tragic death of her dear child” who had died 
while mining for the mita. The mourning mother “eventually died from a broken 
heart.”221 Throughout the dialogue, Monteagudo uses Atahualpa to expose the most 
oppressive and horrible scenes of colonialism and provide concrete examples for why it 
was time to consider ending the colonial relationship with Spain. Instead of defining the 
revolutionary movement as one against Ferdinand VII, Monteagudo outlined a cause to 
avenge Spanish conquest and end three centuries of Spanish oppression.   
Monteagudo’s pasquine had all the elements to be a rallying cry, on par with 
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense with worked as a catalyst for the independence process 
in North America, for Alto Peruvian independence, but it failed to spread beyond the city 
walls of Chuquisaca. Monteagudo work cleverly used important regional symbols, 
developed a revolutionary platform, and provided incisive criticism of Spanish 
colonialism. Further, the dialogue, which some scholars suggest was performed, would 
have fit into a recognizable Andean genre of street drama centering on conquest era 
figures.222 However, Monteagudo’s manuscript had a few fatal flaws. Monteagudo used 
erudite language and shifted into Latin on multiple occasions throughout the dialogue, 
which would not have resonated with the majority of Alto Peruvians. But more 
importantly, the manuscript only circulated around the lettered city of Chuquisaca. At this 
early stage, pro-independence leaders like Monteagudo had not yet forged physical and 
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personal connections that could braid together the rural and urban countryside in an 
efficient and cohesive manner.223  
Even though Spanish authorities cracked down on the pasquines of Monteagudo 
and his peers, other revolutionaries continued to produce revolutionary literature and 
forged broader connections into the indigenous communities of Alto Peru. In 1810, the 
honorary canon of the Cathedral of Chuquisaca, Andrés Jiménez de León y Manco 
Cápac, “was the principal author of a general revolution compromising the provinces of 
Potosi and Cochabamba.”224 Andrés Jiménez de León y Manco Cápac, who was either an 
indigenous noble or mestizo of notable indigenous decent, took issue with the local 
authorities who were ruling in King Ferdinand VII’s name in Alto Peru and the ways they 
exploited indigenous communities. Like Monteagudo, he embraced the Inca past, by 
claiming the nickname Manco Cápac, the founder of the Inca civilization.  The Canon 
Manco Cápac had vast connections around Alto Peru and assembled a number of close 
conspirators including Juan Manuel Caceres, Gavino Estrada, Hipolito Sandeo, and the 
cacique of Toledo named Titichoca. These connections were made possible by 
Mancocapac’s use of Inca symbolism, clear policy goals, and his use of indigenous 
messengers to spread information. 
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The Canon Mancocapac began organizing his rebellion shortly after the 
Chuquisaca rebellion in 1809, and he used a system of indigenous messengers to connect 
much of the valley region of Alto Peru together into a potential revolutionary territory.  
From his outpost in Chuquisaca, Mancocapac sent messengers to neighboring provinces 
of Potosi and Cochabamba to gauge their interest in a political upheaval. Spanish 
authorities who captured one of his messengers claimed that Mancocapac hoped “to 
manipulate the innocent communities, subvert the miserable and gullible Indians, and 
lead them with the detestable ideas of not paying tribute…to their parish priest and their 
legitimate authorities.”225 Colonial authorities were terrified of his “diabolical influence,” 
and believed that Mancocapac wanted to “leave these provinces inhabited by only the 
Indians so they remain the masters of this America.”226 Enacting the promises of pro-
independence pasquines, Mancocapac and his followers posed a genuine threat to the 
colonial order and the future of the Spanish colonies. Using the symbol of the inca, along 
with policy proposals to abolish tribute and give political sovereignty to indigenous 
communities, Mancocapac proposed an alternative future for Alto Peru, and one that 
might have been more compelling than the continuation of Spanish colonialism.  
Mancocapac’s agenda was defined in negotiation with the indigenous 
communities of the region. Mancocapac’s chasquis also appear to have carried 
information from indigenous communities back to the leaders of the rebellion. The flow 
of information was not unidirectional and Mancocapac seemed particularly interested in 
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the wishes of the indigenous communities he hoped to attract. Within Mancocapac’s case 
file, there was a list of twelve demands made by indigenous communities. This list not 
only circulated in the Chuquisaca, Potosi, and Cochabamba region of Alto Peru, but it 
was spread along “the general route of Cusco, Arequipa, and Huamanga.”227 
Interestingly, the path followed a large economic zone defined by a large indigenous 
society.228 The demands of the indigenous communities varied, but collectively they 
revolved around three principal concerns: governance, tribute payment, and land 
ownership.  
Indigenous communities in the region demanded greater respect to their local 
governance and wanted to increase their ability to remove poor leaders. Of particular 
concern was the position of sub-delegate. Indigenous communities wanted to remove the 
position completely because they viewed the position as superfluous and exploitative. 
The indigenous communities claimed that sub-delegates were “no more than leaches that 
do not rule justly, do not do a thing other than rob the poor Indians, and cause pain and 
more pain.”229 Instead the indigenous communities wanted to replace this position with 
“judges” through a method of “election within the community.”230 The indigenous 
demands were also aimed at other local leaders including some, local indigenous leaders, 
called caciques, and priest. Not all indigenous leaders and priests were targets, but the 
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indigenous demands specified that caciques “who were thieves” and “pirate priests” 
should be removed and replaced by ones elected by their community. In addition to 
concerns about leadership, communities wanted to ensure that they had jurisdiction over 
their communities and demanded that “they will not take from the communities of 
Indians any legal rights” and will allow them to settle disputes. Collectively these 
demands show a concern with being able to claim primary jurisdiction on issues related 
to their community.  
Along with ensuring their local jurisdiction, indigenous communities sought to 
protect themselves from economic exploitation. The indigenous communities said they 
“would not continue paying the tributes, until it is known to whom there is to contribute,” 
and they specifically noted that they had been forced to pay during the last few years 
even though “the king was killed by the French.”231 In this uncertain era, indigenous 
communities assumed without a rightful Spanish King in power, any pact they had made 
to pay tribute had been nullified.232  The indigenous also demanded to stop paying the 
tax, wanted to end “the mita of Potosi” because the mine owners had made the 
indigenous into “captives worse than in Turkey,” and demanded an abolition of any 
religious payments made to priest. In particular indigenous communities wanted to end 
payments related to burials, marriages, and baptisms. Finally, indigenous communities 
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wanted to ensure that they could not be forced to work or have their animals taken from 
them without fair payment.233  
The final element that indigenous communities wanted was to ensure that they 
would not have their land encroached upon in the future. In their petition, they demanded 
a prohibition on any hacienda owner claiming indigenous landing, hoping to block creole 
landowners from “steal[ing] land” or moving into the lands of indigenous communities. 
They also wanted to prohibit “mestizos that were harmful” from coming into indigenous 
communities lands. Collectively the indigenous communities’ demands outline an 
indigenous political agenda that focuses on the issues of economic exploitation, 
governance, and protection of indigenous land rights. The indigenous communities hoped 
that these demands would help improve the life of their communities and ensure that 
“they do not suffer like captive slaves in these lands.”234 
The demands in this letter resonate with previously stated goals of indigenous 
movements like the Tupac Katari and Tupac Amaru II rebellion. In all these cases 
indigenous groups protested economic exploitation and asserted their communities’ right 
to govern itself. However, the fact that indigenous communities decided to broadcast 
these demands reveals that some indigenous communities seemingly agreed that the best 
way to achieve these goals was through a regionally bounded, proto-nationalist 
movement. Indigenous communities began to understand that the best way to achieve 
their long held goals was not through requests to the Spanish monarchy or Spanish 
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officials and not through a localized rebellion, but by working under the umbrella of a 
larger movement against regional colonial officials. The flow of information made 
possible by chasquis had helped to expand indigenous consciousness and made possible a 
regional rebellion with anti-colonial ambitions. 
Monteagudo and especially Mancocapac developed this emerging consciousness 
through their use of indigenous symbolism and concrete demands and made a larger 
rebellion in Alto Peru a possibility. Mancocapac’s strategies had many parallels to 
broader revolutionary movements in Alto Peru. Like Monteagudo’s dialogue and Tupac 
Amaru II, the honorary canon Andres Jimenez de Leon took on the persona of a former 
emperor of the Inca Empire to symbolically define his movement. The name he took, 
Mancocapac, was a reference to the mythical Manco Capac who was revered as the first 
ruler and founder of the Inca civilization in Cuzco around the thirteenth century. The 
mythical Manco Capac was the main protagonist in the origin stories of the Inca 
civilization.235 Like Monteagudo, the Canon Mancocapac connected contemporary 
politics to the Inca past, and his choice in pseudonym foretold a new era in Alto Peru—
one different from Spanish colonialism.  
Colonial officials immediately recognized the symbolic significance of this term 
and attributed Jimenez’s clever use of the title as his key to success. This led the Viceroy 
of Peru, Jose Fernando de Abascal, to request a new canon for the Coro of Chuquisaca 
who would “promote the unity and conservation of the Spanish Government.” In part, 
Abascal hoped this new religious authority might help combat the “rebel Manco Capac, 
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who with this false title of the ancient Incas, remains uncaptured and continues seducing 
gullible natives.”236 Colonial officials like Viceroy Abascal seemed to believe the mere 
mention of the Inca could produce a “pavlovian reaction” to rebel within indigenous 
communities.237 While the symbol of the Incas was powerful, Andres Mancocapac also 
couched real policy proposals in his platform. Mancocapac openly advocated for an 
ending of tribute payments for indigenous communities in Potosi and Cochabamba. This 
was something that indigenous communities had been campaigning for throughout the 
colonial period. And if we are to believe the Spanish officials, Mancocapac’s movement 
was meant to increase power for indigenous people in the Americas.  
This seditious movement to eliminate tribute and give power back to Alto 
Peruvians was never fully put into action due to the chance discovery of instructions sent 
by Mancocapac’s co-conspirators. In August of 1810, a soldier in Potosi handed over to 
Governor Sanz “the papers, which were carried by an Indian who was the guarantor of 
the discovery of such criminal evilness.”238 Thanks to this chance discovery, colonial 
officials were able to find a few of Mancocapac’s conspirators including Juan Manuel 
Caseres, Gavino Estrada, and Hipolito Sandaeta where they were living “in a Ranch of 
Indians.”239 These arrests largely thwarted the plot, but the cacique of Toledo, Titichoca, 
avoided capture and carried on the rebellion from his indigenous community in Toledo.   
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While only briefly mentioned, the indigenous chasquis who carried the seditious 
papers both made the conspiracy possible and led to its downfall. Mancocapac and his 
conspirators relied on this indigenous man, and likely other similar indigenous men, to 
carry their information across space and connect groups from the intendancies of 
Yampares, Potosi, and Cochabamba into a unified rebellion. This messaging system was 
a chasqui network similar to those of the pre-conquest and colonial worlds, but 
Mancocapac was using it to forge a revolutionary consciousness that connected the urban 
and rural environments of Alto Peru and brought together indigenous communities with 
creole or mestizo priests. Monteagudo and Mancocapac linked the emerging rebellion 
with the Inca by claiming to avenge the conquest by ending Spanish colonialism and 
creating an alternative future that would allow for governance by Alto Peruvians. This 
message, and the chasquis who transported it, allowed the rebellion to transcend  local 
agendas and outlined broad agenda shared by Alto Peruvians. Ultimately, the downfall of 
the rebellion came when colonial officials got a hold of the seditious papers. Perhaps the 
unnamed chasqui was captured and coerced into turning over the information or maybe 
he freely turned against the Mancocapac conspiracy. Whatever the case, the chasqui and 
the instructions he was carrying helped connect Alto Peruvians in a proto-nationalist 
movement that had revolutionary implications. 
Inca Republicanism 
The failed Mancocapac conspiracy marked the end of the first wave of rebellions 
in Alto Peru, but the chasquis of liberty were able to regroup outside of Alto Peru and 
began to sure up their plans for retaking Alto Peru. In the first wave, Alto Peruvians had 
led localized rebellions in the cities of La Paz and Chuquisaca and through a system of 
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messaging that allowed them to connect a variety of nested communities. There 
remained, however many royalist supports in Alto Peru and the chasquis’ revolutionary 
activity aroused a brutal royalist backlash in 1811. As the chasquis of liberty escaped 
capture, they regrouped further south in the former viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata, and 
they began to further develop their revolutionary agenda. There rallying cry to avenge the 
conquest had served to unite disparate communities, but the chasquis now needed to 
clarify their intention for the future governance of Alto Peru. The chasquis elaborated on 
their plan by outlining a republican future for Alto Peru and all of South America that 
would avenge the conquest by returning political power to South Americans.  
After stopping the urban rebellions in Chuquisaca and La Paz, royalist started 
suppressing revolutionary propaganda and the chasquis of liberty who were spreading. 
According to Pazos Kanki, a revolutionary priest turned journalist of indigenous descent, 
the royalists “established a political inquisition more severe than” the religious 
inquisition that had rocked Spain in the fifteenth century.240 This political inquisition 
imprisoned many of the ardent revolutionaries, where they became “victims of Spanish 
wrath.”241 Included in those who were captured was Bernardo Monteagudo, the author of 
the pasquines that defined the revolutionary movement, who was held prisoner “until 
sentencing but without a definitive cause,” but he later escaped.242 The Canon 
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Mancocapac avoided capture, but royalists soon put out a reward for any information 
related to his imprisonment.  
Under this Spanish wrath, many pro-independence figures chose to leave Alto 
Peru and re-group in Buenos Aires. Revolutionaries in Buenos Aires had led their own 
successful revolutionary movement in May of 1810, and had secured a contested 
independence from Spain, making the area southeast of Tucuman a refuge for 
revolutionary thinkers.243 Along this thousand mile route, chasquis of liberty, like 
Monteagudo and Pazos Kanki, brought their ideas and forged connections with like-
minded thinkers. The central figure who connected the revolutions, Juan Jose Castelli, an 
argentine lawyer and key figure in the May Revolution of Buenos Aires, had spent 
considerable time in Alto Peru. Castelli previously attended the University of San 
Francisco Xavier, were he studied under the reformist Villava and met many of the future 
Alto Peruvian revolutionaries. Castelli served as a natural point of contact in the new 
environment. According to Pazos Kanki, Castelli “made his country-house the 
rendezvous for the secret meetings of the revolutionists. There they met, eluding the 
vigilance of the governmental spies.”244 His meetings brought together chasquis of 
liberty, and together they began to discuss what type of government and nation they 
hoped to create. 
Despite leaving Alto Peru, the chasquis always envisioned an independent Alto 
Peru. Throughout 1810-1815, they sought ways to liberate their homeland and to share 
information far into the interior of the continent to make sure that Alto Peruvians were 
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kept informed on the political debates taking place in Buenos Aires. The revolutionaries, 
envisioned a broader political entity called the United Provinces of South America that 
would have adhered to much of the colonial Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata.245 To make 
this possible Castelli and other Alto Peruvian revolutionaries organized an armed force 
and tried to build on the success of the May Revolution and liberate Alto Peru. During 
their campaigns, Castelli and his allies tried to spread their movement using indigenous 
symbolism and concrete policy promises just as the chasquis forerunners had in 1809 and 
1810.246 
In 1811, Castelli led the first of three campaigns to liberate Alto Peru. Throughout 
his travels, Castelli tried to appeal to indigenous groups and enlist their support. Castelli 
met with indigenous leaders, explained tenants of the revolutionary platform, and often 
used indigenous symbolism as a medium to discuss his revolutionary goals. In his most 
famous address, Castelli gave a celebratory speech from the ruins of the ancient Aymara, 
a different preconquest indigenous civilization, religious site of Tiahuanco.  In this 
address, Castelli celebrated the one year anniversary of the Argentine’s May Revolution 
and addressed a largely indigenous audience. Castelli proclaimed, today we celebrate 
“the installation of the government that happily has restored to the habitants of all the 
provinces of Rio de la Plata the possession of liberty, property, and security that for more 
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than three centuries have been usurped by tyranny.”247 He continued and promised to the 
large audience, Castelli the suppression of colonial abuses, an end to taxes, an abolition 
tributes on indigenous groups, the distribution of lands, the creation of schools, and he 
declared “the Indian is equal to any other national.”248 In the speech, Castelli outlined a 
remarkably inclusive vision for Alto Peru’s future using the language of human equality, 
much as other revolutionaries in the United States and France had done in the late 
eighteenth century.  
Castelli’s clear policy goals would have resonated with indigenous groups, but the 
Castelli’s words gathered more meaning due to the site of the speech. Tiauhanco was an 
important cultural and religious site to those in the Andes, even if it was not Inca in 
origin, and Castelli recognized this. Referencing the ruins he spoke from, Castelli told his 
audience to look at the “sad spectacle of these ancient monuments, annihilated by the 
ambition” and ruined by Spanish colonialism. He called on the audience “to listen to the 
clamors of these last vestiges of the magnificence of our ancestors, and avenge their 
insulted memory.”249 Castelli openly connected the emerging independence movement 
with a vindication of the ancient indigenous civilizations of Alto Peru, and he presciently 
                                                           
247 Castelli, “Proclama,” in Discurso en celebridad del triunfo que la fidelisima villa de 
Oruro alcanzó contra el exercito revolucionario invasor de Cochabamba, el 16 de 
noviembre del presente año de 1811. El D.D. Marcos Guzman, cura y vicario del 
beneficio de Sacaca, lo pronunció en la Iglesia Matriz de la misma villa, el 30 de dicho 
mes y año. (Lima, 1813), JCBL, Peru. 
248 John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826., 124. 
249 Castelli, “Proclama,” in Discurso en celebridad del triunfo que la fidelisima villa de 
Oruro alcanzó contra el exercito revolucionario invasor de Cochabamba, el 16 de 
noviembre del presente año de 1811. El D.D. Marcos Guzman, cura y vicario del 
beneficio de Sacaca, lo pronunció en la Iglesia Matriz de la misma villa, el 30 de dicho 
mes y año, (Lima, 1813), John Carter Brown Library (JCBL), Perú Collection. 
 
122 
foretold, in your “arms of bronze” and “in your hands is the liberty of the patria.”250 At 
Tiauhanco, Castelli called on his largely indigenous audience to return Alto Peru to its 
preconquest splendor and reclaim political control of their region. 
Castelli’s speech and most of the chasquis of liberty’s writings share a common 
theme and revolutionary goal, avenging the conquest. The Argentine general pointed to 
the Spanish conquest as the source for the ruin of the ancient indigenous civilizations and 
suggested that the three hundred years of Spanish colonialism created the terrible 
conditions that his indigenous audience now faced. Castelli connected their military 
campaign with the ancient Inca and Aymara civilizations and defined their project as a 
vindication project of these long dead ancestors. Like numerous revolutionaries before 
them, the chasquis of liberty realized the revolutionary potential of Inca symbolism and 
used the mythology of a just and equal pre-conquest civilizations to unify Andeans into a 
revolutionary movement. 
Castelli’s speech sent shockwaves around the Andean world and meant different 
things to various audiences. Pazos Kanki lauded Castelli’s speech and recalled the festive 
atmosphere of “the 25th of May, 1811, [where] they celebrated the anniversary of the 
revolution on the magnificent runs of the Palace of the Inca, Mayta Capac at Tiahuanaco, 
singing hymns to their country and liberty.”251 However, Alto Peruvians with loyalist 
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leanings were horrified of the news. One loyalist priest, Marcos Guzman from Sacaca, 
recalled the Argentines “proclaimed that we should avenge the ashes of the Incas.”252 
Guzman was appalled by the “idolatrous” nature of this “ethnic ceremony that ended with 
many and repeated toast to [the] goddess of lewdness, liberty, and independence.”253  To 
the loyalist Guzman, this speech represented a large threat to the colonial order because it 
was openly tinged with what he called an “ethnic” agenda. Despite different views of the 
speech, news of Castelli’s powerful address quickly spread around the Andes, and the 
next year there were rumors hundreds of miles away in Huánuco, Peru that the arrival of 
Inca Castelli was imminent.254 
The failure of the first Alto Peruvian campaign, forced the chasquis of liberty to 
retreat to Buenos Aires where they continued to try to spread revolution and ensure Alto 
Peruvian independence. Buenos Aires was a hub for revolutionary thought and it had a 
lively print culture which allowed political debates to play out in public. The port city had 
one of the few printing presses in South America at that time, and it became a vital tool 
for the chasquis to spread their revolutionary messages. Pazos Kanki, who had traveled 
the thousand mile route from La Paz to Buenos Aires, recalled that he had never “beheld 
a printing press until my arrival,” but he immediately saw the possibilities inherent in the 
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“admirable invention.”255 Pazos Kanki recognized the printing press’ potential, and he 
“fancied…in those mute characters, the types, the fountain of that light which ere long 
would burst forth and dissipate the clouds of despotism which darkened the horizon of 
my beloved country.”256 Pazos Kanki and his fellow chasquis of liberty thought the print 
industry would help to further expand their revolution and forge a national project that 
went beyond a local or regional level.257 In the preconquest past, chasquis would have 
carried quipus to transfer information, but in the nineteenth century, they believe print 
culture would be the medium of their revolutionary message.  
As journalists, the chasquis of liberty entered into the main debates of the age and 
sought to convince their peers of the importance of political independence and republic 
government. They often took a multi-tiered approach to this project by both translating 
political documents into other languages and putting their own political ideas into print. 
Pazos Kanki, in particular, went to great lengths to translate documents into Spanish, 
including Thomas Paine’s famous tract Common Sense, with the hope of making the 
South American revolution convincing to as wide an audience as possible. He also 
translated many of the political documents and decrees emanating from the burgeoning 
government of the United Provinces of South America into indigenous languages like 
Aymara and Quechua.258 
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Throughout his revolutionary literature, Pazos Kanki too employed the theme that 
the present political movement was an effort to avenge the conquest. Pazos Kanki 
depicted the Spanish and the three centuries of colonialism as a dark tragedy where 
“every step of the Spaniards in America has been marked with blood.”259 He suggested 
this began with the conquest when “Pizarro and his bloody banditti, in the most cruel and 
treacherous manner, murdered the unfortunate Atahualpa, a monarch most beloved by his 
people” and thus they “destroyed the only government then existing in the world, which 
was founded upon the will, and consulted the happiness of the people in its 
administrations.”260 Pazos Kanki openly lamented the fall of the Incas and believed that 
the present revolution would create another government inspired by the Inca past and 
founded on the will of the people. By using the Inca as a symbolic ancestor Pazos Kanki 
hoped South Americans could create a new nation that would be just and equitable.261  
Pazos Kanki began articulating these goals while he worked at a number of 
newspapers in Buenos Aires before becoming the editor of the Censor and La Cronica 
Argentina. Throughout his publications, Pazos Kanki advocated for his ideal vision of an 
independent South America and contested any return to monarchy. Pazos Kanki 
repeatedly claimed that the best way to avenge the conquest was by founding a 
republican nation. Pazos Kanki believed that liberal democratic institutions were vital 
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tenants of any independent nation that he envisioned, and he published articles in 
Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara advocating for a liberal-democratic nationalism.  
Many of his most opinionated articles came about during the contentious 
meetings during the Congress of Tucuman. This congress convened in 1816, and 
delegates from modern day Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia met to discuss a 
political system to rule the newly renamed United Provinces of South America, formerly 
the Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata. After the delegates appointed Juan Martin De 
Pueyrredon as leader of the delegation, intense debates broke out within the congress and 
in the press over what type of governmental structure could best govern the region and 
protect their separatist intentions from the Spanish crown. A few of the thirty two 
delegates proposed the coronation of a European monarch or a literal installation of an 
Inca to govern the United Provinces of South America.  They saw the resonance of Inca 
symbolism and hoped to utilize their memory to govern much of South America.262 
Powerful figures like an Inca or a king, they hoped, might help to provide stability to a 
region of ethnic, geographic, and economic diversity. 
Pazos Kanki vehemently opposed a new Inca and ridiculed the idea of a monarch 
in South America. Pazos Kanki took a satirical approach to condemning the idea of the 
restoration of a literal Inca crown by comparing it to other restorationist groups. He 
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recounted that “in Portugal there is a very widespread sect of men that are not crazy, but 
maybe somewhat extravagant, known as the Sebastianistas because to this day they await 
the coming of King Don Sebastian who died in 1578.”263  King Sebastian, the child King 
of Portugal from 1554-1578, died during a series of crusades in Morocco, but a legend 
grew that he had escaped and would return to Portugal, reclaim the throne, and help to 
save Portugal from their contemporary struggles.  Pazos Kanki ridiculed this idea as very 
imaginative, but warned his readers that “you should know that among us are those, with 
no less fanaticism, who promote the return of monarchs that ended their reign in 1533, 
announcing the return of the Incas.”264  To Pazos Kanki this proposal was both laughable 
and highly dangerous. Pazos Kanki sought to dissuade the literal restoration of an Inca by 
challenging the utopic memories of the Inca Empire. Pazos Kanki respected the Incas as a 
powerful symbol, employed their symbolism including the Inca sun in his own 
newspaper, and wanted to avenge their defeat. He openly praised Incas for creating cities 
of “roman grandeur” and forming a society with “laws more or less just and equitable.”265 
However, Pazos Kanki adamantly opposed restoring an Inca monarch in South America. 
Therefore, Pazos Kanki used the Incas as a trope to discuss his revolutionary 
platform and promote a nation based on republican government. In doing so, Pazos Kanki 
pointed to the divisions within the Inca empire that ultimately led to their defeat, and 
reminded his readers that “Atahualpa was judged before a tribunal (although incompetent 
and cruel) as a bastard and usurper of the throne, as the murderer of his brother Huascar 
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who was stripped by Atahualpa of his legitimate right” to rule.266  Pazos Kanki argued the 
conflict between Huascar and Atahualpa was a “violent convulsion” that “tore apart the 
empire, first by the civil war between the Incas, and later by the invasion of the Spanish, 
had not only dislocated the governmental order of Peru, but also dissolved its 
constitution.”267  The Inca Empire was at the state of dissolution and had endemic 
“disorders.”268 Far from a utopia, Pazos Kanki argued that the empire was flawed, 
divided, and collapsed not because of the Spanish but because of its own failings.  
Pazos Kanki was shocked that some of the delegates of the Congress of Tucuman 
“wanted to found a constitution on the reputation of a false Vatican in the middle of the 
enlightenment of the nineteenth century.”269 To Pazos Kanki, the Incas were an important 
standard in South American’s shared history, and he lauded their accomplishments, 
suggesting the example of the Incas pointed to the promise of South Americans. He even 
thought of them as a possible model for the nation he wanted to create as he noted that he 
did not contend “that the government of the Incas was free from evils. The Peruvians 
were essentially free; they exercised the right of self-government, and lived under rulers 
of their choice, and the history of Peru, even as related by the Spaniards, records no 
feature of systematic oppression or of wanton encroachment, by the Incas, on the rights 
of the people.”270 Instead, Pazos Kanki proposed to model parts of the future government 
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of the United Provinces of South America on elements of the Democratic-Republican 
principles of the era. 
Despite having reservations regarding the Inca plan being discussed during the 
congress of Tucuman, Pazos Kanki still attempted to publicize the actives of this 
congress. So he translated the Declaration of Independence of South America into the 
indigenous languages of Quechua and Aymara to promote the idea of independence 
rather than the return of an Inca Monarchy.271 Pazos Kanki hoped by translating and 
circulating news of these political events  he could help to forge a national consciousness 
and unite much of South America into a broad federal system of government. Pazos 
Kanki envisioned a republican nation that could “establish and maintain that political 
balance which ought to exist between the people and the government.”272 He thought 
through using the memory of the Inca and the promise of avenging the conquest, he could 
promote the benefits of republican institutions, and that Alto Peruvians would rally 
around this new political consciousness.  
Writers like Pazos Kanki, although relegated to Buenos Aires, were able to 
effectively transport their messages far into the interior of South America during much of 
the war. In October of 1810, the viceroy of Peru, Jose Fernando de Abascal, mentioned 
the revolts unfolding in Alto Peru and was particularly concerned with the propaganda 
sent by the revolutionaries in Buenos Aires. The viceroy included a copy of one seditious 
document to give the crown “an idea of the perverse scheming of the infamous Junta in 
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Buenos Ayres.”273  According to the viceroy, “they had introduced [in Alto Peru] more 
than two-hundred copies, directed by the postal service to many groups and particular 
individuals.”274  Chasquis, like Monteagudo, Pazos Kanki, and Mancocapac, and many 
unnamed revolutionaries, were spreading an alternative vision for the future by rumor, 
manuscript, and print around Alto Peru. In an effort to combat this flow of information, 
the viceroy sent out his own proclamation to condemn their seditious plot “to introduce 
the spirit of revolution in all of South America.”275 The viceroy tried to expose 
revolutionaries as fraudulent and commanded “Spanish Americans: now that you see 
these demonstrations of treachery, and false claims with which the insurgents of the 
capital of Rio de la Plata try to deceive you, don’t listen, burn with disdain” these 
seditious papers.276 Despite the viceroy’s condemnations, the contagion of revolutionary 
literature continued flowing around Alto Peru.  
The chasquis of liberty generally made pleas for independence and offered real 
concessions relevant to indigenous communities. In 1813, the General Assembly of the 
provisional government in Buenos Aires published a decree which abolished “tribute, and 
also repealed the mita, the encomiendas, and the yanaconazgo, and the personal service 
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of the Indians” into Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani languages.277 A few years later, in 
1815, the viceroy of Peru again uncovered a newspaper from Buenos Aires that contained 
a proclamation made by an Alto Peruvian priest, who they had previously believed was a 
staunch loyalist. This proclamation was according to the viceroy, an “anathema of 
justice” because it openly called for support for the revolutionary government in Buenos 
Aires and advocated for independence.278  
These messages reached numerous indigenous communities in Alto Peru. In 1816, 
the viceroy reported that indigenous communities were even helping to spread 
revolutionary messages. According to the viceroy’s report, an Indian “from the miserable 
post of Pandura has made himself Caudillo of insurgents” and was “publishing…in the 
form of a proclamation” a report that announced “the troops of Argentina were getting 
close.”279 The viceroy’s report indicated that the Indian from Pandura put himself in 
charge of the communities in order to ensure the revolutions’ “triumph and the ruin of the 
troops of the king.”280 As these examples show, there was a frequent and illicit flow of 
information between revolutionaries in Buenos Aires and likeminded allies in the interior 
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provinces of Alto Peru. Their works and their military advances into the interior were 
meant to spread the rebellion into all of South America and convince the nested 
communities of Alto Peru that their emerging United Provinces of South America was a 
better alternative to remaining loyal subjects of the Spanish monarchy.  
Conclusion 
As the chasquis of liberty traversed the Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata, these 
revolutionaries made an independence movement and a national political consciousness 
possible. Chasquis, like Pazos Kanki and numerous other unnamed messengers, 
physically and ideologically connected nested communities into a common cause and 
helped the region develop a broader political consciousness. Therefore, the birthplace of 
Alto Peruvian nationalism was not in any singular location, but in the chasquis’ travels 
and in the exchanges of ideas made possible by their movement.281 This flow of people 
and ideas across space transformed the local outbursts of unrest in 1809 into a national 
project that sought to avenge the Spanish conquest. By connecting their movement with 
the Spanish conquest of the 1500’s, the chasquis of liberty depicted Spanish rule as brutal 
and illegitimate, and the chasquis offered to instead found a new government that was 
“just and equitable” like the Inca Empire. The chasquis began putting this plan into action 
by abolishing indigenous tribute, repealing of the mita, and offering the possibility of 
citizenship to indigenous communities in the new nation. Indigenous communities in Alto 
Peru rallied to the calls of revolution by the chasquis of liberty. As we will see in the 
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following chapters, Alto Peruvian men and women embraced this movement to avenge 
the conquest.282 
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CHAPTER 5 
LIBERTY IN ALTO PERU: RURAL DEMOCRACY IN ALTO PERU, 
1810-1817
 
One morning in 1812, Manuel Sánchez de Velasco —a lawyer, militia leader, and 
loyalist official in Poopó, Alto Peru—awoke to find a revolutionary pasquine “placed on 
the front door of [his] house.”283 Sánchez de Velasco  had led a campaign to suppress the 
revolutionary literature carried by the chasquis of liberty in order to stop burgeoning 
independence movement in Alto Peru.284 His actions, however, could not subdue the 
revolutionary fervor in the province of Paria, which was increasingly becoming a site of 
military conflict. Sánchez de Velasco  was incensed and frightened by the illustrated 
document plastered to his entryway, which depicted a caricature of the loyalist leader 
hanging from “a small gallows.”285 Sánchez de Velasco  would often think back to that 
brazen threat in the months that followed, as Baltazar Cárdenas —an independence leader 
from Alto Peru of indigenous descent—and his numerous allies captured, imprisoned, 
and sent him to the independence stronghold of Cochabamba, Alto Peru to await trial. 
Sánchez de Velasco  ultimately escaped his imprisonment, but the pasquine on his door 
                                                           
283 Carta nº 186 del virrey Joaquín de la Pezuela a Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres, 6 June 
1819, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Audiencia de Lima, 760, no.14. 
284 For more on the chasquis of liberty see Chapter 3. 
285  Carta nº 186 del virrey Joaquín de la Pezuela a Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres, 6 
June 1819, AGI, Audiencia de Lima, 760, no.14. 
 
135 
foreshadowed the repeated hardships and dangers he would face while fighting against 
the independence armies of Alto Peru.  
Following the exile of Sánchez de Velasco , Cárdenas took control of the region 
of Paria and founded a new political system in the area. From 1812 till 1816, 
revolutionaries, like Cárdenas, continued fighting for independence even as many of the 
chasquis of liberty, like Monteagudo and Pazos Kanki, fled to safer locations in Rio de la 
Plata. Cárdenas and his followers in Alto Peru organized themselves in a republiqueta, or 
a small pro-independence enclave.286 Within these small enclaves, Alto Peruvians 
dismantled the Spanish colonial world by removing unpopular leaders, reimagining 
colonial hierarchies, and reclaiming communal lands. These actions addressed 
longstanding social demands that had plagued Alto Peruvian society for much of the 
colonial period. After dismantling the colonial model, revolutionaries created a new 
political order that enshrined communal democracy, encouraged multi-ethnic citizenship, 
and exported this new form of liberty into neighboring regions. To achieve this new 
order, they coordinated with factions of the broader independence movement, including 
leaders in far-away Buenos Aires.287 By late 1812, revolutionaries in Alto Peru were 
willing this future into existence.  
The actions of the republiquetas citizens reveal their vision for an independent 
America, and therefore this chapter contributes to current historiographical discussions 
on the formation of republicanism, race, and nations. From the early nation period, 
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historians have researched the Alto-Peruvian republiquetas and their political ideology. 
Early nationalist writers in both Bolivia and Argentina celebrated the republiqueta’s 
persistent support of a creole-led nationalist movement in South America.288 In reaction 
to this nationalist narrative, more recent scholars have offered a revisionist interpretation 
and have argued the republiqueta citizens were un-interested in creole leaders’ 
nationalism. Instead, this new line of scholarship suggests revolutionaries were fighting 
for alternative political aims such as local autonomy, indigenous resistance, or economic 
agenda.289 These works have established indigenous political history, but they have 
argued that it should be viewed separately from the Bolivian and Argentine national 
history, because the local and national agendas are depicted as clashing. Instead of 
treating national, class, and racial movements as distinct options, this chapter seeks to 
find a middle-ground to understand the political goals and motivations of largely 
indigenous communities.  
The men and women in the republiquetas of La Laguna, Chayanta, and Ayopaya 
fought for an independent South America in the early nineteenth century, and they began 
to organize governments in Alto Peru that suited their interests. Reports from Spanish 
officials, letters from independence leaders, and a diary of a member of the republiqueta 
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of Ayopaya frequently hint at the republiquetas’ political ideology, and these sources 
reveal a glimpse into the hearts and minds of Alto Peruvian revolutionaries. During the 
wars for independence, Alto Peruvians were able to experiment with new political 
models for the future of their region. Some Alto Peruvians, like Cárdenas, envisioned a 
political future defined by a loose, republican confederation—called the United Provinces 
of South America—that allowed communal democracy to flourish at the local level in 
Alto Peru. Indigenous, mestizo, and creole Alto Peruvians rallied together in a cross-
ethnic coalition and risked their lives to make it a reality. Through their actions, Alto 
Peruvian revolutionaries contributed to the political debates of the nineteenth century by 
developing an innovative definition of liberty that transcended the usual geographical, 
racial, and social barriers that defined the Age of Revolutions. 
Baltazar Cárdenas and the Republiqueta of Chayanta 
In the early years of the independence movement, Alto Peruvians descended into 
a military contest over political sovereignty, and by 1812, Baltazar Cárdenas took control 
over the regions of Chayanta and Poopó.  Cárdenas, an indigenous or mestizo man from 
Alto Peru, was a skilled military leader with a strong personality, and he quickly amassed 
a large indigenous following. A diplomat from Argentine noted that Cárdenas had the 
ability to “revolutionize all of Peru,”  because “the Indians seem to be beginning to take 
part in the insurrection, now that there is a cacique called Cárdenas…of much power and 
influence.”290 Cárdenas attracted a large native following that numbered in the thousands, 
and Cárdenas and his followers established a republiqueta stronghold in the region of 
                                                           
290 “Diputados de los insurgentes de Buenos Aires,”13 September 1815, AGI, ESTADO, 
98, N.34. 
 
138 
Chayanta.291 After securing political control of their local community, they began to 
imagine a new political future and outlined the tenants of the burgeoning independence 
platform: attacking Spanish loyalist, establishing a representative government, and 
coordinating with revolutionary allies in Alto Peru and beyond. This vision for the future 
established local democratic communities that incorporated creole and indigenous 
citizens while acting in coordination with the broader independence campaign that 
dominated South America. 
For loyalists, the rise of Cárdenas marked a dangerous departure from the colonial 
social order. These men had been the local representatives of Spanish authority, and they 
often benefited from colonial policy. Within the community of Chayanta, Marcos 
Guzmán represented the local face of the Spanish empire. Guzmán was a priest and vicar 
of the community of Sacaca. A native of Cochabamba of well-to-do parents, Guzmán 
attended the prestigious University of San Francisco Xavier and served “fifteen long 
years as the priest of Indians in the delicate province of Chayanta.”292 According to 
Guzmán, he had kept the peace in Chayanta and had never appeared in a tribunal “for a 
complaint or demand filed against him.”293 This proved quite the accomplishment 
because the region of Chayanta was known an epicenter for unrest.294 Chayanta was 
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home to numerous Aymara indigenous communities with relatively intact ayllu 
structures, and the region was a large sending community for the exploitative mita labor 
draft. In the late colonial period, numerous communities in Chayanta had protested 
indigenous exploitation, demanded for the abolition of the mita, and clamored for a 
reduction or elimination of tributary payments.295 In this difficult setting, Guzmán had 
continued collecting tribute and maintained relative peace in the province, but he had also 
alienated some of his constituents with his dogmatic support of Spanish policy. 
Despite this long track record of effective service, Guzmán’s life and the region of 
Chayanta faced new challenges in the second decade of the nineteenth century due to the 
“revolution that South America has suffered and suffers to this day.”296 Guzmán noted 
the changes he witnessed during “calamitous epoch.” However, Guzmán ardently fought 
against the burgeoning independence movement that had swept over the viceroyalty of 
Rio de La Plata and was gaining traction in his province. According to Guzmán, “I have 
distinguished myself from the [revolutions’] beginning by preaching and writing against 
the system of liberty and independence.”297 Guzmán continued “I have contested with 
constant character all their written documents and their wicked form of government” by 
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dictating proclamations, and he tried to purge his “region of [revolutionary] seducers.”298 
The staunch loyalist Guzmán dedicated himself to defending Ferdinand VII and Spanish 
sovereignty in Alto Peru. 
 In 1811, Guzmán condemned the emerging revolutionary and their platform 
before a large crowd in Oruro, Alto Peru. Guzmán warned his audience that “the new 
government of Rio de la Plata is an antimonarchy government, a government that has 
been erected with the principal object to banish the sovereignty of Spain and the catholic 
religion….and supplant it with a democratic one.” Guzmán ridiculed this “barbarous” 
platform as the “chimerical hope of liberty and independence” and went on to argue that 
the revolutionaries’ arguments were “empty of any good meaning, they are not adoptable 
except by libertines.” He warned his listeners that the revolutionaries’ ideas were “no 
more than some flattering words to deceive those who live without morals, without 
religion, and with sentiments of honesty.”299 Guzmán saw the present climate as a clear 
choice between the proven model of Spanish monarchism and radical, unproven 
government that gave sovereignty to Americans. 
Unfortunately for Guzmán, many of his parish members did not see the two 
political options in the same light. The indigenous citizens of Chayanta were frustrated 
with their lack of ability to shape their own political futures as Spanish subjects. His 
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parish members had clamored for local political changes for decades, and they welcomed 
the chance to follow a new political system. In the late colonial period, Tomas Katari—an 
indigenous man from Chayanta—led a political and military campaign against Spanish 
exploitation and made his region one of the three major epicenters of indigenous unrest 
during the age of Andean insurrection, 1780-1783. As the wars for independence broke 
out, indigenous communities in Chayanta began to look for new leaders to step forward 
during the chaos and uncertainty  that followed the Napoleonic invasions. Perhaps 
Chayanta communities met in 1811 and elected Cárdenas to represent their political 
interest. 
In the neighboring republiqueta in Ayopaya, the wars for independence provided 
opportunities for oppressed castas to rise above colonial restrictions of ethnicity and 
class. Leadership in this republiqueta was determined by democratic elections. According 
to the revolutionary drummer and solider Jose Antonio Vargas, when the republiqueta 
met, they held an election “to name a commander and chief by absolute plurality of 
votes.”300 The elections were legitimated and maintained to provide each member of the 
republiqueta a say in the election. During one such election, “each person [made] their 
vote in secret and by written vote. The Indians that do not write, can dictate a vote 
secretly with someone that each Indian trusts.”301 Indigenous communities had not held 
the right to vote during the colonial period, and would not have consistent access to 
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voting rights well into the nineteenth century.302 This system of elections during the wars 
for independence gave indigenous a direct means of shaping the political and military 
campaigns that they were involved in and shows the flourishing of opportunities created 
in times of revolution. Within this new political setting, and support from indigenous 
communities, Cárdenas rose to power in Chayanta, and his armies began to wage his 
campaign to rid his region of oppressive Spanish loyalists. Throughout Alto Peru, 
revolutionaries were able to reclaim their local political sovereignty and ensure 
communal democracy was the norm again in the region.  
Guzmán never adapted to this new political setting, and he maintained his 
staunchly loyalist stance within his community and tried to get his parish to continue 
offering financial and other support to the Spanish crown. Guzmán claimed that he “had 
facilitated within my congregation the contribution of tribute and donation” even though 
the Spanish metropole was discussing the abolition of tribute in Cadiz in 1811.303 In 
effect, he tried to establish a voluntary tribute, although he acknowledged his role in 
compelling his parish to pay to finance the continuation of Spanish colonialism and the 
loyalist armies. Guzmán employed every skill in his arsenal to combat the independence 
movement brought into his province by revolutionary chasquis of liberty and continued 
his attempts to maintain the general peace in the area.  These actions enraged his local 
followers, who began to look for a way to rid their community of Guzmán and Spanish 
influence.  
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The Chayanta priest Guzmán and his staunch loyalism soon became the target of 
Cárdenas and his followers. Guzmán reported suffering “arduous emigrations, frequent 
robberies of my assets, repeated plunders of my benefits and income” along with 
“personal imprisonment, and a hostile persecution that the rebels have declared against 
me, my rights, and my actions.”304 These sufferings reached their apex in July 1812, 
when Cárdenas, who Guzmán described as “the most bloodthirsty caudillo” of “the 
present revolution” reached Sacaca.305 Guzmán recalled “this monster 
[Cárdenas]…caught me by surprise in my parish house in Sacaca, escorted me in an 
armed guard to Buenos Aires.”306 Cárdenas accused Guzmán of being “guilty of treason” 
against the insurgent patria of the United Provinces of South America and sent him for 
trial in the independent regions south of Tucuman.307  
The actions of Cárdenas and his followers provide numerous clues about the 
ideology and goals of his revolutionary republiqueta in Chayanta. Guzmán was a clear 
target for Cárdenas’ revolutionary forces because of his outspoken loyalism. Guzmán 
himself believed he was targeted “for having been faithful to my King Senor Don 
Fernando VII (Good bless him) and for having defended with a constant zeal his 
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Augustin rights.”308 While his loyalist ideology played a part in his persecution, 
Guzmán’s continued collection of tribute and ecclesiastical payments into 1812 also 
would have alienated the indigenous majority of Chayanta. In the late colonial period and 
the beginning of the wars for independence, indigenous figures like the Canon 
Mancocapac had made clear that the end of tribute payment was part of their platform, 
and the revolutionary governments in Buenos Aires had already sent proclamations with 
the chasquis of liberty banning tribute.309 Without a rightful king or clear governmental 
structure in place, indigenous communities questioned the legality of tribute payment and 
what purpose they served. So, Guzmán’s collection of tribute also could have upset the 
delicate political equilibrium in Chayanta.  
Cárdenas had numerous reasons to target Guzmán, but his choice of punishment 
for the Chayanta priest illustrates how the Chayanta republiqueta viewed their campaign. 
Despite being labeled “bloodthirsty” and a “monster,” Cárdenas and his followers’ 
actions show a restrained and measured punishment against a seemingly abusive priest. 
The revolutionaries sacked Guzmán’s house and stole assets from the priest in retaliation 
to the unjust tribute payments that Guzmán repeatedly collected into 1812. Beyond the 
robbery and arrest in his house, Cárdenas did not inflict any physical punishment or 
violence to the priest. Instead, Cárdenas charged him with treason, and sent him under 
armed guard along the path to Buenos Aires for trial and punishment. By choosing to 
send Guzmán to Buenos Aires, Cárdenas hints at his understanding of the independence 
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movement and connects the local actions of indigenous communities in Chayanta to the 
broader independence armies in Buenos Aires .310  
Cárdenas and his followers clearly had local concerns in mind when they targeted 
Guzmán, as Guzmán had gone against the wishes of his parish. Cárdenas and his 
followers, however, chose to hand over jurisdiction of the loyalist priest to their allies in 
far-away Buenos Aires, a distance of over 1620 miles away. They saw their movement as 
part of a much larger anti-colonial rebellion that addressed local goals, like the ouster of 
an abusive priest and the rejection of tribute payment, but within a broader political 
movement that transcended the physical limits of Chayanta. If Cárdenas hoped to achieve 
local autonomy for Chayanta, he could have dealt with Guzmán in the parish of Sacaca. 
Cárdenas “surprised” Guzmán in his house, and the military leader could have carried out 
“communal justice” or “vigilante violence” within the parish as was common practice in 
the Andes.311 Instead, Cárdenas placed his faith in his allies in Buenos Aires to punish 
Guzmán for his community abuses and royalism. Politically, Cárdenas determined his 
community’s goals were entwined with those of revolutionaries throughout South 
America, and he worked in tandem with fellow revolutionaries to liberate the United 
Provinces of South America.  
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Along this journey, however, Guzmán became sick, and the imprisoned priest 
avoided trial in Buenos Aires. Guzmán recalled that “thanks to an act of Divine 
providence I was left along an abandoned path” and he avoided his date in court. 
Cárdenas’s faith in revolutionary armies in Buenos Aires proved to be misplaced as his 
prisoner was able to make his way back to Alto Peru, but Guzmán would not return to his 
community in Chayanta. He instead went to the urban centers that were controlled by 
Loyalist in 1812 as an exile in search of a steady and safer vocation. The actions of 
Cárdenas and his followers rid their community of the Spanish official and provided them 
the opportunity to found a new era of communal democracy. By working within the 
broader independence process, they were able to elect a new leader, to overturn the 
colonial hierarchy, and to end exploitative colonial practices like tribute. However, the 
failure of their allies in Buenos Aires to discipline Guzmán reveals tensions in the 
broader effort to enact a revolution across a mass territory.  
 
Having secured their local community, Cárdenas and his followers tried to expand 
their movement into neighboring provinces and started to expel other officials like 
Guzmán. Cárdenas rallied his allies in his own province and recruited new allies from 
outside his region. Perhaps, he used indigenous means to organize his political meetings. 
In the neighboring province of Sicasica the flow of information facilitated by the 
chasquis of liberty and other local chasquis helped with the growth of a revolutionary 
consciousness. According to the drummer Vargas, indigenous messengers played “their 
horns or pututos in various points (these instruments are the horns of bulls, like those that 
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the postal carries carry when delivering messages.)”312 Using this traditional Andean 
method of communication, the Ayopaya republiqueta was able to forge a revolutionary 
consciousness that transcended the local ayllu affiliation and created a multiethnic 
community defined by communal democracy at the local level.313 Cárdenas likely used a 
similar system and aroused followers to invade the neighboring province of Paria. 
As he entered Paria, Cárdenas found many new followers and new targets. Shortly 
after invading the area, Cárdenas encountered Sánchez de Velasco  who was still shaken 
by the pasquine he found on his door in 1812.  Sánchez de Velasco , who served in the 
Real Audiencia of La Plata, was a militia leader for a small unit of loyalist forces in Paria 
during the wars for independence. As a military leader, Sánchez de Velasco  governed the 
community of Poopó where he “actively and rapidly began the collection of tribute now 
made voluntary by the decree of the Courts.”314 Like Guzmán in Chayanta, Sánchez de 
Velasco  coerced indigenous communities to continue paying tribute after it was legally 
abolished by the Cortes of Cadiz. 
Sánchez de Velasco  collected a large amount of tribute from indigenous 
communities in the area in order to financially support the weakened Spanish colonialism 
and their army. Spanish officials reported that that the Sánchez de Velasco  handed over a 
donation of 673 pesos delivered to him by “the cacique of Peñas, to cover the expenses 
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that the military troops of the king demand.” 315 In total, Velasco was able to accumulate 
a reported donation of 1000 pesos from indigenous groups in Paria. However, Sánchez de 
Velasco ’s persistent collection of tribute made him exceptionally unpopular. According 
to Spanish reports, “when, then, the tribute collection was activated….the revolution of 
the Indians of Sicasica, Corque, and Chayanta began, and they attempted to introduce the 
fire of discord in the party of Paria.”316 Sánchez de Velasco collected tribute and inspired 
rancor by taking money from indigenous communities and giving it to the loyalist war 
effort. 
Cárdenas entered Paria in 1812 and targeted representatives of Spanish authority, 
including Sánchez de Velasco .  The loyalist Sánchez de Velasco  reported “the caudillo 
Baltazar Cárdenas was my first tyrant” who persecuted him for his loyalist stance and his 
collection of tribute.317 Eventually, Sánchez de Velasco  was “made prisoner…by the 
Caudillo Cárdenas,” and the revolutionary movement “plundered [Sánchez de Velasco ’s] 
interests and part of [the interests] of the King.” Following the sacking of Sánchez de 
Velasco’s property and the tribute he had been “voluntarily” collecting, Cárdenas 
imprisoned Sánchez de Velasco  and handed him over to a couple neighboring caudillos 
located in Cochabamba, which was a rebel stronghold to the north of Cárdenas’ home 
territory of Chayanta.318 Cárdenas again chose to expel a political and military opponent 
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instead of putting Sánchez de Velasco  on trial within the community. While in 
Cochabamba, Sánchez de Velasco  reported “the tyranny of Cárdenas” along with “the 
despotism of Esteban Arce, and the oppression of Mariano Antezana,” two other 
revolutionary leaders in Alto Peru, “successively sentenced me to death, defiled me with 
insults, and held me in irons and a prison cell.”319 Under the imprisonment of these Alto 
Peruvian caudillos, Velasco remained for a number of months but avoided execution. 
The experience of Sánchez de Velasco  has a number of parallels to Cárdenas’ 
other victim Marcos Guzmán. Like Guzmán, Sánchez de Velasco  was targeted for 
remaining loyal to Spanish crown and the Courts of Cadiz during Napoleon’s Iberian 
invasion. Sánchez de Velasco , too, was very unpopular in his community for his active 
collection of “voluntary” tribute from indigenous groups. Cárdenas’ actions in both cases 
suggest that he was working unison with fellow pro-independence caudillos as he handed 
over Sánchez de Velasco  to his allies, Arce and Antezana. Likewise, he entrusted 
Guzmán’s punishment to independence leaders in Buenos Aires. Cárdenas saw the 
neighboring communities of Cochabamba had the same interest as the republiqueta 
citizens of Paria and Chayanta.  
While Velasco’s physical journey was not as drastic as Guzmán’s exile to Buenos 
Aires, the trip to Cochabamba covered a vast territory and marked an important shift in 
regional culture in Alto Peru. Cárdenas’ stronghold in Chayanta and the surrounding area 
was known as an Aymara region with a distinct language, culture, and history of mita 
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labor and retention of traditional communal living.320 Velasco’s ultimate imprisonment 
location, Cochabamba, had a vastly different history. Cochabamba was a region with a 
more temperate climate and numerous expansive valleys. The Cochabamba region was 
known for agrarian production, a vast system of haciendas, and a much larger mestizo 
population.321 Despite these multiple, nested cultures, the wars for independence seem to 
have provided the opportunity for expanding trans-regional identity and political 
consciousness. The followers of Cárdenas and his allies in Cochabamba were unified by 
an ideology guided by the goals of founding political independence, ensuring the safety 
of communal democracy, and eliminating of social abuses like forced tribute. This 
political agenda tied most of South America into one large anti-colonial confederation, 
which helped transcend differences of race and region that had prevented the growth of a 
revolutionary movement in the past.  
Ultimately, Cárdenas and his fellow caudillos did not execute Velasco, and the 
loyalist escaped incarceration in late 1812. At this time the invading independence armies 
from Buenos Aires were losing their first Alto Peruvian campaign and the loyalist forces 
of General Goyeneche were able to retake parts of Alto Peru.322 In these military 
campaigns, the loyalist official Goyeneche was able to re-take Cochabamba, and liberate 
Velasco. According to Velasco, “divine providence saved me from the dangers, and risks 
of death, and the arms of the King granted me liberty to serve the cause another time.”323 
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After “the province of Cochabamba was subjugated” by the loyalists, Velasco briefly 
returned to Poopó before Spanish officials entrusted him with a new government 
commission in the region of Tomina, which remained in insurrection.  
 
Padilla and Azurduy: the Republiqueta of La Laguna  
In Tomina, Sánchez de Velasco  continued his service to the King and came under 
the persecution of another revolutionary Republiqueta led by Manuel Ascencio Padilla. 
Sánchez de Velasco  served in a vastly different social world in Tomina than the one he 
left in the parish of Poopó. While Poopó sat between the important mining centers of 
Potosi and Oruro, Tomina was on the frontier of Alto Peru. To the west, Tomina bordered 
the important colonial administrative city of Chuquisaca, but to its east lay Santa Cruz de 
La Sierra, a sparsely populated edge of Spanish empire. Poopó had a large population of 
Aymara communities with a long history of forced mine work in the mita. Tomina 
instead had a large population of indigenous communities that were of Quechua descent, 
and the region’s economy was largely based on haciendas and agricultural labor. Tomina 
was a site of frequent conflicts between Spanish official and indigenous communities of 
Chiriguanos who were less integrated into the Spanish colonial world. Despite these vast 
cultural and social differences, Velasco’s approach to governance and ultimately the 
reaction of his new constituents and his ultimate fate mirrored his experience with the 
republiqueta of Chayanta.  
When Velasco arrived in Tomina, the province remained in the control of Padilla 
and the followers in the republiqueta of La Laguna.  Padilla was a creole born in 
Chayanta in 1774. As many Alto Peruvians, He had long supported the Spanish crown 
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and served in Spanish militias. Following his Spanish military service, Padilla attended 
the University of San Francisco Xavier. There would have read the revolutionary 
literature assigned by professors, like Victorian Villava, and he would have met future 
revolutionaries, like Bernardo Monteagudo. When Padilla left the university in 1805, he 
married the mestiza Juana Azurduy. Like many Alto Peruvians, Padilla exchanged his 
political allegiance by the outbreak of the wars for independence with the possibility of a 
new and better future hinted at by the chasquis of liberty. He began fighting against the 
Spanish armies of Peru in a republiqueta that controlled a broad region that included parts 
of Yampares and Tomina. Padilla took a position of power in the republiqueta and 
attracted a large, multi-ethnic coalition that included indigenous and creole soldiers who 
held sovereignty over the region from 1810 to 1816.324  
Sánchez de Velasco  recalled that Tomina was “still in a state of insurrection” in 
1813, and he lamented that he was still expected to govern the region “without other 
arms” until the royal army of Peru arrived. Spanish officials had sent instructions to 
“conserve the peace and tranquility” in Tomina, and they cautioned Sánchez de Velasco  
to use “prudence…[to] govern” the area.325 He followed orders, to a degree, and delayed 
collecting tribute when he first arrived, but after a loyalist army arrived, Sánchez de 
Velasco  began a forced collection of tribute. In addition to the typical tribute payments, 
he demanded the province contribute “supplies, mules, and horses to the [royal] army” 
which he was able to supply in the “short time” of little more than a month. While 
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indigenous had long paid tribute to the crown, these additional tributes to fund the 
royalist armies alienated some communities of Tomina, including the small parish of 
Pomabamba which did not actively comply with Velasco’s demands.326 Sánchez de 
Velasco ’s demands put additional economic strains on his community, and they eroded 
any affinity for Spanish forces that existed in the region. 
Angered by the lackluster compliance, Sánchez de Velasco  began to investigate 
his province, and he learned more about Padilla and his alternative vision for Tomina. As 
Sánchez de Velasco  waited for the “ungrateful Pomabambinos to comply to [his] 
equitable orders,” he heard “the rumor of the seduction of Padilla” who he believed was 
organizing a plot to rid Tomina of Spanish rule. Velasco rushed to stop “the flight of the 
inquietude,” but he fell prisoner to the republiqueta and its leader Padilla. Following his 
arrest, Padilla transported Velasco along the road to Buenos Aires where he was held in 
one of the Spanish missions and sentenced to death by the Caudillo Warnes, a close ally 
of Padilla who was in constant communication with the revolutionary forces of the 
United Provinces of South America.327  
Sánchez de Velasco ’s second experience of imprisonment reveals that the 
republiquetas had established relationships that transcended the local region, and this 
suggests a degree of ideological similarity between the republiquetas. Sánchez de 
Velasco , the outspoken loyalist and tribute collector, was a consistent target of multiple 
pro-independence figures even after traveling to regions with markedly different 
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histories. In both his arrests in Paria and Tomina, he was targeted for his outspoken 
loyalism and his forced tax collection. In Tomina, Velasco’s tax collection and forced 
collection of goods and animals alienated communities on the edge of empire that lacked 
significant silver revenue. In both cases the republiquets seemed to have a script to deal 
with royalist enemies. In neither case did the communities take the punishment into their 
own hands. The leaders, instead, chose to ensure the just punishment of their prisoners to 
allies in the liberated portions of Rio de la Plata. Repuliqueta leaders found that they 
could address the issues that concerned their local communities by working within the 
burgeoning revolutionary project that was creating the United Provinces of South 
America, and they chose to coordinate with revolutionaries from Alto Peru and Buenos 
Aires because they believed the regions had similar goals.  
Fighting in a broad confederation with groups from Buenos Aires allowed for the 
individual communities to determine their own leaders and establish a vibrant culture of 
communal democracy at the ground level. In the case of Tomina, Padilla and his 
followers were able to oust poor leaders like Sánchez de Velasco .  But more broadly, 
revolutionaries established a democratic culture that allowed Alto Peruvians to transcend 
the limiting social norms of race, class, and gender that dominated the late colonial 
period.328 While loyalists hoped to preserve the colonial order, and a social hierarchy that 
privileged Spanish ancestry, revolutionaries envisioned a more egalitarian and democratic 
future that allowed people of merit the ability to rise to positions of leadership. At the 
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local level, the Andes had a long tradition of “communal” or “Andean democracy.”329 
During the South American independence wars, however, revolutionaries hoped to export 
this more egalitarian model to the entire continent and beyond.330  
 Alto Peruvians were able to join and participate in Padilla’s republiqueta in Alto 
Peru, and they were able to improve their social standing by breaking with the Spanish 
colonial model. In Padilla’s republiqueta, a young indigenous man named Juan 
Wallparrimachi joined the commune to fight from 1811 until his death in 1814. 
Wallparrimachi was orphaned at a young age, and Padilla, the upper-class creole, took 
charge of his care. Wallparrimachi was educated by the caciques of the Chayanta region, 
and he joined the wars for independence after they broke out.331 While fighting with 
Padilla, Wallparrimari wrote numerous lyrical poems that followed the organization of 
the Quechan literature traditions. These poems dealt with topics of his lost love, who was 
sent away to Arequipa to join a convent, the natural environment, and other issues that 
concerned him.332 Within the republiqueta, Wallparrimari was still able to assert his 
Quechan identity, using indigenous language and covering themes he thought were 
important, even while fighting alongside creoles like Padilla and in coordination with 
rebels in Buenos Aires. Instead of a creole movement, Padilla’s enclave was quite multi-
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ethnic, and the republiqueta was able to create their own cultural expressions that 
privileged the Quechan lyrical tradition.  
The soldier, drummer, and chronicler of the wars for independence Jose Antonio 
Vargas had a similar experience in Sicasca. Born in 1796 in the mining center of Oruro, 
Vargas was the son of Blas Marino Vargas, a local scribe for the Spanish courts. Vargas’ 
father fought against the indigenous rebellions of the 1780s where he acted as an 
“instrument of pacification” and utilized his language skills because he had “knowledge 
of the two languages, Aymara and Quechua.”333 Vargas’s father was likely a mestizo and 
his mother was also probably of indigenous descent. Throughout his journal, the 
revolutionary drummer Vargas always represented himself as a creole, but early national 
census records recorded Vargas as indigenous.334Despite his ambiguous racial status, 
Vargas reported that he had always taken a firm stance against the Spanish and against 
monarchism.  Vargas recalled “I have always been for the party against the Spanish 
Monarch.”335 His anti-monarch stance arose while he was a young student and heard 
political rumors suggesting that it was time to sever political ties from Spain.  
When the wars broke out in 1809 and 1810, Vargas was still too young to take 
active part in the rebellion, but by 1814 Vargas joined the local republiqueta of Ayopaya 
and served under the command of a number of local caudillos. According to Vargas, the 
republiqueta was loosely organized and created its own power hierarchies that reflected 
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ability and respect in within the organization. Within the republiqueta of Ayopaya, 
Vargas served under revolutionaries from Alto Peru and Buenos Aires. He served within 
an integrated army of indigenous and creole soldiers, and often mentioned indigenous 
languages and customs dominating interactions. In both cases, Vargas and Wallparrimari 
enjoyed the loose affiliation between like-minded revolutionaries. Reovlutionaries 
organized the republiquetas and paved the way for a multi-ethnic federalist political 
arrangement that created a broad revolutionary union, while allowing for local 
democratic control of their own community.  
Indigenous soldiers made up the majority of the republiqueta troops, and they 
played key roles in the military successes or failures of the region. Following the Tupac 
Amaru II rebellion, the Spanish prohibited indigenous communities from serving in the 
military or carrying arms.336 Independence forces, however, opened their ranks to 
indigenous soldiers. According to Padilla, his indigenous followers far outnumbered his 
creole and mestizo followers. These soldiers did not serve in a strictly auxiliary role but 
were integrated and often were the decisive elements in the success of Padilla’s military 
campaigns. For example, while under attack in 1816, Padilla recalled that one of his 
commanders was stationed in the small community of Tarabuco with a large group of 
indigenous soldiers. Padilla reported, he had “30 infantry men and all the natives of that 
parish.” This battalion with “bold energy, love, and intrepidness for the sacred cause of 
the patria, looked with disregard to their lives in order to crush the intruding enemies, and 
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intercept their correspondence.”337 The residents of Tarabuco and Padilla’s allies in 
Tomina were able to slow the first invasion of loyalist into their republiqueta with 
guerilla warfare tactics. Because of this valuable contribution, Padilla’s forces were able 
to rally and defeat the loyalist invasion, and they forced their enemies to retreat “to the 
city of Chuquisaca. Unfortunately,  [the retreating general] was able to take “many mules, 
horses, and winnings, belonging to the neighbors of my province.”338 
Enraged by this defeat, the loyalist commander Jose Santos de Las Herras sent 
another coronel “with the order to put an end to those natives” that “daringly” had 
defeated the previous invasion.  Padilla recalled that without fear of firearms “the valiant 
naturals” fought the next round of insurgents, and “with the strength of the most unheard-
of valor,” they defeated the loyalist completely. According to Padilla, his indigenous 
followers were key to the victory as “they had precipitated with so much energy and 
courage in the capture of these enemies.” In the fighting the natives of the republiqueta 
were able to kill 13 officials among them the commander Herrera. Padilla wrote to the 
far-away General Belgrano and the other officials in Buenos Aires, and he hoped they 
would recognize soldiers would be distinguished for their valiant service to the 
revolution. Padilla realized that the victory within their community had significance 
beyond it as it was a major defeat against royalist army that was attempting to retake 
control over all of the Spanish Americas. So, he sent a messenger to deliver the news of 
victory to his allies in Buenos Aires.  
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By fighting with Padilla, indigenous groups were able to protect their own 
territory and contribute in the political and military campaign that dominated their era. 
The armies of Padilla were integrated, which offered a drastic contrast to colonial society 
that placed indigenous groups within a completely separate republic, a republic of 
Indians.339  Further, during the wars for independence, concerns about race did not cloud 
Padilla’s view of his soldiers. Rather, Padilla singled out the actions and bravery of the 
indigenous soldiers of the town of Tarabuco who he recommended be honored by the 
revolutionary government in Buenos Aires. Padilla and his republiqueta had created a 
new world where indigenous communities transcended their normal social position and 
claimed new places in the political and military campaigns to end Spanish colonialism. 
This was something residents in Tarabuco were willing to fight and die for.340 
The communication between Padilla in Tomina and the Argentines in Buenos 
Aires also shows that the soldiers saw their actions as part of a much bigger cause and not 
strictly defense of communal autonomy. Like his ally Cárdenas in Chayanta, Padilla 
expanded his sovereignty into neighboring communities in Alto Peru. At their apex, 
Padilla’s military attacks extended into the urban centers, like Chuquisaca, which were 
over 50 miles from the rural community.341 The symbolic and strategic assault on 
Chuquisaca, a well-protected city and royalist stronghold, frightened Spanish forces 
because they revealed Padilla’s ultimate aims. Padilla and his forces wanted to rid South 
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America of Spanish leadership and create a new world in their image: one that allowed 
creoles and indigenous citizens to shape their political future. 
Padilla’s wife, Juana Azurduy, like other Alto Peruvians, saw a meteoric rise in 
social position thanks to the disruptions caused by the wars for independence in Alto 
Peru. The now nearly mythical Azurduy, grew up as a mestiza woman in the provinces of 
Yampares and Tomina. Azurduy spent some time training to be a nun in a local convent 
before meeting and marrying Padilla. The pair settled down and had a number of children 
in Yampares during the late colonial period. After the wars for independence erupted, she 
too joined the rebellion in 1809 and took an active part in the republiqueta as Padilla’s 
confidant and an active military combatant in the numerous battles fought in Tomina. 
 In 1816, Padilla outlined the important role his wife played in a series of conflicts 
between his republiqueta and loyalist forces. With his followers scattered around Tomina, 
and an important ally gone to Santa Cruz, Padilla caught word that “700 men and a 
cavalry left the city of Chuquisaca with the object to annihilate the troops that compose 
my division.”342 Padilla split his forces and left Azurduy in the community of Villar in 
charge of “30 infantry men and 200 natives with all armed.”343 When Azurduy and her 
followers met the invading troops, Azurduy’s forces “completely repelled the loyalist 
forces,” and the republiqueta took an important strategic site as a result of the defeat.  
These actions so impressed the Argentine general Manuel Belgrano that he 
recommended the “Amazon Doña Juana Azurduy” be nominated for distinction of 
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military service by the revolutionary government in Buenos Aires.344 Azurduy’s actions 
and the respect of her contributions by Padilla and the Argentine general reveal the 
possibilities opened up by the political uncertainty during the wars for independence. 
Azurduy typically would have been constrained by the gender and caste expectations of 
the early-nineteenth century.345 In this setting, she would have been expected to serve as a 
mother to her four children and assist her husband in the family’s affairs. As a mestiza, 
Azurduy would have not fit neatly into either the  Republic of Indians or the Spanish 
colonial world, since mixed race individuals were often criticized by both those of 
Spanish and indigenous dissent. Some of these expectations clearly persisted because 
Belgrano’s description of Azurduy compared her to an amazon. Azurduy, however, took 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the political disruptions and expand her 
influence. 
Within the communal democracy of the Tomina republiqueta , which allowed 
local men and women to rise to power, Azurduy rose above her socially assigned place in 
nineteenth-century Alto Peru. She led an integrated force of creole regular soldiers and 
the indigenous residents of Tomina. In the republiqueta, Azurduy’s ability and the respect 
she garnered made her one of the community’s military leaders. This seems to be a 
common event in times of war as other women joined their husband in the political and 
military campaigns of the indigenous rebellions of the 1780s and the wars for 
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independence.346Azurduy was seemingly well-suited for the military position, and she 
continued to play an important military and political role in Tomina. Azurduy’s bravery 
and successful defeat of the loyalist forces brought recognition to both her and her 
husband. The news of Azurduy’s bravery was republished in the Argentine press culture 
of Buenos Aires. South Americans celebrated her actions and awarded Azurduy an 
honorary position of military coronel by the revolutionary government of the United 
Provinces of South America.347 
Although Padilla openly and enthusiastically tried to work with the Argentine 
generals like Belgrano, Padilla privately criticized the Argentines for their missteps in 
Alto Peru. He even complained to Belgrano that it was unfair for the Argentines to rely 
on his small, un-trained forces to continue fighting against the large royalist army of 
Peru. In this letter, Padilla questioned if the Argentines had the Alto Peruvians interests in 
mind and suggested that he and his followers might have to pursue another path forward 
if the Argentines could not pull their own weight. Despite Alto Peruvians continued 
efforts to work with Argentines, leaders, like Padilla, continued to be let down by the lack 
of forces sent from Rio de la Plata and the multiple prisoners that were released when 
they were sent South to Buenos Aires.348 
The relationship between Padilla’s republiqueta and the overall independence 
movement was flexible enough that it allowed his followers to address their local 
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concerns even when support from Buenos Aires was sparse.. Padilla soldiers were able to 
defend their territory and their goods against forced appropriation by the loyalist armies. 
The fighting also allowed them to expel local officials, like Sánchez de Velasco , that 
they did not want to rule their area. Further, Padilla’s army was also able to claim some 
important agricultural land from hacienda owners in Tomina as a result of the fighting. 
By working within an overarching project to end Spanish colonialism, Padilla and his 
forces were able to address local concerns that had plagued their region since the 
conquest, while working to liberate South America from Spanish rule.  
Padilla and his followers were strategic when singling out individuals who were 
the representatives of Spanish authority and those who had abused their positions of 
power within their community. In regards to land seizures, their targets were not 
indiscriminate but often the most prominent local creole officials, like Francisco 
Entrambasaguas. Entrambasaguas, a lawyer and government official in Alto Peru, could 
track his household’s history all the way back to one of the first conquistadors of Peru, 
Santos Blazquez.349 The Spanish crown granted his ancestors a massive encomienda in 
Alto Peru, and Entrambasaguas’ family had derived wealth and indigenous labor from 
this grant since at least the 1570s. Entrambasaguas and his “opulent” family remained 
staunch loyalists during the wars for independence and continuously defended the 
“sacred and Augustin rights of [their] majesty” by serving as a political advisor in the 
intendancy of Yamparaes.350 According to Entrambasaguas, he fought against Padilla’s 
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forces in the battle of Carretas and during Padilla’s invasion of the city of Chuquisaca. 
However, the fighting got so contentious in 1815 that he was forced into exile. 
Padilla’s sovereignty over Tomina eventually came to an end after Spanish forces 
made him a military priority in September 1816. Spanish forces sent a large force into the 
region, and they were able to re-take and suppress the immediate military threat in Alto 
Peru. In the fighting, Spanish forces stabbed Padilla, a wound that ultimately killed him 
at the battle of La Laguna. Following his death, loyalist forces decapitated Padilla in a 
symbolic show of violence to assert their authority over Tomina and deter Padilla’s 
followers from continuing fighting against Spanish rule. Following the ultimate death of 
Padilla and the installation of loyalist military rule in Tomina in 1816 and 1817, 
Entrambasaguas was able to return to his home and his family’s land. 
 The land Entrambasaguas returned to was not as he had left it. According to 
Entrambasaguas, “my house, that in another time was one of opulence, now appears 
reduced to misery with the devastation that this criminal revolution has caused me.”351 
His house in ruins, Entrambasaguas’ land also had new owners. Entrambasaguas 
lamented that “when [he] returned, he encountered the lands that he possesses in the 
valleys of Mojotoro destroyed and bare of all farm instruments necessary to cultivate [the 
land].” He continued, “now [cultivation] is impossible, because groups of insurgent 
Indians that had been captained by the criminal Padilla now occupy that land.”352 Taking 
advantage of the military campaigns, Padilla’s indigenous followers reclaimed their land 
                                                           
351 Carta nº 160 del virrey Joaquín de la Pezuela, a Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres, 
secretario de Gracia y Justicia, 10 September 1818, AGI, Lima, 758, N.6. 
352 Carta nº 160 del virrey Joaquín de la Pezuela, a Juan Esteban Lozano de Torres, 
secretario de Gracia y Justicia, 10 September 1818, AGI, Lima, 758, N.6. 
 
165 
rights that had been granted to the Entrambasaguas family during the conquest. 
Indigenous soldiers in Padilla’s republiqueta were dismantling the Spanish colonial 
model and were reclaiming lands that had belonged to their ancestors prior to the 
conquest.  
Indigenous communities in the late colonial period and during the outbreak of the 
wars for independence had made land governance an important part of their political 
agenda.353 Fighting with Padilla and under the umbrella of the independence movement 
in Buenos Aires allowed for indigenous men and women in Tomina to re-claim land for 
their own use. However taking land from Entrambasaguas and his opulent family also 
carried symbolic weight. Padilla’s fathers did not just re-take any land, but instead 
targeted the land of the descendent of one of the original conquistadors of Alto Peru. In 
their actions, they avenged part of the damage done by the conquest and their actions 
attempted to address exploitation caused by Spanish colonialism. The writings of the 
chasquis of liberty like Pazos Kanki and Monteagudo had always painted their movement 
as a vindication of the conquest and now the indigenous communities of Tomina had 
literally reclaimed land from an ancestor of the original conquistadors.  
Conclusion: An Indigenous Vision of Independence 
 During the South American wars for independence, Alto Peruvians fought to 
create a more egalitarian society that corrected many of the social and political problems 
that plagued their region in the late colonial period. They fought to expel Spanish leaders 
and end Spanish sovereignty in the Americas. In place of the colonial model, Alto 
Peruvians imagined a new republican confederation—the United Provinces of South 
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America—that brought together most of South America into a common union and 
allowed local indigenous communities to establish multi-ethnic democratic communities. 
Through this project, Alto Peruvians ousted oppressive leaders, abolished indigenous 
tribute payments, elected new leaders, and reclaimed land taken from native 
communities. Alto Peruvians were making this vision a reality in the republiquetas in the 
provinces of Tomina, Yampares, Chayanta, and Paria as they dismantled the colonial 
world that was created with the conquest, and they created a new American one through a 
re-conquest of South America.  
Even though Padilla’s and Cárdenas’s republiquetas could not hold out against the 
much better armed Royal Army of Peru, their followers were able to envision and create 
a new model for an independent America. Despite the capture and execution of many of 
the republiqueta leaders, their surviving followers—including Juana Azurduy—continued 
the military and political campaign. They still believed their project—the United 
Provinces of South America—was attainable, and they continued fighting for an 
independent and more egalitarian American future until the world they imagined had 
been created. Their project was shared by some of the revolutionaries in Buenos Aires, 
and they made it their mission to find political and military aid for the burgeoning 
republic that the republiquetas were founding. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE  LAND OF LIBERTY: VICENTE PAZOS KANKI, THE AMELIA 
ISLAND AFFAIR, AND THE LIMITS OF HEMSIPHERIC 
REPUBLICANISM, 1817
 
In October 1817, an Alto Peruvian revolutionary named Vicente Pazos Kanki and 
a group of his allies landed on Amelia Island, Florida with a plan to liberate Florida from 
the Spanish.354 Pazos Kanki, a man of Aymara descent from Larecaja, Alto Peru, had 
traveled thousands of miles in the early nineteenth century, persistently promoting Alto 
Peruvian independence during stops in South America, Europe, and eventually Amelia 
Island. The other revolutionaries in his cohort had navigated equally extensive courses by 
1817—some hailing from South America, a few from Europe, and others from Haiti. 
Upon landing on Amelia Island, this multiethnic group quickly overwhelmed the sparse 
Spanish defenses and burned a local plantation.355 They then began envisioning a new 
political future for Amelia Island, one defined by republican principles and a remarkably 
inclusive conception of citizenship. In other words, they founded a land of liberty.356 
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The Amelia Island Republic lasted less than a year, but during that short time, 
Pazos Kanki and his allies pushed the contemporary limits of republican thought. Their 
republic brought together indigenous, African, and European citizens under the shared 
idea that the revolutionary concepts of popular sovereignty and human rights applied to 
men of all races. The Amelia Island revolutionaries wrote a constitution, began recruiting 
Floridians of African and indigenous descent to join their newly-minted republic, and 
held elections in November 1817. The voters elected Pazos Kanki to the Supreme 
Council of Florida, making him one of the few popularly-elected, indigenous 
representatives during the Age of Revolutions. The republic they formed declared that 
democratic principles had no limit. The world they imagined stood in stark contrast to the 
other political projects around the Atlantic, and across Florida’s northern border in the 
United States, where new-found republics guarded racial and social hierarchies handed 
down from the colonial era.  
Through a focus on Pazos Kanki and his vision for the Amelia Island Republic, 
this article intervenes in current historiographical discussions on United States-Latin 
American relations and the development of republican thought. For nearly a century, 
scholars have advocated for a hemispheric approach to studying the Americas, 
developing innovative and comparative works that analyze the similarities and 
differences between the United States and their neighbors to the south.357 Recently, 
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however, scholars have looked beyond comparative history and have focused on the 
political, social, and intellectual topics that crisscrossed national and regional boundaries 
around the globe during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, calling the 
epoch the Age of Revolutions.358 Their works do not explicitly compare the two regions, 
rather they look for commonalities between revolutionaries from different nations. In 
spite of all the advances of this scholarship, many historians continue to overlook Latin 
America and depict revolutionary thought radiating out of the North Atlantic cores of 
France, the United States, and more recently Haiti—eventually reaching other regions, 
like mainland Latin America.359  
This chapter flips that convention on its head, showing instead that revolutionary 
thought from Latin America was at the vanguard of hemispheric republicanism and 
shaped the constellation of political possibilities that defined and shaped the Age of 
Revolutions.360 This approach allows a study of a short-lived republic to speak to scholars 
                                                           
358 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996); Jane Landers, Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Reddiker, The Many-Headed 
Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary 
Atlantic, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012); Eliga H. Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled 
Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery,” American Historical 
Review 112 (June 2007). 
359 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1967); Caitlin Fitz, Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of 
American Revolutions, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016); Alan Taylor, 
American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804, (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2016); Matthew Karp, This Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm 
of American Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
360 For others who take this approach see: Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: 
Power and the Production of History, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Ada Ferrer, 
Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1999); James Sanders, The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: 
Creating Modernity, Nation, and Democracy in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Ernesto Bassi, “The ‘Franklins of Colombia’: 
 
170 
of both Latin America and the United States, and show that while there were 
convergences on political thought, Latin American revolutionaries also offered critiques 
and challenges to the existing Atlantic paradigms of racialized nationalism and the 
persistence of slavery. In effect, revolutionaries like Pazos Kanki were at once leaders of 
the Age of Revolutions and also offered a powerful challenge to what it had become by 
the nineteenth century. While the rest of the revolutionary Atlantic seemed to retreat from 
the egalitarian promises of the equality of all men, Pazos Kanki and his allies in 1817 
tried to make that maxim a reality on Amelia Island. 
Over three thousand miles from his Alto Peruvian homeland, Pazos Kanki hoped 
to found a republic that reflected his vision for independence. In each election, each 
proclamation, Pazos Kanki and the Amelia Island republic offered powerful social and 
political commentary on the tensions, conflicts, and issues of the early nineteenth 
century. Through their actions and proclamations, they critiqued other nations around the 
Atlantic World that limited citizenship with property and racial requirements. In its place, 
the Amelia Island revolutionaries envisioned an alternative vision of republicanism: a 
multiethnic society that brought European, African, and indigenous men together under 
shared revolutionary principles. This vision was inspiring to some, and terrifying to 
citizens in the United States and Spain who helped to ensure that the Amelia Island 
experiment and its vision for the future was ephemeral, thus ending the first wave of the 
Age of Revolutions in the North Atlantic. In the process, however, the Amelia Island 
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revolutionaries helped to re-ignite debates about the meaning of revolutionary principles 
and helped to re-draw the political and social boundaries in the Americas.  
 
Liberation Theology: Incas, Republicanism, and the Education of a Revolutionary  
 Pazos Kanki took a winding path to Amelia Island, but the lessons he learned 
along the way shaped him and his ideology. He was a man of humble origins, but his 
education was sound, and having traveled widely, he had a unique perspective on the 
world. Pazos Kanki grew up in an indigenous community—or ayllu—in Larecaja, Alto 
Peru, but left his home to embark on an odyssey that would take him on a tour of a great 
many sites in the world. He traveled to Cuzco, and Buenos Aires, then London, and 
finally to the land of liberty he helped to create on Amelia Island. On this chasqui-like 
journey, Pazos Kanki trained to be a Catholic priest, learned of the Inca past, read French 
revolutionary literature, and came to know quite well both the promises and limits of 
nineteenth-century thought.361 What he learned along this journey both troubled and 
inspired him, and it led Pazos Kanki to develop his own unique vision for a better future: 
an ideology that merged thought from religious, indigenous, and enlightenment springs 
and went on to shape the wars for independence in South America and the Amelia Island 
Republic.  
Pasos Kanki was born in the midst of the Tupac Amaru II rebellion in 1779, and 
this foundational event forever changed the world he lived in. Pazos Kanki recalled that 
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he was “born among [Alto Peruvians], from an indigenous family.”362 Having a Spanish 
father, who may have died in the Great Andean Rebellions, and an indigenous mother, 
Pazos Kanki spent most of his early years in an indigenous ayllu.363 While in Larecaja, he 
claimed he “learned the language that our ancestors expressed themselves in the ancient 
Peruvian empire,” likely Quechua or Aymara.364 In his native language, Pazos Kanki’s 
learned lessons in political thought. His region experienced a massive re-organization 
after the Great Andean rebellion of the 1780s. This rebellion, led by indigenous leaders 
Tupac Amaru II and Tupac Katari, attempted to create a reformed colonialism that 
addressed indigenous concerns. Pazos Kanki drew inspiration from this rebellion and 
called Tupac Amaru II “illustrious, because he was the first who rose up to deliver Peru 
from the calamities inflicted by the Spanish despotism.” He described him in letters to  
US Senator Henry Clay as a “valiant leader” who “died like a hero, leaving to posterity 
an example which will never be forgotten.”365  
Although the great Andean rebellions were contained by Spanish forces,  many 
indigenous communities saw a growth of communal democracy on the local level.366 
Within these communities, like Larecaja, indigenous men and women developed a 
remarkably egalitarian culture that allowed different factions and ideas to compete for 
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political prominence. Power in these ayllus was decentralized and decisions were based 
on the general will of the people. The communities would elect local leaders, called 
caciques, who protected their communal interests against a colonial system designed to 
squeeze indigenous communities for the benefit of the metropole. Pazos Kanki lived in 
and witnessed this form of democracy and carried these lessons with him. Even later in 
life, he still claimed, “the accents of this original language, so resonated with [him], do 
not cease to beat in my ears, like a spell.”367 Pazos Kanki’s fluency in indigenous 
political processes made him especially sensitive to the needs and concerns of the 
indigenous communities in Alto Peru, which he would continue to support throughout his 
adult life.  
At a young age, Pazos Kanki  began studying with the local parish priests in 
Larecaja, and he was tapped to become a member of the clergy, so he traveled to La Paz, 
and later Cuzco, to advance his studies. It was during this training that Pazos Kanki went 
to what he called “the ancient Cuzco, metropolis of the Incas,” where he quipped that it 
was an odd place to learn “the rudiments of European knowledge.”368  While there, he 
studied at one of the principal universities of Peru, the Universidad de San Antonio Abad 
del Cusco, and read the religious and philosophical literature of the Spanish world, 
including formally studying Quechua for the first time.369 He took a particular interest in 
the Jesuit order, an order that explored the frontiers of faith and the Spanish empire. 
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Pazos Kanki noted that the “dictionaries of the languages of Peru and the [Jesuit] 
Missions” give a sense of Aymara and Quechua grammar.370 Along with language and 
historical knowledge, Pazos Kanki learned the moral lessons of the Catholic faith, which 
he grappled with for the rest of his life. He would go on to translate the Gospel of Luke 
into Spanish and Aymara.371 These lessons guided Pazos Kanki and he drew from 
religious lessons throughout his life as he tried to create a more egalitarian society for his 
contemporaries.  
During the course of his studies, Pazos Kanki also began seeing the limits of his 
theological training. Having grown up in an ayllu, Pazos Kanki knew intimately the 
relationship between a priest and his parish.372 A well-meaning priest could be a great 
source of comfort and charity for a community, but in Pazos Kanki’s experience, they 
could often become what he saw as  “an engine of….horrible oppression.”373 He 
witnessed priests mistreat indigenous parishioners, demanding exorbitant payments for 
basic services like weddings or funerals, and Pazos Kanki took particular offence at 
European priests, who he accused of having “hearts colder than the gold they covet.”374 
He began seeing Catholicism and the clergy in Alto Peru as “so abused and transformed 
into a systematic mode of thieving and robbery” that it had become a “calamity more 
dreadful than a pestilence.”375 Pazos Kanki, jaded by the failed promises of religion, 
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claimed that “South America will forever remain ignorant and enslaved, so long as the 
freedom of religious opinion is restrained.”376 Having worked within the church and 
having experienced abusive clergymen from his life in the ayllu, Pazos Kanki knew both 
the value and limits of organized religion and wanted citizens to choose their preferred 
method of religion. 
Pazos Kanki, disenchanted by theological studies, began to mine Cuzco’s deep 
history and extensive libraries for other veins of knowledge.  He read widely about 
Andean history, and eventually, he encountered a book so infamous that it was banned in 
the Spanish colonies: Garliasco de La Vega’s The Royal Commentaries of the Incas. 
Pazos Kanki noted that “his imagination was absorbed” by the writings and history of 
Garliasco de La Vega, the famous chronicler of the Inca Empire, son of a Spanish 
conquistador and an Inca princess. Within De La Vega’s account, a narrative that 
depicted a complex yet idyllic society disrupted by the Spanish conquest, Pazos Kanki 
read about “the injustice, betrayal, inhumanity, and tyranny” of the Spanish conquest.”377 
Comparing his lived experience in Cuzco, Pazos Kanki suggested Alto Peru continued to 
be shaped by the “cruel and unrelenting spirit of the Spanish Government” of Carlos III 
and Carlos IV, which had “created an unhappy and deplorable state” in South America.378 
Drawing inspiration from Incan foundational tenets, Pazos Kanki hoped to build a future 
for Alto Peru that would mirror the complex and idyllic society like the one he read about 
in Garliasco de la Vega’s chronicle.  
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During his time in Cuzco, Pazos Kanki also met and witnessed others who were 
inspired by the Ancient Incas, including a revolutionary generation that tried to 
overthrow the Spanish and re-install an Inca government in the 1805. The plot, led by a 
mineralogist named Gabriel Aguilar and Juan Manuel Ubalde, a member of the audiencia 
(or royal high court), organized an anti-colonial plot that brought together creoles, 
indigenous noblemen, and mestizos under the idea to bring about a return of the Incas.379 
Pazos Kanki witnessed Ubalde’s execution. He recounted that “Ubalde…was hung in 
August 1805. He died with the serenity of a philosopher, without denying his principles, 
or the causes which led him to engage in the revolution.”380 In a letter to US congressman 
Henry Clay, Pazos Kanki described how Ubalde used his execution to make a passionate 
appeal that called on South Americans to continue the independence cause which Ubalde 
predicted “was not far distant.”381  
Following Ubalde’s lead, Pazos Kanki quickly abandoned his path towards a 
religious career and began focusing on contemporary politics and revolutionary thought. 
In particular, he claimed to have been enthralled by “the vigor of the age,” an era of 
debate and possibility and he threw himself into reading revolutionary authors. He 
commented that his “imagination was exalted with the lectures of Rousseau, Voltaire, 
Mirabeau, and other philosophers,” whose ideas he considered and began applying to the 
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problems he saw in Alto Peru.382 Pazos Kanki was not alone in this passion, and soon 
found himself with many peers who were intrigued by the debates of the era. According 
to Pazos Kanki, “the beginning of the movement for independence and political 
liberty….the youth took the lead, since they were the most avid followers of this new 
ideology.” This new generation became enchanted with the new political ideas being 
discussed in the Atlantic world and they began to consider how they could be applied to 
the social situation of South America. As a young adult, Pazos Kanki joined this 
revolutionary generation as a new branch of the Spanish-American enlightenment.   
As the wars of independence erupted in 1809, Pazos Kanki continued his 
revolutionary odyssey and traveled throughout Alto Peru, migrating from Cuzco to 
Potosi, and to Chuquisaca, and eventually to the liberated costal region of the viceroyalty 
of Rio de la Plata. In Chuquisaca, he may have been involved in a conspiracy where 
indigenous men and women planned to assault the city like they had in May 1809.383 
After leaving Chuquisaca, he befriended Manuel Moreno and Bernardo Monteagudo, two 
of the leading pro-independence leaders in South America, who shaped his political 
beliefs and led him to Buenos Aires. There, Pazos Kanki worked as a journalist and 
joined fellow Alto Peruvian migrants who tried to promote and spread the growing 
independence process in South America.384 In 1811, Pazos Kanki became the editor and 
principle publisher for the newspaper La Gaceta de Buenos Aires. Shortly thereafter, he 
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founded his own newspaper El Censor where he was able to outline and broadcast his 
political ideas. 
During his early journalistic career, Pazos Kanki boldly championed 
republicanism and liberty from Spain. Even as Spanish authorities promised to provide 
representation to the Spanish colonies through the 1812 Constitution, Pazos Kanki 
opposed any reconciliation with the Spanish metropole. He argued that “the name of the 
king is incompatible with free men” and even with political representation men were not 
truly free under a monarchy. He believed that “liberty only can exist under a democratic 
government.”385 He was confident that the revolutionary climate of the early nineteenth 
century could lead to a more democratic and egalitarian future. 
 Due to Pazos Kanki’s outspoken republicanism and his growing reputation as a 
controversialist, Argentine revolutionaries quickly looked to muzzle Pazos Kanki. In 
March 1812, Pazos Kanki published an article that criticized the contemporary political 
climate and the leaders of Argentina’s first triumvirate, and their plan to reinstall a South 
American Monarch to Power. Pazos Kanki, instead, hoped to found a republic. Pazos 
Kanki lamented “a general apathy and indolence which is apparent each day,” and he 
pondered if “the true interest of these provinces are confined perhaps due to treachery.”386 
A member of the revolutionary government, Pedro Jose Agrelo, took offense with Pazos 
Kanki’s statement and demanded an explanation from Pazos Kanki on the grounds that 
his attack “offends….the honor and purity of a government that has served the confidence 
of the people.”387 Argentine government officials condemned Pazos Kanki and defended 
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the governments’ exclusive right to determine who to confide in and who was a traitor of 
the emerging Argentine nation. Pazos Kanki’s Argentine peers forced him into exile 
following his outspoken critiques in which he called on them to fulfill their discursive 
promises of republicanism and to create a better government. 
 Pazos Kanki was unperturbed and quickly left the port city of Buenos Aires in 
search of American allies who would support Alto Peru’s campaign to found a republican 
nation. Having read extensively about the other independence movements in the Atlantic 
World, he had long held an interest in North American political thought. Pazos Kanki 
thought highly of Thomas Paine’s political tract, Common Sense, because it laid out in 
plain and persuasive language reasons a colony should break free from its colonizer, and 
translated it into Spanish in an effort to convince other South Americans that it was time 
to end monarchical governments in their region. During the early years of the wars for 
independence, he also formed a long-distance friendship with the Kentucky congressman 
Henry Clay.388 Clay and Pazos Kanki exchanged hundreds of letters outlining their 
political ideas, and in Clay, Pazos Kanki found a strong supporter who respected the 
South American revolutionary’s ideas.389 Based off his communication with Clay and 
desire to truly implement the democratic ideas upon which the United States was 
founded, Pazos Kanki set off to the north in search of allies to aid the beleaguered 
independence fighters holding out in his homeland.390  
 Pazos Kanki and his shipmates eventually made it to North America, and he made 
stops in the port cities of Savannah, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. In each of these 
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settings, Pazos Kanki tried to promote South American independence and republican 
government. He quickly formed friendships with South American expatriates like Pedro 
Gual, an ardent revolutionary from Gran Colombia, and sympathetic North Americans 
who threw their financial and political support to help promote Pazos Kanki’s ideas. 
During his travels he was invited to become a member of the Historic Society of New 
York where he was able to publicize the independence struggles in South America.391  
 After spending a few months cultivating support for the independence movements 
in the Eastern port cities of the US, Pazos Kanki found a growing Latin American 
expatriate community in the US, including Pedro Gual, and they hatched a plan to help 
overthrow the Spanish in Florida and found a republican government. They settled on 
Amelia Island, a barrier island on the northern tip of Spanish Florida, that teemed with 
eccentrics and revolutionaries. The island, with its live oaks, brackish waters, and deep 
port, was a strategic location on the United States-Florida border and had changed hands 
numerous times—variously claimed by the British, the Americans, the Spanish, and 
sometimes pirates. Pazos Kanki and his multiethnic group believed it a fitting place for 
their Republic, which they hoped would become a symbolic and strategic victory for the 
Republican movement.  
 During his route to Amelia Island, Pazos Kanki developed a political ideology 
that was a patchwork of religious, indigenous, and revolutionary doctrines. He drew 
inspiration from the communitarian democracy typical of the late-colonial Andes that he 
was raised in and the Inca Empire’s promise of a better life. Although disenchanted with 
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the inconsistencies of religious practice, he remained a steadfast believer in the moral 
lessons found in Christian doctrine. And he believed republican government, its 
representative design and its guarantees of human rights, provided possibilities for a 
better future for Americans. In his stops in Alto Peru and beyond, Pazos Kanki honed this 
political ideology, and became an outspoken revolutionary. Pazos Kanki brought these 
diverse strains of Age of Revolution thought together when he began shaping  the Amelia 
Island Republic in 1817. 
 
“The Refuse of All Nations”: The Multiethnic Republic of Florida 
 In the summer of 1817, Pazos Kanki and his the rest of his company launched 
their plan to liberate Amelia Island and form their own government. Pazos Kanki recalled 
that the group, made up of revolutionaries from Santo Domingo, Cartagena, and France, 
was “full of the love of liberty” and began their “project of wresting from the hands of 
their enemies the provinces of Florida.”392 They arrived to Amelia Island in three boats, 
and after a brief skirmish, took the island. Spanish observers reported that Pazos Kanki 
and company then began “seducing” others to their cause with political speeches, crafted 
a constitution, founded a newspaper, and held democratic elections on the island.393  The 
world they formed was at once an example of the possibilities of the Age of Revolutions, 
and a critique of what other newly formed nations had become. It rejected limited 
citizenship and the continuation of slavery that defined much of the early-nineteenth 
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century Atlantic World, and instead envisioned an inclusive republicanism that brought 
together what one observer called “the refuse of all nations” into a common coalition on 
Amelia Island.394  
 The sea-washed shores of Amelia Island had long been a haven for those 
searching for a different way of life, when in 1817, Pazos Kanki and his followers began 
trying to liberate Florida.395 The island, a thirteen-mile-long barrier island on the northern 
edge of the Spanish American empire, was a contested space that served as home to a few 
thousand residents in the early nineteenth century. The Spanish had held nominal claim to 
Florida for much of the preceding centuries, but the British briefly controlled East Florida 
and Amelia Island from 1763 to 1783, leaving many colonists of English descent, like the 
Earl of Egmont who owned an indigo plantation on the island. Many empires explored 
the island’s potential without much financial success. While empires seemed to overlook 
Amelia Island, leaving it a backwater, visitors like William Bartram, an American 
naturalist, believed that the island with its “thorny thickets, and prickly vines,” “spacious 
forest of Live Oaks,” and “shelly paved sea beach” had the potential to become a “polite 
and hospital” setting.396  
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 By 1817, the Spanish once again held control over Amelia Island, but because of 
sparse defenses, runaway slaves, pirates, and adventurers largely held sway over the 
area.397 Throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Amelia Island would 
become the site of numerous experimental projects by travelers and pirates, becoming 
known for illicit trade and as an entry point for illegal slave trader and an escape route for 
runaway slaves. Despite numerous petitions from residents, like a local merchant Jorge 
Clarke, for added protections, colonial officials were still trying to shore up defenses in 
March 1817 with “the wood that is needed for works fortification.”398 Pazos Kanki and 
his followers chose Amelia Island because the contested nature of this borderland 
territory, but also because of its symbolic and strategic importance being next to a 
Republic founded on the equality of all men, the United States. Pazos Kanki knew their 
political project, to found a multiethnic republic, would capture the attention of observers 
in the United States and beyond.399 
 Building on their early successes, Pazos Kanki hoped to create a revolutionary 
workshop on Amelia Island that would serve as “a school,” where South American 
“patriots would have been taught to imitate the heroic conduct held out by [the U.S.A] 
forty years ago.”400 He believed that North Florida would be conducive to the growth of 
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revolutionary ideas and serve as a rendezvous spot for South Americans to launch 
military campaigns to help support the military struggles in Mexico and South America. 
From his positive interactions in the United States and the reading of revolutionary 
literature, Pazos Kanki was convinced that US leaders would support his campaign, as he 
commented that the United States had “prepared the way to the emancipation and liberty 
of the New World” and the Amelia Island revolutionaries intended to continue the 
mission of spreading republicanism in the Americas, starting in Florida. 
 The revolutionaries began to put the plan into action in September 1817, when 
they sailed from Baltimore to Port-au-Prince to consolidate their forces. Unfortunately, 
some men deserted the cause and a number of damages to their vessel forced the group to 
postpone the attack for a few months. In June of 1817, General Gregor McGregor, a 
Scottish soldier and adventured who had been named the brigadier general of the 
Independent American armies of Venezuela and New Granada, launched his assault on 
the island. McGregor’s small force was quickly able to gain a foothold on Amelia Island, 
and by June 30 they held an uneasy control over the area.401 In the process, the 
revolutionaries “set fire to and robbed the Domingos Plantation,” one of the few large 
structures on the island.402 After getting a foothold, Pazos Kanki and his cohort set out to 
create the revolutionary school of the Americas they had dreamed of during their travels. 
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Pazos Kanki recalled that McGregor released several proclamations that attested “his 
love of order, and his exertions to prevent any violations of the laws of the United 
States.”403  
 As these plans played out, a power struggle emerged on Amelia island. Jorge 
Clarke, a small scale merchant in Florida, reported “there was a disorder larger than could 
be imagined” taking place on Amelia Island.404 McGregor and Hubbard, a former police 
officer from New York, got into a power struggle over leadership and the direction of the 
burgeoning society on Amelia Island.405 McGregor and Hubbard disagreed on the goal 
and plans for Amelia Island. McGregor still hoped to use the island as a meeting ground 
and revolutionary hub where revolutionaries could coordinate their political missions. 
Hubbard was less idealistic in his goals, and he thought of “nothing but mercenary 
speculations.”406 These competing plans divided the small number of followers, and the 
island fell into a state of confusion for a short period. Hubbard and his followers “usurped 
the supreme authority” and forced McGregor to step down; however, McGregor sent 
word to his ally Luis Michel Aury, who was sailing in the Gulf of Mexico, for aid and 
support.  
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 Luis Aury, a former French sailor turned privateer, became a strong supporter of 
independence movements throughout Latin America.407 He was known for his radical 
political stances, and his contemporaries believed that he “had acquired his ideas of 
liberty in the French revolutionary school.”408 Aury, like many other contemporaries 
during the Age of Revolutions, wanted to take part in the broader campaign to create 
republic nations. He was commissioned by the South American revolutionaries in 
Cartagena and helped 3000 pro-revolutionary South Americans escape a Spanish 
blockade.409 Aury transported some of these men to Port-au-Prince before eventually 
making his way to the United States. Below the deck of Aury’s ship, his eclectic group of 
shipmates made up of revolutionary thinkers of diverse national and ethnic backgrounds, 
including revolutionaries from New Granada and emigrants from Haiti. These sailors, 
and sailors more generally, were widely known for their egalitarian stances and the 
communitarian nature they cultivated aboard their ship.410 
 Aury, after being commissioned by the Mexican revolutionaries to serve as a 
mercenary sailor for the independence project, arrived and restored order and safety to 
Amelia Island on September 1817, and helped the South American revolutionaries take 
control of the island. Pazos Kanki claimed that  Amelia Island “was closely besieged by a 
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force from St. Augustine, and about to surrender, when by the fortunate arrival of Aury, 
everything was changed.”411 Jorge Clarke and his free, black wife named Flora, 
witnessed the arrival of Aury on 5 October 1817, when he reported that they 
“encountered a party of the enemies with seventy two men, in three armed ships,” who 
“disembarked in the firm land in front of Amelia Island.”412 Aury and his crew were able 
to repulse the Spanish militia forces and ease tensions on the island. Amelia Island, safely 
under the control of Aury, hoisted an early version of the Mexican flag, one that 
represented the revolutionary forces in Mexico, and signaled a new era for their 
republican experiment. 
 On November 5, Pazos Kanki, Aury, and the revolutionaries declared martial law 
in order to stabilize the infighting between different factions on the island. Pazos Kanki 
and Aury released a proclamation that criticized the “scandalous transactions of a 
fraction…who have solely been engaged in subverting social order.” Instead they claimed 
that they came to Amelia Island for a different mission, proclaiming that they had “come 
here to plant the tree of liberty, to foster free institutions, and to wage war against the 
tyrant of Spain, the oppressor of America, and the enemy of the rights of man.”413 Pazos 
Kanki outlined his vision for this liberty in his public defense of the Amelia Island affair 
where he claimed that liberty came from “the best precepts of legislation, which assure to 
man his social rights…his prosperity, and the sole exercise of his mental faculties.” They 
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envisioned a new future for Amelia Island that would allow for the “authority of self-
government” and an assurance of social and civil rights for its constituents.414  
 For Clarke, however, the defining feature of the group was not their political 
beliefs or ideas but their ethnic make-up. He commented that Commodore Aury sailed 
with “the morenos of San Domingo, ” who took “possession of the battery,” echoing the 
events of the Haitian Revolution.415 Other contemporary observers reported that Aury’ 
crew was diverse, writing that they were made up of “the refuse of all nations, and all 
colours, collected from the mass of iniquity spread over the islands of the West Indies, 
and the Spanish Americas.”416 Beyond an integrated army, Jorge Clarke suggested that 
Aury’s forces were overturning the racial hierarchy of the early nineteenth century, as 
Spanish troops defending the island were disturbed that Aury’s black allies were both 
“rich and insolent.”417 Even for Clarke, a man who lived with a free black woman, the 
integrated nature of the revolutionaries forces was noteworthy—they stood in contrast to 
other nations in the Atlantic World that continued to be defined racially. The diversity of 
the Amelia Island revolutionaries was purposefully their republic’s defining feature, as 
Pazos Kanki explained “the diversity of people which composes an army, has never 
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altered its national character; as individuals of different origin, united under the same 
laws, form but one nation.”418  
 Other commenters similarly reported that Aury “makes no difference between the 
complexion of one man and another provided they behave well.”419 In an era of second 
slavery and attempts to reinforce a racial hierarchy in new republics, the Amelia Island 
revolutionaries envisioned a different future: a project that brought together people of 
indigenous, African, and European into a multiethnic republic. Like other nations in Latin 
America, that were experimenting with ideas of racial harmony and racelessness, Pazos 
Kanki and the Amelia Island republic experimented with the relationship between race 
and nation and they chose to establish a multiethnic republic defined by a political 
ideology—republicanism.  
 Having taken the island, Pazos Kanki and Aury began consolidating their power 
and started recruiting residents to their republican project. Jorge Clarke reported back to 
Spanish officials that the revolutionaries “have used a system of fine politics to seduce 
residents to their agenda.”420 Clarke even saw “Commodore Aury among the islands 
inhabitants” spreading “some letters promoting a revolution.”421 Under this leadership 
group, the island also tried to expand its political and social reach to other parts of 
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Florida. Pazos Kanki recalled that many residents of Florida “will retain a grateful 
remembrance of [Aury’s] conduct towards them” because he ordered “rations to be 
distributed daily amongst them from his own stores.”422 There is even some evidence that 
the revolutionaries tried to recruit Florida’s Native Americans. As there were 
unconfirmed reports back to the King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, about rumored attempts to 
attract Indians to their project.423 Those indigenous communities were in the midst of 
their own conflict with the United States government—the First Seminole War—and 
there is no evidence that the two projects allied together.424 Aury and Pazos Kanki’s 
efforts to recruit followers caused some residents of Amelia Island to join in with the 
revolutionaries. One Florida resident, Miguel Mabrity, reportedly conspired with the 
invaders of Amelia Island and was elected to a position of power within the burgeoning 
republic.425  
 Carlos Seton, another Amelia Island resident, was accused of being a “rebellious 
individual” and “uniting with the insurgent government” on Amelia Island.426 He 
forcefully denied this accusation. Seton, instead, testified that he “would have defended 
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the town until the last moment” if the leading officials of Amelia Island, the troops, and 
the militia did not have “a fixed determination to not fight or defend the town.”427 Instead 
of fighting to defend his town and plantation he followed his neighbors in retreat, and he 
claimed the Amelia Island revolutionaries “carried off three of my slaves”: a “man named 
Moses, his woman named Benia, and a black named Susett.”428 The enslaved were 
recaptured on the island after the Amelia island affair was resolved; given the open 
diversity of the revolutionaries, Moses, Benia, and Susett may have joined the republican 
project or they may have escaped to live on their own during their time as fugitives.429 In 
either case, the revolutionaries upturned the colonial system on the island and opened up 
opportunities for people on the island: Mabrity got involved with the “fine politics” of the 
revolutionaries and the enslaved on his property used the opportunity to escape. 
 Having secured their space on the island and expanded their followers, the 
revolutionaries decided to have open democratic elections. On November 16, the 
burgeoning government issued a public notice summoning “the inhabitants of this Island 
of Amelia…for the purpose of electing Representatives whose duty it will be to frame 
and constitute a provisional Government.”430 The summon allowed “every free inhabitant 
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who shall have resided fifteen days” on the island the opportunity to vote.431 On the 
nineteenth and twentieth of November 1817, the free inhabitants of Amelia Island voted 
for local representatives and elected nine men to positions of power: “Pedro Gual, 
Vicente Pazos, Mr. Murden, Luis Comte, Coronel Irwin, Mr. Lavignac, Coronel Forbes, 
Miguiel Mabrity, and Doctor Chapelle,” while Luis Aury took the title commander in 
chief of the Republic of Florida.432 This eclectic group hailed from all over the Atlantic 
world. Pazos Kanki was born in Alto Peru, Gual was from Venezuela, Aury was from 
France, Luis Comte was from Baltimore and part of an émigré family from San 
Domingue,  J. Irvin was former US congressman in Pennsylvania, and Mabrity was a 
resident of Amelia Island. This group made up the Supreme council of the Floridas, and 
they would be in charge of the experimental republic, representing one of the most 
diverse collections of leaders in the world at the time. 
 Following the election, the new legislators of the Amelia Island set out to draw up 
a formal constitution for their burgeoning republic. The Supreme council named Pedro 
Gual, Murden, and Vicente Pazos Kanki to frame the provisional government for the 
Amelia Island Republic and they presented their report in early December. Their 
provisional government was in line with many of the constitutions created during the Age 
or Revolutions. It had democratic representation, with two elected officials for each 
district in Florida. It had checks and balances between three branches of government: 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It had guarantees on basic rights, like the 
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freedom of the press and freedom of conscience. Their plan was to continue with a more 
exhaustive constitution in the near future.  
 What made this constitution and the Amelia Island Republic different was that it 
brought together such a diverse constituency and was designed by an indigenous man. 
For a few short months, on a small Florida island, Pazos Kanki and the “refuse of all 
nations” pushed democratic principles to their full extent. Citizens on Amelia Island, like 
some of their contemporaries throughout the United States, Europe, and Latin America, 
rallied together under a Republican ideology and its revolutionary promises. Pazos Kanki 
and his allies liberated an area from the Spanish empire, held democratic elections, and 
wrote a constitution that reflected the beliefs of the Age of Revolutions. Unlike many of 
their contemporaries, though, the Amelia Island republic had no racial or ethnic 
requirements, it burned plantations and liberated the enslaved, and the revolutionaries 
elected indigenous men to positions of power. Former slaves, revolutionaries from South 
Americans, and French privateers formed a nearly perfect union and filled abstract 
democratic thought with tangible content. They interpreted, quite literally, the abstract 
promises of the French and American revolutions, and they made them a reality on 
Amelia Island. In the process, they offered an alternative to the partial revolutions 
elsewhere around the Atlantic, and attempted to ensure that the Age of Revolutions 
would usher in a new more egalitarian future.  
 
The Resemblance of Revolutions: Pazos Kanki defending the Land of Liberty 
 With their power consolidated, their followers expanded, and their constitution 
framed, Pazos Kanki and his allies had visions of their “tree of liberty” taking root and 
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flourishing in Florida, but others around the revolutionary Atlantic held reservations 
about the Amelia Island experiment and its ideology. The Amelia Island Republic, which 
began during a conservative and reactionary period against revolutionary thought, soon 
faced off with Republican and monarchical governments that had culled the revolutionary 
branches from their trees. The small sects that had hoped to recreate the colonial social 
order were largely excluded from leadership or exiled to other regions. Meanwhile, 
Republics and European empires, like the United States and France, had found new forms 
of exclusion and had begun to create a different order founded on “Republican racism,” 
which defended slavery, emboldened racism, and promoted a new era of economic 
imperialism—one that looked similar to the colonial period. The experimental republic 
on Amelia Island was not compatible with this reactionary current. It was the antithesis. 
The bourgeoning republic on Amelia Island, therefore, was rooted out  by the United 
States military and was left to be protected by Pazos Kanki, who defended their ideals 
before the Congress of the United States in 1818. 
 The Amelia Island Republic, still in a tender age, could not stop the United States, 
and its president James Monroe, when they decided to intervene and put an end to the 
project on Amelia Island. Pazos Kanki reported that Amelia Island’s new Republic, 
which “had as yet counted but twenty days of existence,”…“was broken in upon by a 
military and naval force of the United States, who took possession of the island” in 
December 1817.433 Outnumbered by the US military, the residents of Amelia Island 
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peacefully surrendered to the armed forces. Following their surrender, according to one 
of the United States Senior Naval Officer, Commodore J.D. Henley, “the black troops of 
General Aury,” were “embarked on board one of their ships lying in the Port, and the 
remainder of his followers will be sent off the island.”434 In this moment, the multiethnic 
republic on Amelia Island received neither ceremonial toasts nor support from their Sister 
Republic in North America. Instead, their project was rejected, and the black and mestizo 
citizens of Amelia Island were segregated according to the racial conventions of the 
United States.435 
 To symbolically show that the US had control over Amelia Island, Commodore 
Henley, the US naval commander who helped to overtake the island, took the supplies 
and ships of the Amelia island forces and raised the US flag over the island. One of the 
solider, who oversaw the action, gloated in the victory: He asked one of the defeated men 
from Amelia, while pointing to the newly raised US flag, “whether the stars and 
stripes….did not form a better flag than the mottled and chequered colours of the united 
republics of Mexico and Venezuela.”436 In this way, the Amelia Island Republic, and the 
first wave of the Age of Revolutions, ended. The promise of a multiethnic republic in 
Amelia Island was silenced. 
 Observers in the United States quickly began questioning the experimental 
republic on Amelia Island. North Americans were particularly concerned with the racial 
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makeup and social order on Amelia Island. A commenter from New York, who had 
followed the developments on the island, blamed Aury for ruining the original well 
intentioned project. He suggested that “Aury arrived with his traveling fleet of privateers, 
and his crews of blacks and mulattoes, and everything changed.”437 The commenter, 
missing the purpose of the Amelia Island republic, was eager to support another project 
in the image of the United States, with limited and racially exclusive citizenship, but not 
one like the one Amelia Island. Pazos Kanki and the other revolutionaries on Amelia 
Island, therefore, soon found that they were being “confounded [with] pirates and 
freebooters” in the newspapers , private letters, and other publications in the United 
States.438 Pazos Kanki passionately defended the Amelia Island project and the broader 
revolutionary movement in Latin America by telling the congress of the US that “the 
cause of liberty and independence…found ardent defenders in nearly eighteen millions of 
people” in the Caribbean, Mexico, and South America.439What they were proposing to 
implement was controversial to observers in other parts of the globe, it was a alternative 
to the republics of the early-nineteenth century.  
 US politicians also had concerns about the republican experiment right across 
their southern border. Beyond offering a critique and alternative to the racial practices in 
the USA, the growing society on Amelia Island also posed a threat to the United States’ 
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expansionist goals. At this early period of the US republic, politicians wanted to assert 
their sovereignty in North America and claim their place among the world powers.  
Allowing a group of South American revolutionaries to take Florida would have 
prevented the United States from claiming Florida and its strategic location jutting out 
into the Gulf of Mexico. It would have also raised numerous questions about the United 
States’ racial policies that congress was not interested in answering in 1817. 
 Pazos Kanki went to Washington D.C. to protest the actions of the US before 
congress on 5 February 1818. The United States claimed that it had the authority to 
invade Amelia Island, because the revolutionaries on the island were acting as pirates and 
also selling slaves across the St. Mary River into the United States. The United States 
congress had outlawed the international slave trade in 1808, but the illicit slave trade 
continued unabated well into the nineteenth century.440 Pazos Kanki addressed these 
concerns directly in his protest by using the laws of Amelia Island. Before Congress, 
Pazos Kanki disputed that anyone in their group had been trading slaves into the United 
States. Instead he suggested, “the authorities at Amelia, following the orders of the 
republics of the south [meaning South America]…have prohibited the infamous traffic, 
would never have suffered it to be continued in the island.”441 Pazos Kanki did confirm 
that the revolutionaries had captured a Spanish slaving vessel and carried the enslaved to 
Amelia island, but he argued that it was better to integrate the enslaved into Amelia 
Island than turn them back over to the Spanish. To confirm this defense, Pazos Kanki 
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even got “respectable” citizens from across the United States’ border in Georgia to vouch 
that the burgeoning Florida Republic had not been introducing slaves into the United 
States.442 
 To combat the charge of piracy, Pazos Kanki compared the Amelia Island 
revolutionaries to Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, and the other revolutionary 
founding generation of the United States. Pazos Kanki noted that Franklin had contracted 
privateers during the United States’ wars for independence. He also claimed Aury and his 
forces only attacked Spanish vessels since they were at war against the Spanish crown. In 
a self-reflexive moment, Pazos Kanki mused “Such has always been the fate of those 
who struggle for liberty; their sacrifices are numbered and praised by posterity, whilst the 
generation that witnesses them, seems to consider them as entitled only to derision or 
reproach.”443 He sought to draw parallels between the Amelia Island group and their own 
founding fathers in an effort to show how the Amelia Island republic was continuing and 
advancing the republican experiments of the eighteenth century. 
 While on his stage in front of congress, Pazos Kanki also offered a damming 
critique of the United States’ alternating inaction and then action during the Spanish 
American wars for independence. Pazos Kanki described the “nearly eighteen millions” 
of “ardent defenders” of liberty and independence through Latin America. To him, the 
South American campaign was a struggle to establish sovereignty, restore “social and 
                                                           
442 James Monk to Dr. Chappell, in State Papers and Publick Documents of the United 
States, (Boston, 1819). 
443 Pazos Kanki, The Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest of Don Vicente Pazos, 
Commissioner on Behalf of the Republican Agents established at Amelia Island, in 
Florida under the Authority and in Behalf of the Independent States of South American, 
p. 25. 
 
199 
civil rights,” and form Republican governments. He chastised the United States for their 
failure to recognize the revolutionaries or their new republics of Gran Colombia or the 
United Provinces of South America.444 Pazos Kanki dreamed of the entire Western 
hemisphere joining together for a common cause as “the interest of the New World seems 
to enjoin the union of all Americans against their common enemies, the European 
monarchies.” Pazos Kanki asked “how can we account for the seizing of Amelia from the 
patriots, under pretense of fears….of some political contagion spreading amongst them, 
and disturbing their public tranquility” when all Americans seemed to be struggling to 
found governments on similar principles.445 
 But Pazos Kanki soon found that politicians had other reservations about a 
liberated Republic of Florida by South Americans. Anglo-Americans politicians had a 
difficult time seeing commonalities with their South American counterparts. John Q. 
Adams, the Secretary of State during the Amelia island affair suggested that “the struggle 
in South-America, is savage and ferocious almost beyond example. It is not the tug of 
war between Greek and Greek, but the tyger-conflict [sic] between Spaniard and 
Spaniard.”446 He saw almost no reason to support South American independence or the 
Amelia Island affair, because he believed the South American patriots were not of the 
same stock as North American Republicans. Adams wrote to a friend, “The resemblance 
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between this Revolution and ours is barely superficial.” He contrasted them as a differing 
in ideology and content, he claimed “ours was a war of freeman, for political 
Independence—this is a war of slaves against their master.” In some ways Adams was 
right. The Amelia Island Republic was different from the one in the United States. It was 
a critique of it.  
 Although short lived, the Amelia Island Republic reveals the promise and limits 
of the Age of Revolutions. The significance of the Amelia Island republic was the social 
and political commentary underlying each election, each proclamation. The republic on 
Amelia Island offered a powerful critique of the tensions, the conflicts, and the issues that 
still plagued republicanism in the early nineteenth century, like the racial paradigms and a 
social hierarchies handed down and jealously guarded from the colonial era. In its place, 
the Amelia Island revolutionaries envisioned its mirror image, a world where indigenous 
men rose to positions of power, where plantations burned to the ground, and where the 
“refuse of all nations” decided elections. Unfortunately, the United States military 
invaded the Amelia Island Republic and set into motion the process of acquiring and 
incorporating Florida into the United States. Pazos Kanki, after defending Amelia Island 
before the Congress of the United States, would once again try to create his vision of 
republicanism, this time, back in his homeland: Alto Peru. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION  
 
 After fifteen long years of fighting, the community of San Pedro de Buena Vista, 
a community in Northern Potosi, was ready to celebrate. Men and women from Alto Peru 
had fought and struggled to gain political independence over the course of two decades 
and were now enjoying the completion of their struggle. So, on the 9 December 1826, the 
community organized a fiesta to celebrate the victory of Ayacucho, the battle which 
guaranteed the independence of South America. The day-long celebration included “a 
concert…in a gallery before the priest’s house,” where citizens could listen to music that 
celebrated the Bolivian nation. After the concert, citizens watched “a procession of 
notables” pass through the city streets, performing for the onlookers, where observers 
heard “a charming alternation of music.” The ceremony concluded with “various sonatas 
offered by the children of Manco Capac,” the indigenous majority of Northern Potosi, 
who performed a tribute to the Republic that they had helped to found. The citizens of 
San Pedro de Buena Vista commemorated, through song and pageantry, their long and 
winding path to create an independent republic.447 
 From 1809 to 1825, men and women in the valley region of what is today Bolivia 
fought against the Spanish colonial project, and in the process helped to shape political 
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debates not only in South America but the broader Atlantic. Some, like those in 
community of San Pedro de Buena Vista, grew up in the same region as the crown jewel 
of the Spanish colonial system—Sucre and Potosi. They fought in small republiquetas to 
help found a new nation that they could help to shape. Others from the region, like Jaime 
Zudáñez and Bernardo Monteagudo, helped the independence struggle from afar, 
traveling to present-day Peru and Argentina to fight in safer settings to ensure 
independence was achieved. What the revolutionaries formed was not perfect, but it was 
worth celebrating. Alto Peruvians had tossed off the yoke of Spanish colonialism and had 
created something of their own, something they could continue to modify and improve 
through their own participatory democracy. The citizens of San Pedro de Buena vista 
were celebrating the blood, toil, sweat, and tears that were required to form the Bolivian 
nation, and they were envisioning how they might continue to make it better. 
 The Bolivian republic was the ultimate outcome of the efforts of the multi-ethnic 
revolutionaries, like Pazos Kanki, Azurduy, and Vargas, but in the process of forming 
their own nation, Alto-Peruvians helped to shape broader political debates. These 
chasquis of liberty traveled countless miles and debated the precepts of the Age of 
Revolutions that encompassed Latin America, Europe, and the Atlantic World in the 
early nineteenth century. Through their travels, they connected disparate struggles for 
independence and made hemispheric republicanism a reality by forming alliances with 
other nation states’ leaders. Revolutionaries like Pazos Kanki, envisioned an inclusive 
republicanism that stood in contrast to other republics in the Atlantic World that defended 
slavery and racial exclusion during the independence struggle. After the war was over, 
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and a republican state was formed, the chasquis of liberty continued their fight to expand 
liberty in South America.  
 
Defining the Bolivian Nation 
 Bolivians formally proclaimed independence on August 6, 1825, with the help of 
outside military aid from Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre. Bolívar and Sucre, 
both creoles from Northern South America, defeated Spanish forces in present-day 
Venezuela and Colombia and then turned to the last strongholds of the Spanish Colonial 
Army in Peru and Bolivia. In the Andean region, guerrilla warfare had pitted royalists 
against a growing number of independence fighters and left the region in a state of 
deadlocked civil war. Pro-Independence forces in Bolivia joined in with Bolívar’s forces 
and decisively defeated the royalist forces on 9 December 1824 in the Battle of 
Ayacucho, effectively ending any possibility that the royalist would be able to hold on to 
the colonies for the Spanish Crown. Sucre continued his liberation march and defeated 
the last strongholds of royalist support in Alto Peru. With the royalist defeated, Alto 
Peruvians, with their war-time allies Bolívar and Sucre, began forming a nation in their 
own image.448 
 In 1826, Bolivian citizens and Bolívar designed a constitution that had both 
forward thinking and troubling elements. Like many of the newly formed nations in the 
Age of Revolutions, Bolivia was defined as “a popular Representative Government” 
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where “sovereignty emanates from the people.”449 From the opening of the wars for 
independence in 1809, popular actors, like Francisco Rios, had demanded this type of 
participatory democracy, where they were allowed to shape the political future of their 
region. The constitution outlined that the popularly-elected government would then be 
“divided into four sections: Electoral, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,” with each 
power acting as a check against the power of the other branches of the government, 
hoping to prevent the abuse of power that was common in monarchical governments.450 
Like their fellow-republics in the United States, Haiti, and South America, Bolivians 
would now have popular sovereignty, instead of being ruled by a European empire.  
The 1826 Constitution defined the Bolivian nation and its citizenship in a 
comparatively inclusive manner, stating that Bolivia would be a “popular representative 
government” and that citizenship included “all natives of the Territory of the Republic” 
and “all those who, up to the present day, have been slaves, and who are de facto made 
free.”451 These men and women were guaranteed all civil rights available in the new 
republic. This inclusive definition of citizenship was a central goal through many of the 
struggles of the chasquis of liberty, including Vicente Pazos Kanki and Bernardo 
Monteagudo, but it stopped short of extending voting rights to all. The 1826 Constitution 
required that voters be literate, at least twenty-one years old, and have some form of 
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occupation that makes them financially independent, effectively putting class restrictions 
on the electorate.  
Initially, the new Bolivian Republic also re-organized its method of tax collection. 
Indigenous communities had long demanded the abolition of indigenous tribute 
collection, and they had made major gains in getting both revolutionary and royalist 
forces to promise the abolition of the mita labor draft during the decades of warfare. In 
the early republican period, national leaders, like Bolivar, realized they could not 
immediately restore tribute labor. As one commenter noted, “many of the principal 
sources of revenue resorted to by the old government, would cease, as being oppressive 
and unpopular.”452 So, Bolivar and the Bolivian Republic mandated that “the Indian 
tribute was abolished , monopolies done away, duties on imports and exports diminished, 
the alcavala reduced to a simple tax on retailers.”453 Indigenous tribute was later 
reinstated in the early republican period, underlining the contested and debated nature of 
the early republic.  
The early period of the Bolivian nation was defined by turbulence, with multiple 
competing factions trying to make and remake the republic in their own image. Bolivar 
shortly served as the first president of the Bolivian Republic, but was quickly replaced by 
his close friend Sucre. Sucre’s time in power was short lived and Bolivia would go on to 
have six presidents in their first five years as a new republic. During this period, 
Bolivians continued to experiment with their preferred method of organizing the 
government, and often, conservative factions gained political control, so like many 
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revolutions—including those in the United States, France, and Haiti—not all the hopes 
and dreams were immediately achieved in the republican period. But the republican 
infrastructure offered popular classes a different way to engage with and shape their 
political future.454 
Chasquis of Liberty and their Paths 
 During this turbulent period, the chasquis of liberty continued to find a variety of 
ways to shape the Bolivian nation and other newly-formed republics. Even though the 
pro-revolutionary factions won the wars for independence, their work was not done. They 
continued to fight to improve the governments that they helped to create. Some stayed in 
what was Alto Peru and lived in the nation they helped to form. Others attempted to 
shape the political futures of other nations in South America as national leaders, 
diplomats, or citizens. Often they were competing against a new opponent—no longer 
Royalist, but those who hoped to limit the revolutionary changes in the republican period. 
So ardent revolutionaries, like the chasquis of liberty, continued to fight for the ideas that 
showed the possibilities of the Age of Revolutions.   
José Manuel de Goyeneche, who was put in charge of announcing the news of the 
French invasion of Spain, remained a loyal follower of the Spanish crown, but was 
quickly replaced as Spain’s political and military leader of South America. After relaying 
the news of Napoleon’s invasion, Goyeneche became the key royalist figure trying to 
maintain a state of order in Alto Peru. After early riots, like the one in Chuquisaca on 
May 25, 1809, Goyeneche assumed a military role and fought against the growing 
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military presence in the region and the forces arriving from the Viceroyalty of Rio de La 
Plata. He struggled to maintain political order and lost a number of decisive battles, 
including the Battle of Tucuman in 1812 and the Battle of Salta in 1813. Along with 
losing battles, Goyeneche lost the confidence of the Spanish crown. The Spanish replaced 
Goyeneche with Joaquín de la Pezuela y Sánchez as the military and political leader of 
Alto Peru, ultimately an impossible mission with the rise of independence beliefs and 
forces. Goyeneche returned to Spain and lived out his life in the Spanish royal court. 455 
Francisco Rios, the leader of the May 25, 1809 riot in Chuquisaca, drifted into 
obscurity after helping to start the wars for independence in South America. Like many 
members of the popular classes, Rios did not reappear in either the colonial or national 
records after his actions in the Chuquisaca riot.456 Rios testified about his actions in 
colonial courts in Oruro a few months after the riot, where he defended his actions by 
claiming to be a loyal supporter of the crown and suggesting alcohol contributed to his 
actions.457 With the current records, it is unknown whether Rios took an active part in 
other moments of the independence record, but numerous other rioters played important 
parts in the later battles of the wars for independence—including Jaime Zudáñez who 
went on to campaign for independence in Chile and later became a political 
representative in congresses in Uruguay. 
                                                           
455 See chapter 1. 
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Bernardo Monteagudo, the revolutionary journalist of African descent, continued 
to fight for his vision of Latin American nationalism after the wars after revolutionaries 
won the wars for independence. During the wars for independence, he helped to promote 
the idea of republicanism in Buenos Aires and Chuquisaca, and revolutionaries spread his 
writings throughout South America. His most famous document, known simply as the 
Dialogue, helped to sway public opinion in Chuquisaca in favor of independence, and 
foretold the importance of Inca imagery in Andean nationalism.458 After the conclusion 
of fighting, Monteagudo traveled throughout much of South and Central America, 
including Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. Ultimately, Monteagudo became an 
early national leader of Peru. There, he advocated for a “general federation between 
Hispano-American states,” helped to design the political structure of Peru, and became a 
close ally of Simón Bolívar.459 Monteagudo, unfortunately, was unable to see his plans 
put into effect. He was assassinated in January 1825 in a plot by a number of 
conservative Peruvians who felt Monteagudo’s reforms were too hasty.460 Monteagudo, 
like many others striving for political independence, lost his own life for his political 
cause.  
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While many of the revolutionaries who helped Bolivia gain independence ended 
up leaving the nation, others stayed in the region and celebrated their independence. 
Juana Azurduy, the mestiza woman who fought alongside her husband, Manuel Padilla, 
in small rebel enclaves, called Republiquetas, continued living in Bolivia after 
independence. She survived the frequent battles with royalist forces in a region which 
was prioritized by the Spanish and resulted in constant warfare over nearly two decades. 
After the war, she slipped into obscurity, living out her life in the same valley region that 
she had fought for during the wars for independence.461 Another republiqueta veteran, 
José Santos Vargas, also survived the front lines of the independence wars and lived out 
his life in the town of Mohosa, Bolivia. Vargas enthusiastically supported the new 
republican Bolivia, and even wrote a diary of his time fighting in the independence wars. 
He submitted it to Bolivian officials and suggested that his diary “could be, in a great 
way, useful to the clarification and writing of our national history.”462 For Vargas, 
political independence was not a continuation of the colonial past—a mirage of 
transition—but a tangible reminder of what he had fought for in the early nineteenth 
century.  
Finally, Vicente Pazos Kanki, the indigenous, priest-turned-revolutionary, went 
on to assume a place in the diplomatic corps of the early Bolivian and Argentinian 
nations. After his exile from South America for his ardent support of republicanism, 
Pazos Kanki traveled throughout the Americas and Europe seeking to find international 
support for Latin American independence. His most extreme measure was trying to 
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liberate Florida and creating a nation with multi-ethnic citizenship. While his vision for a 
Republican Florida was short lived, Pazos Kanki drew attention to the independence 
struggles and his allies in South America ultimately prevailed.463 After independence, 
Pazos Kanki appointed himself ambassador for the United Provinces of South America—
his vision for a federal alliance between all the newly-formed states in South America—
and he resided in London.464 As a diplomat, Pazos Kanki negotiated  with European 
nations and reveals the opportunities the wars for independence created for visionaries 
like Pazos Kanki, who rose out of an indigenous village to become an international 
diplomat.
.   
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